Young v. City of Des Moines

• Citation: 262 N.W.2d 612,1 A.L.R.4th 431
• Decision Date: 22 February 1978
• Docket Number: No. 2-58565,2-58565
• Parties: Terry L. YOUNG, Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. CITY OF DES MOINES, Iowa, Appellant and Cross-Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

Page 612

262 N.W.2d 612

1 A.L.R.4th 431

Terry L. YOUNG, Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. CITY OF DES MOINES, Iowa, Appellant and Cross-Appellee.

No. 2-58565.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Feb. 22, 1978.

Robert D. Hall and Larry J. Eisenhauer, Des Moines, for appellee and cross-appellant.

David J. Welu and James M. Sullivan, Asst. City Attys., for appellant and cross-appellee.

Considered en banc.

RAWLINGS, Justice.

False arrest damage action by plaintiff Terry L. Young resulted in judgment on jury verdict against defendant municipality. The city appeals challenging a jury instruction given regarding lawful arrest. Young cross-appeals trial court's matter of law holding that punitive damages were not recoverable from a municipality. We reverse on both appeals.

Acting without a warrant, several city policemen arrested Young on a charge of intoxication. A dismissal followed when arresting officers failed to appear at trial time. Young's subsequent action against the city was instituted under provisions of Chapter 613A, The Code 1973, Governmental Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

I. First considered is the city's contention that trial court's lawful arrest instruction was improperly phrased or otherwise inadequate.

In this regard, a peace officer's warrantless arrest authority is codified in § 755.4, which relevantly states:

"A peace officer may make an arrest * * * without a warrant:

"1. For a public offense committed or attempted in his presence.

"2. Where a public offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground for believing that the person to be arrested has committed it.

"3. Where he has reasonable ground for believing that an indictable public offense has been committed and has reasonable ground for believing that the person to be arrested has committed it."

Noticeably, trial court instructed the jury the city had the burden of proving Young's arrest was lawful and then said:

"Under the law of Iowa defendant's police officer was authorized to arrest a person and take him into custody without a warrant, where a public offense has in fact been committed and the police officer has reasonable ground for believing that the person to be arrested has committed the public offense.

" * * *

"If the defendant has established by a preponderance of the evidence:

"(1) That at or prior to the time involved herein a public offense in fact had been committed;

"(2) That defendant's police officer believed plaintiff had committed said public offense;

"(3) That defendant's police officer had reasonable ground for believing plaintiff had committed said public offense; then defendant's said police officer under the law had the authority to arrest plaintiff, and in such event defendant will have established said defense and your verdict will be for defendant."

The city timely objected on two grounds, reiterated on appeal. First, it alleges trial court should have instructed the jury pursuant to § 755.4(1); i. e., for an offense committed in the officers' presence. Second, it argues Young's arrest was lawful if the officers had probable cause to believe Young was committing a public offense in their presence.

Because intoxication is not an indictable offense, the arrest must have been authorized under either (1) or (2) of § 755.4.

Unquestionably, Young was arrested for an alleged violation of § 123.46: being intoxicated in public. And the officers' testimony indicates the arrest resulted from conduct occurring in their presence. We therefore conclude trial court erred in failing to instruct on § 755.4(1).

II. Nevertheless, Young argues such error is harmless because the city's asserted probable cause standard will not suffice to support an arrest effected under § 755.4(1) as well as (2).

In other words, Young submits his arrest under (1) or (2) is lawful only if it is proved he actually committed a public offense. Supportively cited are Snyder v. Thompson, 134 Iowa 725, 112 N.W. 239 (1907) and State v. Small, 184 Iowa 882, 169 N.W. 116 (1918).

Snyder involved a false imprisonment action arising out of an intoxication arrest under (2)'s predecessor, wherein this court said, 134 Iowa at 728, 112 N.W. at 241:

"In the first place, a public offense must have been committed, and, in addition thereto, the officer making the arrest must have reasonable ground for believing that the person to be arrested committed it. Stated differently, if no public offense has in fact been committed, the section furnishes no justification for making the arrest." (emphasis supplied).

Subsequently, the court cited Snyder as authority in Small, a prosecution for resisting an arrest made pursuant to (1)'s predecessor, for this statement, 184 Iowa at 884, 169 N.W. at 117:

"An offense, then, must have been committed in the presence of the policeman, in order to have justified him in making the arrest. It is not enough that he may have so thought, or have had reasonable ground so to believe; the offense must actually have been attempted or committed in his presence, to have justified the arrest." (emphasis supplied).

Apparently to the same effect is Stewart v. Feeley, 118 Iowa 524, 528, 92 N.W. 670, 671-672 (1902), an earlier false arrest action also based on (1)'s predecessor.

