Young v. City of Ann Arbor

• Decision Date: 04 June 1934
• Docket Number: No. 167.,167.
• Citation: 267 Mich. 241,255 N.W. 579
• Parties: YOUNG v. CITY OF ANN ARBOR et al.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

267 Mich. 241

255 N.W. 579

YOUNG

v.CITY OF ANN ARBOR et al.

No. 167.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

June 4, 1934.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Washtenaw County, in Chancery; Fred S. Lamb, Judge.

Suit by John Young against the City of Ann Arbor and others. From an adverse decree, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Argued before the Entire Bench, except NORTH, J.

Frank B. De Vine, of Ann Arbor, for appellant.

William M. Laird, of Ann Arbor, for appellees.

POTTER, Justice.

This is a test case to determine the constitutionality of Act No. 94, Public Acts of 1933. In the consideration of that question this court has nothing to do with the wisdom or policy of the law or the motives which actuated the Legislature in its enactment. The sole question for our consideration is whether the statute is or is not constitutional. A statute must be violative of the Constitution, the fundamental law, before it may be declared unconstitutional. Statutes are enacted by the Legislature, presumably after consideration, and all presumptions are in favor of the constitutionality of the deliberate acts of a co-ordinate department of government. It is only when the rule established and declared in the Constitution by the people conflicts with the rule of a statute enacted by the people's public servants, the Legislature, that the latter must give way.

A different rule of construction applies to the Constitution of the United States than to the Constitution of a state. The federal government is one of delegated powers, and all powers not delegated are reserved to the states or to the people. When the validity of an act of Congress is challenged as unconstitutional, it is necessary to determine whether the power to enact it has been expressly or impliedly delegated to Congress. The legislative power, under the Constitution of the state, is as broad, comprehensive, absolute, and unlimited as that of the Parliament of England, subject only to the Constitution of the United States and the restraints and limitations imposed by the people upon such power by the Constitution of the state itself.

‘The purpose and object of a State Constitution are not to make specific grants of legislative power, but to limit that power where it would otherwise be general or unlimited.’ Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 251.

1. The validity of Act No. 94, Public Acts 1933, is challenged upon the grounds: Its title is defective; the body of the act covers more than one subject; it violates section 14 of article 10 of the Constitution in that it permits the municipal and quasi municipal corporations mentioned therein to engage in works of internal improvement; provides for the creation of public utilities other than those designated by the Constitution; provides for the creation of public indebtedness not authorized by the people; in effect, confers a franchise without a vote of the people, and amends various statutes by implication, without reference thereto.

2. It is contended the act violates section 21 of art. 5 of the Constitution, which provides: ‘No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title.’

(a) ‘A title is but a descriptive caption, directing attention to the subject-matter which follows.’ Loomis v. Rogers, 197 Mich. 265, 163 N. W. 1018, 1020.

(b) ‘If the act centers to one main general object or purpose which the title comprehensively declares, though in general terms, and if provisions in the body of the act not directly mentioned in the title are germane, auxiliary, or incidental to that general purpose, the constitutional requirement is met.’ Loomis v. Rogers, 197 Mich. 265, 163 N. W. 1018, 1020.

The general object of the act in question is to authorize the municipal and quasi municipal corporations named therein to make public improvements and pay therefor by bonds payable from the income to be derived from their operation. All the rest of the statute is germane to this main object.

(c) ‘An act complete in itself is not within the mischief designed to be remedied by this provision, and cannot be held to be prohibited by it without violating its plain intent.’ People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481.

The act in question is complete in itself, and not unconstitutional, though it may amend other statutes by implication.

3. Counties, townships, and school districts, so far as the questions here involved are concerned, have such powers as may be conferred upon them by law. Section 1, art. 8, section 16, art. 8, section 9, art. 11, of the Constitution in effect so provide. The constitutional powers of port districts are governed by section 30 of article 8 and of metropolitan districts by section 31, art. 8. With these we are not concerned. Ann Arbor is a city.

‘Any city or village may acquire, own, establish and maintain, either within or without its corporate limits, parks, boulevards, cemeteries, hospitals, almshouses and all works which involve the public health or safety.’ Section 22, art. 8.

