Young Broths. v. Longshore and Warehouse
| Decision Date | 11 March 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-00452 DAE-BMK.,02-00452 DAE-BMK. |
| Citation | 250 F.Supp.2d 1244 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii |
| Parties | YOUNG BROTHERS, LTD., Plaintiff, v. INTERNATIONAL LONGSHORE AND WAREHOUSE UNION, LOCAL 142; Tyrone Tahara; John Does 1-10; Doe Corporations 1-10; and Doe Partnerships 1-10, Defendants. |
Ernest C. Moore, III, Paul M. Saito, Torkildson Katz Fonseca Jaffe, Moore & Hetherington, Honolulu, HI, for Young Brothers, Ltd., plaintiff.
Herbert R. Takahashi, Stanford H. Masui, Danny J. Vasconcellos, Rebecca L. Covert, Takahashi Masui & Vasconcellos, Honolulu, HI, for International Longshore and Warehouse Union, Local 142, Tyrone Tahara, John Does 1-10, Doe Corporations 1-10, Doe Partnerships 1-10, defendants.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFEDANTS'MOTION TO DISMISS
The court heard Defendants' Motion on March 10, 2003. Paul M. Saito, Esq., appeared on behalf of Plaintiff; Stanford H. Masui, Esq., appeared on behalf of Defendants. After reviewing the motion and the supporting and opposing memoranda, the court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Complaint for Lack of Jurisdiction and Failure to State a Claim ("Motion").
Young Brothers, Ltd. ("Plaintiff) provides inter-island shipping and transportation services. Its principal office is in Honolulu, Hawaii, and during the last calendar year, it attests to grossing in excess of one million dollars in revenue and to purchasing goods or services either directly or indirectly from suppliers or manufacturers located outside Hawaii in excess of one million dollars. The International Longshore and Warehouse Union, Local 142 ("Defendant ILWU") is a union governed by the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") and Tyrone Tahara ("Defendant Tahara") is a business agent of Defendant ILWU.
In its Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the no-strike clause of the Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") between Plaintiff and Defendant ILWU. In addition to the express no-strike provision set forth in Article 23 of the CBA, the CBA included an express grievance procedure provision for employees that would culminate in final, binding arbitration of all disputes between the parties. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to pursue any grievances they had under this provision.
Plaintiff claims that at approximately 9:20 a.m. on February 8, 2002, Defendants caused an illegal work stoppage when Defendant Tahara came onto Plaintiffs property and instructed Plaintiffs employees to cease working. Employees were allegedly prevented from obeying management's order to return to work because Defendant Tahara placed himself in the path of their forklifts. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Tahara's actions caused a work stoppage and production slow down that lasted two hours.
To compensate for the delays and disruptions caused to Plaintiffs business operations, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185, for violation of a contract between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce. Plaintiff also seeks compensation for damages resulting from Defendants' tortious interference with Plaintiffs contractual relations with its customers. Finally, Plaintiff seeks an injunction against Defendants ILWU and Tahara admonishing them to abide by the CBA and preventing them from participating in future work stoppages.
Defendants filed this Motion to Dismiss ("Motion") on December 16, 2002. Plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendants' Motion ("Opposition") on February 20, 2003. Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition ("Reply") was filed on February 27, 2003.
When considering whether to grant or deny a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim, this court must consider the precedent set forth pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 12(b)"). Rule 12(b) allows the consideration at the pre-trial stage of any defense, objection, or request "which is capable of determination without the trial of the general issue." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b).
A motion to dismiss is generally "capable of determination" before trial "if it involves questions of law rather than fact." See United States v. Shortt Accountancy Corp., 785 F.2d 1448, 1452 (9th Cir. 1986). Although the court may make preliminary findings of fact necessary to decide the legal questions presented by the motion, the court may not "invade the province of the ultimate finder of fact." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted.)
A motion to dismiss will be granted where Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears to a certainty that Plaintiff "would be entitled to no relief under any set of facts that could be proved." Fidelity Fin. Corp. v. Federal Home Loan Bank, 792 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir.1986), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 1064, 107 S.Ct. 949, 93 L.Ed.2d 998 (1987). All allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 753-54 (9th Cir.1994).
This court is not required to accept as true legal conclusions presented as factual allegations if those conclusions cannot be drawn reasonably from the allegations. Bergquist v. County of Cochise, 806 F.2d 1364, 1369 (9th Cir.1986). Also, failure to delineate a cognizable legal theory should result in dismissal. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1990).
Defendants petition this court to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint on three grounds: (1) the court lacks jurisdiction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act to issue an injunction because Plaintiff has not resorted to arbitration and the claim is moot; (2) Plaintiff is required, but has failed to exhaust contractual remedies that are identical to the relief requested in its Complaint; and (3) Plaintiffs state tort claims are preempted under Section 301 of the LMRA. In addition, Defendants argue that this court must dismiss the charges filed against Defendant Tahara in his individual capacity.
Plaintiff responds to Defendants' Motion by arguing that jurisdiction to pursue claims for monetary damages and injunctive relief against future work stoppages exists under 29 U.S.C. § 185. Plaintiff also rejects Defendants' argument that dismissal is appropriate because Plaintiff did not submit its claims to arbitration. Plaintiff argues that the CBA does not expressly require arbitration and thus, it is not Plaintiffs exclusive remedy.
Plaintiff also briefly addresses Defendants' assertion that Plaintiffs tortious interference claims are preempted by the LMRA. It maintains that an alleged interference with contract and prospective advantages does not require an interpretation of the CBA and therefore, a state claim for damages is not precluded by Section 301 of LMRA. Plaintiff also argues that suit against Defendant Tahara is appropriate because the reason for the work stoppage could be found to be outside the CBA and/or Defendant Tahara may be found to have been acting in his individual capacity. Plaintiff argues that neither Defendant ILWU nor Defendant Tahara have protection from suits under the LMRA.
Plaintiff argues that under 29 U.S.C. § 185 it has jurisdiction to pursue a civil action for damages arising from Defendant ILWU's alleged breach of the no-strikes provision in the CBA. The plain text of this statute reads:
Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter and any employer whose activities affect commerce as defined in this chapter shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts of the United States.
29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (emphasis added).
In support of its argument, Plaintiff cites case law from the Seventh Circuit that is factually and legally on point with respect to an employer's right to refuse to arbitrate and instead to pursue legal action in a federal district court, especially if the union has violated the no-strike provision. Faultless Division v. Local Lodge No.20^0 of District 153, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 513 F.2d 987 (7th Cir.1975); Cuneo Press, Inc. v. Kokomo Paper Handlers' Union No. 3b, 235 F.2d 108 (7th Cir.1956). It also cites two Supreme Court opinions that set forth the general proposition that the federal district courts have jurisdiction to hear civil suits against unions. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 101 S.Ct. 1836, 68 L.Ed.2d 248 (1981).
Defendants do not respond directly to Plaintiffs assertion that the failure of the union to abide by the no-strike clause makes it liable in damages for its action. Although the case law clearly allows employers to sue a union for damages, the specific terms of the contract govern the circumstances under which such a suit is appropriate. Defendants argue that Articles 30 and 36 of the CBA at issue in this case preclude a suit for damages at this time.
In this Motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs Complaint must be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to comply with Article 30 of the CBA, which Defendants assert mandates that Plaintiff follow a specific grievance procedure in lieu of, or, at least prior to pursuing a civil action in federal district court. Plaintiff, however, argues that the clear terms of the provision do not require that it abide by the grievance procedure. Rather, the text refers explicitly to an employee's obligation to follow the grievance...
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