Young v. Barker, Docket No. 76767

Citation405 N.W.2d 395,158 Mich.App. 709
Decision Date14 May 1987
Docket NumberDocket No. 76767
PartiesDarlene YOUNG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mark BARKER, Robert Dossetto, M. Killem, S. Klebanowski, City of Detroit, William Hart, Gary Blanchard, Detective Facemyer, City of Sterling Heights, Maurice Foltz, William Hackel, Gerald L. Hough, and Macomb County, jointly and severally, Defendants-Appellees. 158 Mich.App. 709, 405 N.W.2d 395
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan (US)

[158 MICHAPP 713] Gregory T. Zalecki, Troy, for plaintiff-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., and Ronald W. Emery, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Mark Barker.

Donald Pailen, Corp. Counsel, and William L. Woodard and Linda D. Fegins, Asst. Corp. Counsels, Detroit, for the City of Detroit, Officer James Klebanowski and Police Chief William Hart.

Tyler & Thayer, P.C. by William J. Liedel, Detroit, for the City of Sterling Heights, Gary Blanchard, Detective Facemyer and Maurice Foltz.

Before BRONSON, P.J., and GRIBBS and CLEMENTS, * JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff, Darlene Young, filed suit against defendants for alleged injuries arising out of her arrest of July 31, 1978. Plaintiff advanced claims of negligence, gross negligence, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, constitutional rights violations, assault and battery, intentional infliction of mental distress, invasion of privacy and abuse of process. Certain orders of disposition are presently on appeal before this Court: (1) the trial court's dismissal of all counts against the City of Detroit, Police Chief Hart and Officer Klebanowski and the negligence counts against defendants Barker, the City of Sterling Heights, Blanchard, Foltz and Facemyer upon motion for summary judgment on March 4, 1983; (2) the trial court's dismissal of all remaining counts against defendant Barker upon a directed verdict at the close of [158 MICHAPP 714] plaintiff's opening statement at trial; and (3) the trial court's dismissal of all remaining counts against defendants City of Sterling Heights, Blanchard, Foltz and Facemyer upon a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's proofs. Plaintiff appeals as of right.

This case arises out of the arrest of plaintiff on July 31, 1978. On that date, plaintiff and Wilda Watkins were stopped by State Troopers Mark Barker and Robert Dossetto on an expressway in Detroit at 12:00 or 1:00 a.m. Plaintiff, who was driving, was stopped on a traffic offense: the license plate on the car was wired on. Plaintiff did not have an operator's license and she was unable to show the troopers the car's registration. Plaintiff then falsely identified herself as Wilda Watkins, giving the troopers Watkins' driver's license. The troopers ran a LEIN check and told plaintiff that there were outstanding warrants on the Watkins name. Plaintiff then gave the troopers her correct name, at which point the troopers ran another LEIN check and discovered that there were outstanding warrants in plaintiff's correct name, Darlene Young, for loitering, failure to appear in court and prostitution. Plaintiff's passenger identified herself to the troopers as Mary Staples and plaintiff did not inform the troopers that her passenger was, in fact, Wilda Watkins.

Plaintiff testified that she thought she was taken to State Police Headquarters and later to a City of Detroit facility. When she was fingerprinted, she signed the card as Darlene Young. She testified that the troopers never mistreated her or used physical force against her. Next, she was taken to Sterling Heights and identified as Wilda Watkins (even though she told police that she was in fact Darlene Young). When she was arraigned, she informed the judge of her correct identity, but the [158 MICHAPP 715] judge held her over. At a second court hearing, bond was set and defendant was placed in the Macomb County Jail. Defendant remained in jail until the charges were dismissed in October, 1978.

Defendant further testified that a Detroit police matron knew who she was. She stated that she was allowed to make a phone call while at the Detroit facility and that she called her boyfriend. When she was taken to Sterling Heights she was again given the opportunity to make a phone call. She was represented by counsel at the second court hearing on August 14. Her attorney asked for an adjournment of the preliminary examination and requested a lineup. On September 19, her bond was reduced to a personal bond, but she was taken to Roseville for charges under the name of Shirley Williams. She pled guilty to a larceny charge and was sentenced to sixty-three days in jail. She had a birth certificate at her home which could have been presented but which plaintiff did not produce. Plaintiff has used at least sixteen different names in the past.

Plaintiff brought counts of negligence and gross negligence, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, constitutional rights violations, assault and battery, intentional infliction of mental distress, invasion of the right to privacy and abuse of process against all of the named defendants. State Trooper Barker's partner at the arrest, Robert Dossetto, was not timely served with a summons and complaint and, therefore, is not a party on appeal. Defendant Gerald Hough was dismissed as a party upon stipulation.

