Young v. City of Mobile
| Decision Date | 29 October 2014 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-00586 |
| Parties | JERONE YOUNG, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF MOBILE, et al. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama |
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Samuel Jones' Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant Michael Williams' Motion for Summary Judgment, and Defendant City of Mobile's Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting briefs (Docs. 85-86, 8990, and 93-94), Plaintiff Jerone Young's Responses (Docs. 103-105), and the Defendants' replies (Docs. 106-108).
On November 27, 2013, Plaintiff Jerone Young ("Young") commenced this action by filing a complaint against the City of Mobile ("the City"), Police Chief Michael T. Williams ("Williams"), Mayor Samuel L. Jones ("Jones"), and Mayor Sandy Stimpson ("Stimpson"). (Doc. 1). The complaint alleged that the Defendants had violated his due process rights as well as the protections of the Equal Protection clause under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments made actionable by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts One and Four), violated his due process rights under the Alabama Constitution of 1901, Article 1, § § 6, 13, and 22 (Count Two), and violated his liberty interest possessed in his good name and reputation (Count Three). (Doc. 1 at 6-13). Williams answered the complaint on December 30, 2013 (Doc. 18). Jones and the City answered the complaint on January 16,2014 (Docs. 21 and 22). On January 16, 2014, Stimpson filed a motion to dismiss the complaint (Doc. 23) and an answer to the complaint. (Doc. 23). On February 5, 2014, Young filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss Stimpson. (Doc. 27). On February 6, 2014 Young's motion was granted and Stimpson was dismissed as a party. (Doc. 28).
On August 15, 2014, all Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims (Docs. 85, 89, and 93). Young's responses and the Defendants' replies were timely filed, and the motions are now ripe for consideration.
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (Dec. 2010). Rule 56(c) provides as follows:
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.
(2) Objection That a Fact Is Not Supported by Admissible Evidence. A party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.
(3) Materials Not Cited. The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.
(4) Affidavits or Declarations. An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.
FED.R.CIV.P. Rule 56(c) (Dec. 2010). The party seeking summary judgment bears the "initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). If the nonmoving party fails to make "a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof," the moving party is entitled to summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 998-999 (11th Cir. 1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff Jerone Young ("Young") has been a "classified merit system employee" of the Police Department of Defendant City of Mobile ("the City"). (Doc. 1 at 3). Young was employed by the Mobile Police Department as a building maintenance supervisor. (Doc. 105-1 at 31-32) In September 2011, he was charged with conduct unbecoming an employee and failure to be truthful during an investigation. (Id.)
On October 31, 2011, Young received a pre-disciplinary hearing notice from the City. (Doc. 105-1 at 30). The notice advised him of the charges against him and the hearing date on November 9, 2011. (Id.) A hearing took place on November 9, 2011 and in a letter dated November 10, 2011, Young was suspended and demoted from his position effective December 12, 2011. (Doc. 105-1 at 36).
The City operates under a merit system created by state statute and administered by the Mobile County Personnel Board (MCPB). (Doc. 88-1 at 2-5). The state law establishing the merit system, as well as the rules adopted by the MCPB, have certain procedures by which any employee may appeal an adverse employment decision through the independent board which then has full authority to affirm, increase, decrease, or completely reverse any disciplinary action. (Id.). The MCPB rules require that a pre-disciplinary hearing be held within seven (7) days after written notice to the employee (Doc. 105-2 at 3; Doc 105-3 at 17).2
On December 2, 2011, Young filed a timely notice of appeal based on the procedural violations of Rule 14.3(a), arguing that his hearing did not take place within seven days of written notice. Young received notice of the hearing on October 31, 2011 and the hearing occurred on November 9, 2011, which was not within seven days ofOctober 31, 2011. On February 28, 2012, the MCPB heard oral arguments on the matter and on March 13, 2012, the board reversed the City's decision to demote and suspend Young, based on violations of the procedural guidelines of Rule 14.3(a). (Doc. 105-2 at 3-4). Pursuant to a written decision from the MCPB, Young was restored to his position and granted back pay for time missed. (Id.)
On November 27, 2013, Young filed this complaint against the City of Mobile, former Mayor Samuel L. Jones, former Chief of Police Michael T. Williams, and current Mayor Sandy Stimpson.3 Young seeks $500,000 in compensatory damages, punitive damages, $2,500 in attorneys fees incurred as a result of the MCPB hearing, attorneys fees, costs, and expenses resulting from this action, permanent injunction, and any other relief the Court finds appropriate. (Doc. 1 at 14-1 5).
Before turning to its summary judgment analysis, the Court will first address the City's motion to strike the contents of an affidavit (Doc. 105-1) that Young submitted with his reply to the City's motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 109). Though Young included the affidavit with his response to each of the Defendants' motions for summary judgment, only the City has moved to strike. (Doc. 109).
The City contends that the affidavit's contents are improper pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). (Doc. 109 at 1). Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4), "An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competentto testify on the matters stated." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The City argues that the affidavit contains statements that are not based on Young's personal knowledge and would not be admissible into evidence. (Doc 109 at 1). The City's motion to strike is MOOT as the contents of the affidavit were not considered relevant to the decision.
Young alleges violations of his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution pursuant to Section 1983, which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order "[t]o sustain a cause of action based on section 1983, [a plaintiff] must establish two elements: (1) that [he] suffered a deprivation of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the act or omission causing the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of law." Wideman v. Shallowford Community Hosp., Inc., 826 F.2d 1030,1032 (11th Cir.1987) (internal quotations and citation omitted). The complaint alleges that Young suffered a deprivation of Constitutional rights when the defendants "demot[ed] and suspend[ed] Plaintiff without following mandatory and nondiscretionary Mobile County Merit System procedure....
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