Young v. Beck
Citation | 231 P.3d 940,224 Ariz. 408 |
Decision Date | 20 May 2010 |
Docket Number | No. 1 CA-CV 09-0188.,1 CA-CV 09-0188. |
Parties | Amy YOUNG, Plaintiff/Appellee,v.Kenneth L. BECK and Barbara Beck, husband and wife, Defendants/Appellants. |
Court | Court of Appeals of Arizona |
Beale, Micheaels & Slack, P.C. By K. Thomas Slack and Tracy A. Gromer, Phoenix, Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee.
Diane M. Lucas, P.C. By Diane M. Lucas and Michael S. Ferraro, Phoenix, Ehmann DeCiancio, PLLC, By Christopher Robbins, Tempe, Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants.
¶ 1 Jason Beck, driving a vehicle furnished by his parents, Barbara and Kenneth Beck (the “Becks”), was involved in a car accident resulting in serious injuries to Amy Young. The question presented here is whether the Becks are liable for damages allegedly caused by their son's negligence based on the family purpose doctrine. For the following reasons, we hold that the Becks are liable for Jason's negligence, notwithstanding he drove the vehicle contrary to parental restrictions.
¶ 2 Jason, age seventeen at the time of the accident, was driving a car provided by his parents. Mrs. Beck had given Jason permission to drive from his place of employment to his friend's house to spend the night. After arriving at his friend's house, Jason was joined by more friends; Jason drove as he and his friends participated in “egging” houses and parked vehicles. Later that evening, after dropping off a member of the group at her home, Jason collided with a vehicle driven by Young.
¶ 3 Jason had been involved in another accident about a month earlier. As a result, the Becks placed restrictions on his driving privileges. Jason was permitted to drive the car to school, church, or work, but was prohibited from serving as a “taxi service” for his friends or their girlfriends. These “restrictions” were in place at the time Jason caused the car accident involving Young.
¶ 4 Young sued Jason for damages based on his alleged negligent conduct in causing the accident. The complaint also named the Becks as defendants, alleging they were liable for Jason's negligence under the family purpose doctrine because Jason was driving a car furnished to him by his parents for his pleasure and convenience, with their implied or express consent. Both parties moved for summary judgment on the applicability of the family purpose doctrine. Following oral argument, the court ruled in favor of Young. The court framed the issue as whether the family purpose doctrine applies when “a parent has specifically prohibited a particular use of a vehicle” and the “liability [was] incurred while using the vehicle for the particular use and purpose that was prohibited.” The court summarized Arizona law relating to the family purpose doctrine and then explained its resolution of the issue:
¶ 5 The parties subsequently entered into a “high-low” settlement agreement, providing a range of damages to be paid from the Becks to Young depending on whether the trial court's summary judgment ruling is affirmed or reversed on appeal. Based on the pleadings and the argument of counsel, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Young and the Becks timely appealed.
¶ 6 Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We view the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw any inferences reasonably derived from the facts in favor of that party. Angus Med. Co. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 173 Ariz. 159, 162, 840 P.2d 1024, 1027 (App.1992). In determining whether any genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the trial court erred in applying the law, our review is de novo. Eller Media Co. v. City of Tucson, 198 Ariz. 127, 130, ¶ 4, 7 P.3d 136, 139 (App.2000).
¶ 7 The family purpose doctrine was adopted by the Arizona Supreme Court in 1919, when the court addressed whether a father could be held liable for his son's negligent operation of an automobile. Benton v. Regeser, 20 Ariz. 273, 278, 179 P. 966, 968 (1919). Bryan, the minor son, had driven his sisters to church in a family vehicle and then traveled to another church to find his brother. Id. at 275, 179 P. at 967. Unable to locate his brother, Bryan was driving home alone when he collided with a man riding a bicycle. Id. at 274-75, 179 P. at 966-67. The injured man sued Bryan for damages based on negligent operation of the car. Id. at 274, 179 P. at 966. Bryan's father was also named as a defendant based upon the allegation that Bryan was acting “as an agent” and “in the business” of his father at the time of the accident. Id. The claim against Bryan was dismissed during the trial, but a jury found the father liable. Id. On appeal, our supreme court affirmed the judgment, adopting the rule that a “father who furnishes an automobile for the pleasure and convenience of the members of his family makes the use of the machine ... his affair or business, and that any member of the family driving the machine with the father's consent, either express or implied, is the father's agent.” Id. at 278, 179 P. at 967.