On March 4, 1983, three separate motions for summary judgment were brought. Defendant Barker argued that plaintiff was arrested for driving without a license, driving with an improperly fixed license plate and with no registration and, [158 MICHAPP 716] therefore, he acted within the scope of his employment in arresting her. Barker argued that governmental immunity applied to the negligence and gross negligence counts. As to the intentional tort claims, Barker argued that there was probable cause to arrest and that he was exercising his privilege to so act as long as he was exercising the legal right to arrest in a proper way. Plaintiff countered by arguing that although Barker had a right to pull plaintiff over, he intentionally misidentified plaintiff to the Detroit Police Department. She argued that there was a question of fact as to whether Barker intentionally misidentified her to punish her for falsely identifying herself.

The City of Detroit defendants, including the city, Chief Hart and Officer Klebanowski, requested summary judgment, arguing that when plaintiff was booked, Klebanowski relied upon the information given by the arresting officer as proper department procedure. Further, plaintiff was booked under the name Darlene Young, also known as Wilda Watkins, and released the next morning to the Sterling Heights Police Department. Plaintiff basically countered by arguing that Officer Klebanowski intentionally misidentified plaintiff or failed to investigate her claim that she was not Wilda Watkins.

The Sterling Heights defendants argued that they were immune because the city and the chief of police are entitled to absolute immunity and the officers are immune because of the district court's actions at the arraignment when plaintiff informed the court that she was not Wilda Watkins. The Sterling Heights police had probable cause under the circumstances to represent to the court that plaintiff was in fact Wilda Watkins and the court's decision not to release her took away the Sterling Heights defendants' power. Plaintiff argued [158 MICHAPP 717] that the Sterling Heights detectives failed to investigate plaintiff's claim of mistaken identity which could have been established by a fingerprint check or handwriting analysis. According to plaintiff, they had knowledge that they had the wrong person. However, plaintiff did concede at the motion for summary judgment hearing that the municipalities were immune as to the negligence counts.

The trial court dismissed all counts against the City of Detroit, William Hart, and Officer Klebanowski. The court granted summary judgment to defendant Barker as to the negligence counts, finding that Barker made a legal arrest. However, the court denied summary judgment as to the intentional tort counts, finding that there might be a question of fact as to the intentional tort claims.

Following plaintiff's opening statement at trial, all the remaining defendants moved for a directed verdict. Defendant Barker argued that on the facts set forth in plaintiff's opening statement Barker had probable cause to arrest plaintiff and that the privilege of making a lawful arrest is a defense against plaintiff's remaining claims. The Sterling Heights defendants argued that a directed verdict should be granted because once plaintiff was taken before the district court for arraignment their liability was cut off.

The trial court granted defendant Barker's motion for directed verdict upon the culmination of plaintiff's opening statement and denied it as to the Sterling Heights defendants. However, after the close of plaintiff's proofs, a directed verdict for the remaining defendants was granted on a finding that there was no unlawful restraint and that the entire incident was triggered by plaintiff's own statements and conduct. The court found that the officers' actions were supported by probable cause.

[158 MICHAPP 718] We first review plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred in dismissing the negligence claims against State Trooper Barker upon motion for summary judgment. The trial court did not specify in either its order or at the hearing upon which subsection of the summary judgment rule judgment was granted. Our review of the proceedings leads us to conclude that the trial court did not dismiss the negligence claims against Barker on the basis of governmental immunity, but rather on the basis that the court found no negligence. We have determined that summary judgment was properly granted under GCR 1963, 117.2(3), now MCR 2.116(C)(10), no genuine issue of material fact, and that from a careful reading of the trial court's...

To continue reading

Request your trial
26 cases
  • People v. Davis
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • June 14, 2002
    ...203, 481 N.W.2d 3 (1991) (vehicle stopped after it was discovered the license plate belonged to another vehicle); Young v. Barker, 158 Mich.App. 709, 714, 405 N.W.2d 395 (1987) (LEIN check performed when vehicle stopped on highway and the plaintiff did not have a license); People v. Bell, 7......
  • Hickey v. Zezulka
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • July 27, 1989
    ...if the trial court, in its discretion, determines that the suit was vexatious, frivolous or brought to harass. Young v. Barker, 158 Mich.App. 709, 726, 405 N.W.2d 395 (1987), lv. den. 429 Mich. 857 The trial court properly denied defendants' petition because plaintiff's action was not vexat......
  • Moher v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan
    • June 8, 2012
    ...*3 (Mich.Ct.App. Oct. 31, 2006); Brassell v. Laban, 2006 WL 782163, *3 (Mich.Ct.App. March 28, 2006); Young v. Barker, 158 Mich.App. 709, 405 N.W.2d 395, 402 (Mich.Ct.App.1987); White v. City of Vassar, 157 Mich.App. 282, 403 N.W.2d 124, 130 (Mich.Ct.App.1987); Brewer, 349 N.W.2d at 202. Th......
  • Lanman v. Hinson
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan
    • August 10, 2006
    ...Michigan law, an officer may use such force as is reasonably necessary to effect a lawful arrest or seizure. Young v. Barker, 158 Mich.App. 709, 405 N.W.2d 395, 402 (1987). If an officer uses reasonable force then his actions in making a lawful seizure are justified. Id. On the other hand, ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT