Young v. City of New York

• Decision Date: 16 September 1985
• Citation: 493 N.Y.S.2d 585,113 A.D.2d 833
• Parties: John Wesley YOUNG, et al., Appellants, v. The CITY OF NEW YORK, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 585

493 N.Y.S.2d 585

113 A.D.2d 833

John Wesley YOUNG, et al., Appellants, v. The CITY OF NEW YORK, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department.

Sept. 16, 1985.

David Jaroslawicz, New York City, for appellants.

Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., Corp. Counsel, New York City (Francis F. Caputo and Miriam Skolnik, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

Before MOLLEN, P.J., and BRACKEN, NIEHOFF and RUBIN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County, dated November 9, 1984, which denied their motion for summary judgment as to liability.

Order reversed, on the law, with costs, motion granted, summary judgment is awarded to plaintiffs on the issue of liability, and matter remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for an assessment of damages.

It is undisputed that while plaintiff John Wesley Young was stopped for a red light at an intersection, his auto was struck in the rear by a fire engine owned by defendant City of New York, and operated by William C. Reinhardt, a New York City fireman. Plaintiff Young now claims that he suffered serious physical injuries arising from that occurrence.

When a suit is founded in negligence, ordinarily plaintiff will be entitled to summary judgment only in those cases where "there is no conflict at all in the evidence, the defendant's conduct fell far below any permissible standard of due care, and the plaintiff's conduct * * * was not really involved" (Andre v. Pomeroy, 35 N.Y.2d 361, 365, 362 N.Y.S.2d 131, 320 N.E.2d 853, quoting from 4 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N.Y.Civ.Prac., par 3212.03). Summary judgment, however is not precluded where the facts are undisputed and where, as a matter of law, the conduct of the defendant is negligent.

When a rear-end collision occurs under the circumstances as demonstrated in this case, such collision is sufficient to create a prima facie case of liability on the part of defendant and imposes a duty of explanation with respect to the operator of the offending vehicle (O'Callaghan v. Flitter, App.Div., 493 N.Y.S.2d 28 [2d Dept.1985]; see, Carter v. Castle Elec. Contr. Co., 26 A.D.2d 83, 85, 271 N.Y.S.2d 51). The statements contained in the affidavit of Reinhardt submitted in response to plaintiffs' motion (that he saw plaintiff John Wesley Young's vehicle stopped at the red light, that he applied his brakes at "a normal braking...