Young, Matter of, 60S00-8707-DI-687

Decision Date27 November 1989
Docket NumberNo. 60S00-8707-DI-687,60S00-8707-DI-687
PartiesIn the Matter of Eugene V. YOUNG, Jr.
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

Eugene V. Young, pro se.

Linda K. Barnard, Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Comm'n, Indianapolis, for the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Com'n.

PER CURIAM.

This attorney disciplinary proceeding was initiated by the filing of a verified single-count complaint by the Disciplinary Commission of this Court. The Respondent, Eugene V. Young, Jr., has been charged with engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation and engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation, respectively, with Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4) and (5). Pursuant to the procedures set forth under Admission and Discipline Rule 23, a Hearing Officer was appointed, a hearing was held, and the Hearing Officer has tendered to this Court his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

The Hearing Officer has offered a recommendation as to the appropriate sanction to be imposed in this proceeding, to which the Disciplinary Commission objects. In response to the Disciplinary Commission's objection, the Respondent urges this Court to accept the recommended sanction or, in the alternative, provide a full review of all aspects of this case.

This Court's review in a disciplinary proceeding involves a de novo examination of all matters presented for consideration. In re Hampton (1989), Ind., 533 N.E.2d 122. Unless challenged, however the findings of the Hearing Officer establish the factual basis upon which the allegations of misconduct are measured. In re Sekerez (1984), Ind., 458 N.E.2d 229. Admission and Discipline Rule 23, Section 15(c), requires a party in a petition for review to set forth the alleged erroneous factual findings and provide a transcript of the proceedings containing all testimony in support of such contention. In that such petition or transcript has not been provided, the Hearing Officer's factual findings establish our basis of analysis. In re Long (1986), Ind., 486 N.E.2d 1031; In re Sekerez, Supra. This does not mean, however, that this Court is required to accept the conclusions of law predicated on these findings or any recommended sanction. In re Long, Supra; In re Crumpacker (1978), 269 Ind. 630, 383 N.E.2d 36.

Employing the above described process of review, we now find that in January, 1985, the Respondent was consulted concerning the filing of a bankruptcy petition. At that time, the Respondent was paid $160.00; $100.00 was to be considered as a retainer and $60.00 was to be used as the filing fee. It was understood by the client that the total fee would be $275.00 and that the full amount would be paid before the final hearing was scheduled in the bankruptcy court. In October, November, and December, 1985, Respondent's client paid twenty dollars each month bringing the total paid fee to $220.00.

Over the next twenty months, this client received numerous demands from creditors and on two occasions received summons for law suits filed by creditors. Prior to September 29, 1986, Respondent advised his client that a creditor's meeting would be held on that date at 11:00 A.M. At the allegedly scheduled time, Respondent met his client in the hall of the Federal Building in Indianapolis, Indiana, and informed her that the meeting had been canceled. Respondent further informed his client that another hearing would be scheduled within thirty days.

Thereafter, Respondent's client telephoned the Bankruptcy Court in Indianapolis and was advised that no bankruptcy petition had ever been filed on her behalf. By a letter dated November 18, 1986, the client requested that the fees paid to date be returned. On January 22, 1987, Respondent's client filed a suit against the Respondent in the Monroe Superior Court, Small Claims Division, and was eventually awarded a judgment in the...

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9 cases
  • Thrasher, Matter of
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • February 12, 1996
    ...neither party seeks this Court's review of such findings, we accept and adopt them. In re Huebner, 561 N.E.2d 492 (Ind.1990), In re Young, 546 N.E.2d 819 (Ind.1989). Within this review process, we now find that the respondent was admitted to the bar of this state in 1978. In 1991, the respo......
  • Kinney, Matter of
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • October 8, 1996
    ...The review process employed in disciplinary matters entails a de novo examination of all matters presented for consideration. In re Young, 546 N.E.2d 819 (Ind.1989). This Court remains the ultimate fact-finder and final arbiter of misconduct and sanction. In re Geisler, 614 N.E.2d 939 (Ind.......
  • Garringer, Matter of
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • January 10, 1994
    ...and fully briefed his position. This Court's review in disciplinary cases is de novo, and we examine all matters presented. In re Young (1989), Ind., 546 N.E.2d 819. Our review is of the entire record tendered in the case, including the Hearing Officer's findings and conclusions, which are ......
  • Manns, Matter of
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • October 21, 1997
    ...The review process employed in disciplinary matters entails a de novo examination of all matters presented for consideration. In re Young, 546 N.E.2d 819 (Ind.1989). This Court remains the ultimate fact finder and final arbiter of misconduct and sanction. In re Geisler, 614 N.E.2d 939 (Ind.......
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