Interestingly, § 755.4 has been subjected to little change since its enactment in 1851. ¹ Section 2840, The Code 1851. Later our general assembly reenacted § 755.4 without significant alteration as part of the recent criminal code revision. Section 804.7, Supplement to the Code 1977.

Generally, when a statute receives a certain judicial interpretation and is subsequently reenacted without pertinent change, such interpretation is presumed adopted or approved by the legislature. See In re Marriage of Kouba, 257 N.W.2d 35, 38 (Iowa 1977); Jahnke v. Incorporated City of Des Moines, 191 N.W.2d 780, 787 (Iowa 1971); State v. Stueve, 260 Iowa 1023, 1027, 150 N.W.2d 597, 599-600 (1967); 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 49.09 (rev. 4th ed); 73 Am.Jur.2d, Statutes, § 322; 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 370b.

But the foregoing presumption is not conclusive. It stands only as one factor among many in determining legislative intent. 73 Am.Jur.2d, § 323 at 470-471; 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 370b at 853-854. As stated in Wardlow v. City of Keokuk, 190 N.W.2d 439, 448 (Iowa 1971), such presumption "is a forceful contention when a court is considering reversing its previous decisions construing a statute. However, even then it does not constitute a bar but merely a fact to be weighed in determining the advisability of changing a previous construction."

Neither does it nor the pressures of stare decisis prevent our reconsideration, repair, correction, or abandonment of past judicial pronouncements, especially when error is manifest. Kersten Co., Inc. v. Department of Social Services, 207 N.W.2d 117, 121 (Iowa 1973); State v. Gorham, 206 N.W.2d 908, 912-913 (Iowa 1973), and citations; Fitzgerald v. Hale, 247 Iowa 1194, 1205, 78 N.W.2d 509, 515 (1956); Stuart v. Pilgrim, 247 Iowa 709, 713-714, 74 N.W.2d 212, 215-216 (1956).

Moreover, cautious application of the aforesaid presumption is particularly appropriate in light of two recent cases which fail to follow the demanding interpretation of § 755.4(1) fostered by Small. In State v. Morris, 227 N.W.2d 150, 152-153 (Iowa 1975) and State v. Ricehill, 178 N.W.2d 288, 291 (Iowa 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 942, 91 S.Ct. 945, 28 L.Ed.2d 222 (1971), this court applied only the "probable cause" standard to warrantless arrests for misdemeanors allegedly committed in the officers' presence. Because of these conflicting interpretations, heavy reliance on the above-stated general rule of statutory construction is hazardous. 73 Am.Jur.2d, § 323 at 471 and n. 35; 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 370b at 853 and nn. 85-87.

In fact, it is equally important in statutory construction to interpret § 755.4(1) fairly, reasonably and sensibly in accordance with the plain meaning of words used by the legislature. See, e. g., Rodman v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 208 N.W.2d 903, 909 (Iowa 1973). Similarly, courts should not under cover of construction extend, enlarge, or otherwise change the language chosen by the legislature. E. g., State v. Wedelstedt, 213 N.W.2d 652, 656 (Iowa 1973).

In this regard, the statute says "committed", not "actually committed", a term tacitly read into § 755.4(1) by Small, or "committed in fact", words arguably engrafted into (1) by Snyder. In light of the fact these constructions were relatively contemporaneous with passage of the enactment, we must next determine whether there is a common law justification for the Small-Snyder more demanding interpretation. § 4.6(4), The Code; 2A Sutherland, § 50.01 et seq.; 73 Am.Jur.2d, § 184 at 385; 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 363 at 796-799.

III. At common law a peace officer could make a warrantless arrest if he had reasonable suspicion a felony had been or was being committed by the person to be arrested. An officer's authority to make warrantless misdemeanor arrests was limited, however, to offenses involving breach of the peace committed in his presence. See generally United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418-421, 96 S.Ct. 820, 825-827, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976); Commonwealth v. Gorman, 288 Mass. 294, 192 N.E. 618, 619-620 (1934); Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 Iowa L.Rev. 201, 228-240 (1940); 5 Am.Jur.2d, Arrest, § 24 et seq.; 6A C.J.S. Arrest § 16 et seq.

Such limitation was consistent with the general hostility toward state action untempered by judicial review of applications for warrants. Only where the crime was serious or the conduct violative of civil order could the officer act without first resorting to judicial processes.

As aforesaid, § 755.4 is a codification of the common law concerning warrantless arrests. However, Iowa like many states statutorily extended warrantless arrest authority to include any misdemeanor committed or attempted in the officer's presence.

This...