¶ 8 Since Benton, this rule has been referred to as the family purpose doctrine. E.g., Pesqueira v. Talbot, 7 Ariz.App. 476, 480, 441 P.2d 73, 77 (1968). Couched in more modern terminology, the doctrine provides generally that a head of household who furnishes or maintains a vehicle for the use, pleasure, and convenience of the family is liable for the negligence of family members who have the general authority to drive the vehicle while it is used for family purposes. See Jacobson v. Superior Court, 154 Ariz. 430, 431, 743 P.2d 410, 411 (App.1987). The doctrine is an “exception to the general principle that one who permits another to use his automobile does not thereby become liable for that person's negligence in the absence of an agency or employment relationship.” Brown v. Stogsdill, 140 Ariz. 485, 487, 682 P.2d 1152, 1154 (App.1984). The doctrine's “social usefulness is its primary justification; it provides for an injured party's recovery from the financially responsible person-the family head-deemed most able to control to whom the car is made available.” Jacobson, 154 Ariz. at 431, 743 P.2d at 411.
¶ 9 The Becks argue that the family purpose doctrine does not apply when, as in the present case, a minor drives a family car for his own pleasure and convenience in violation of restrictions placed on the use of the car by his parents. The Becks further contend the trial court erred in finding that Jason's use of the car constituted a family purpose, essentially holding them strictly liable for Jason's negligence. In response, Young argues that the family purpose for which the vehicle is used “need be nothing more than the pleasure or convenience of the family member driver.” In other words, Young asserts that even if Jason drove the vehicle in direct violation of restrictions imposed by his parents, his failure to comply does not affect their liability under the doctrine.
¶ 10 Liability under the family purpose doctrine arises when: (1) there is a “family with sufficient unity so that there is a head of the family”; (2) the “vehicle responsible for the injury must have been one ‘furnished’ by the head of the family to a member of the family”; and (3) the “vehicle must have been used on the occasion in question by the family member with the implied or express consent of the head of the family for a family purpose.” Pesqueira, 7 Ariz.App. at 480, 441 P.2d at 77; Brown, 140 Ariz. at 487, 682 P.2d at 1154. Applying the doctrine here, it is undisputed that the Becks were a family of sufficient unity, as they all lived in one household and the Becks provided Jason with room and board. See Pesqueira, 7 Ariz.App. at 480, 441 P.2d at 77 ( ). It is also undisputed that the Becks furnished the car to Jason, as they were the owners of the car and they paid for its maintenance, gas, and insurance. Cf. Blocher v. Thompson, 169 Ariz. 182, 186, 818 P.2d 167, 171 (App.1991) ( ). The only disputed issue is whether Jason drove the car with the implied or express consent of the Becks for a family purpose.
¶ 11 There is no question that Jason had permission to drive on the night of the accident for certain purposes. According to his parents, however, that permission did not extend to the transporting of friends, a restriction imposed as a result of his prior accident. Indeed, the night of the accident Mrs. Beck told Jason that he could only drive the car from work to his friend's home. Thus, he did not have express consent to drive at the time of the accident because he was not given permission to transport friends.
¶ 12 To ascertain whether the Becks gave implied consent, we must determine if Jason drove the car for a family purpose. The...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Young v. Beck
...did not apply because Jason violated their restriction against “transporting of friends.” Young v. Beck, 224 Ariz. 408, 411 ¶ 11, 231 P.3d 940, 943 (App.2010). Alternatively, the Becks contended that the doctrine should be abolished. Id. at 413 ¶ 19, 231 P.3d at 945. The court of appeals re......
-
Alosi v. Hewitt
...authority to drive the vehicle while it is used for family purposes.” Young, 227 Ariz. at 4, ¶ 8, 251 P.3d at 383 (quoting Young v. Beck, 224 Ariz. 408, 410, ¶ 8, 231 P.3d 940, 942 (App.2010)). Thus, the doctrine consists of three elements: “(1) when there is a head of the family, (2) who m......
- City Of Chandler v. Ariz. Dep't Of Transp.