There was much agitation in the Constitutional Convention for municipal ownership, and section 23 of article 8 was embodied in the Constitution, which provides: ‘Subject to the provisions of this constitution, any city or village may acquire, own and operate, either within or without its corporate limits, public utilities for supplying water, light, heat, power and transportation to the municipality and the inhabitants thereof,’ etc.

It is contended a sewage disposal plant is a public utility and not included within the provisions of section 23 of article 8, and therefore the city has no power or authority to construct it.

In the Constitutional Convention when section 22 of article 8 was under consideration, Mr. Barnett thought the language ‘public health and safety’ too general and indefinite. Mr. Milnes stated that in the committee it was insisted anything which involved the public health or the safety of a city should be included. Mr. Hemans said: ‘There cannot be any question but that the institutions under public health and safety are of the same characted as those already enumerated.’ And Prof. Fairlie declared: ‘The matters dealt with in the section * * * are all matters involving the public-health and safety. They do not involve the public utilities.’ It was pointed out in the convention that what were strictly public utilities were covered by section 23 and subsequent sections of article 8 of the Constitution. It will be conceded that a sewage disposal plant is a work which involves the public healty and safety and a city has express constitutional authority to establish and maintain such plant.

4. It is urged that Act No. 94, Public Acts 1933, violates section 14 of article 10, of the Constitution, which provides: ‘The state shall not be a party to, nor be interested in any work of internal improvement, nor engage in carrying on any such work, except. * * *’

The history of Michigan's experience with internal improvements has been recited by this court. Attorney General v. Pingree, 120 Mich. 550, 79 N. W. 814,46 L. R. A. 407. In our early national history the Erie Canal was constructed by the state of New York, making available cheap transportation west to Lake Erie and furnishing an outlet for the products of the North Central States bordering on the Great Lakes, rich in agriculture, lumbering, and mineral resources. All these were made tributary to the market of New York and probably more than anything else stimulated the growth, wealth, and prosperity of that city which became the commercial and financial metropolic of the new world. Michigan sought to emulate New York's example, and the Constitution of 1835 provided the state should encourage internal improvements and provide for the application of funds appropriated for that purpose. Section 3, art. 12, Constitution of 1835. By Act approved July 25, 1836 (Laws 1835-36, pp. 57, 60) the state asked Congress for the appropriation by it of $500,000 acres of land for internal improvements in lieu of the propositions concerning land made by Congress to the state. After the admission of Michigan into the Union, the Governor urged legislative action looking toward internal improvements, and the Legislature passed Acts No. 67, Laws of 1837, and No. 97, Laws of 1837. The state was authorized to borrow $5,000,000 and to issue its bonds therefor. The system of internal improvements in this state was not successful, possibly because available jobs were distributed as political patronage, and finally, under Governor Felch, they were sold out to private enterprise. So strong was public sentiment in condemnation of the state engaging in internal improvements that the Constitution of 1850 prohibited the state from being a party to or interested in any work of internal improvement. Section 9, art. 14, of 1850. This was continued in the Constitution of 1908 by section 14, art. 10, of the Constitution above quoted. Many cases considering what is and what is not an internal improvement are collected in 31 C. J. pp. 262, 304. This court sought to establish a line of demarcation between internal improvements and local public improvements in Attorney General v. Detroit Common Council, 148 Mich. 71, 111 N. W. 860, but the distinction was not made much clearer by judicial exposition. It will be admitted, if the state cannot engage in the construction and operation of internal improvements, municipalities and quasi municipal corporations may not do so. The latter are but instrumentalities of the state for carrying on the scheme of local government, and the state cannot lawfully delegate power to a municipal or quasi municipal corporation to do what it has no power or authority to do itself. Attorney General v. Detroit Common Council, 148 Mich. 71, 111 N. W. 860 and cases cited. Whether a sewage disposal plant is or is not an internal improvement does not affect the validity of the statute in question, for the reason that the Constitution, by section 22 of article 8 clearly authorizes the...