Young v. City of Mobile
| Decision Date | 27 February 2019 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:17-cv-24-TFM-MU |
| Parties | JERONE YOUNG, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF MOBILE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama |
Pending before the Court is Defendants City of Mobile's (the "City"), Mayor William Sandy Stimpson's ("Stimpson"), Chief of the Mobile Police Department James Barber's ("Barber"), and Lieutenant Rodney Greeley's ("Greeley") (collectively, the "City Defendants") Motion for Summary Judgment and Incorporated Memorandum of Law ("Motion for Summary Judgment") (Doc. 49, filed Aug. 29, 2018). The motion has been fully briefed (Docs. 49, 61, & 65) and is ripe for review. Having considered the motion and relevant law, the Court finds the Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be GRANTED.
Also pending before the Court is Plaintiff Jerone Young's ("Plaintiff" or "Young") Affidavit Motion for Leave of Court to File This Affidavit (Doc. 60, filed November 14, 2018)1 and Affidavit Number 2 Motion for Leave of Court to File This Affidavit (collectively, the "Motions for Leave to File Affidavits") (Doc. 62, filed November 30, 2018), and the City Defendants' Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff Jerone Young's "Affidavit Number 2" ("Motion to Strike") (Doc. 66, filed January 28, 2018). Having considered the motions and relevant law, the Court finds the Motions for Leave to File Affidavits should be GRANTED, and the Motion to Strike should be
The district court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims in this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction).
The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue, and there are adequate allegations to support both.
Plaintiff filed his original pro se Complaint in this Court on January 13, 2017, in which he brought claims against the City for employment discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees (Doc. 3, filed Jan. 20, 2017) as amended (Doc 4, filed February 10, 2017) was granted by the Court on February 13, 2017 (Doc. 5). The City filed on March 9, 2017, its Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement and Incorporated Memorandum of Law ("the City's first motion to dismiss") pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and (e). (Doc. 9).
On March 13, 2017, an attorney entered a notice of appearance on behalf of Plaintiff (Doc. 12) and filed an Amended Complaint as a matter of course pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1) (Doc. 15), which rendered moot the City's first motion to dismiss (Doc. 16). Plaintiff's Amended Complaint brought claims against the City Defendants2 for violations of Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process, First Amendment free speech and right to petition, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §1981, state law due process, and for breach of contract and negligence. (Doc. 15). On April 4, 2017, the City filed its Motion to Dismiss Count VII of Plaintiff's Complaint ("the City's second motion to dismiss") pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (Doc. 17), and on the same day, filed its Answer to Amended Complaint (Doc. 18), which did not include its response to Count 7 of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint since the City's second motion to dismiss solely addressed Count 7. The Court denied the City's second motion to dismiss (Doc. 28) after the parties briefed their arguments (Docs. 22 & 23). The City filed its Answer to Count 7 of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Doc. 29) on May 16, 2017, and the remaining City Defendants filed their answers (Docs. 30-32) on May 19, 2017.
After the Court entered its Scheduling Order (Doc. 34), it granted a motion to withdraw that was filed by Plaintiff's counsel (Docs. 38 & 39). After a status conference, the Court suspended the deadlines in the Scheduling Order to afford Plaintiff the opportunity to retain alternate counsel by November 7, 2017 (Doc. 43). Plaintiff failed to retain alternate counsel by the prescribed date, so the Court held another status conference and again extended the time in which Plaintiff could retain alternate counsel (Doc. 45). Plaintiff still failed to retain alternate counsel, so the Court entered new deadlines (Docs. 45-46).
On August 29, 2018, the City Defendants filed their instant Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 49) to which Plaintiff filed his response (Doc. 61) and the City Defendants filed their reply (Doc. 65). The motion is fully briefed and ripe for review.
Plaintiff, an African-American male, was hired in August 2000 by the City as a "Maintenance Mechanic" (Doc. 15, ¶¶ 9 & 15). As a Maintenance Mechanic, Plaintiff was responsible for various groundskeeping activities that included trimming trees, bushes, and hedges; cultivating and weeding flower beds; and trimming the grass. (Id., ¶ 16). After a six-monthworking test period, Plaintiff became a permanent classified services employee with the City and was assigned to the Mobile Police Department ("MPD") at its headquarters building. (Id., ¶ 15). Plaintiff's responsibilities at the MPD headquarters included general building maintenance (Id., ¶ 16). Specifically, Plaintiff maintained machinery such as boilers, air conditioners, and heating facilities; plumbing fixtures; carpentry; and electrical units. (Id.).
In July 2008, Plaintiff applied for and received the position of Building Maintenance Supervisor. (Id., ¶¶ 17-18). By August 2009, Plaintiff completed a one-year probationary placement for the position, which became permanent. (Id., ¶¶ 18-19). As Building Maintenance Supervisor, in addition to his general building maintenance responsibilities, Plaintiff was given supervisory responsibilities over two Maintenance Mechanics, contracted-for janitorial services, Public Service workers, and court-ordered community service workers. Plaintiff also retained maintenance responsibilities for the facilities' machinery and equipment. (Id., ¶ 20).
On November 27, 2013, Plaintiff filed his first lawsuit in this Court, in which he alleged racial discrimination, among other claims for relief, against the City, the Mayor of the City, the former Mayor of the City, and the former Police Chief of the City ("Young I lawsuit"). Young v. City of Mobile, No. 1:13-cv-00586-KD-B (S.D. Ala. Nov. 27, 2013). Plaintiff filed his complaint after the Mobile County Personnel Board (the "MCPB") reversed the decision to demote Plaintiff (Doc. 15, ¶ 25) because of the MCPB's "inability or unwillingness to address Plaintiff's racial discrimination charges" (Id., ¶ 26). This Court granted summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff. Young I, Docs. 110 & 111. After Plaintiff's Motion to Alter, Amend or Vacate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) was denied by this Court, Plaintiff appealed its decision, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at Docs. 112, 117, 118, & 126.
Property Unit for the MPD and Plaintiff's direct supervisor. Defendant Greeley was succeeded by Christopher Levy as the Commander of the Property Unit and held that position until July 2017. Following the decision of the appeals court, Plaintiff maintained his position as Building Maintenance Supervisor; however, while his official duties were not modified, his duties would vary based on the needs of the department. (Doc. 49-1, ¶ 4; Doc. 49-2, ¶ 4). For example, Defendant Greeley stated, during his tenure, the community service detail was moved to a different department and was no longer administered by the Property Unit, which occurred around April 2015. (Doc. 49-1, ¶ 4; Doc. 15, ¶ 33). Mr. Levy stated, during his tenure, he handled some of Plaintiff's duties because Plaintiff failed to perform them. (Doc. 49-2, ¶ 4). Both Defendant Greeley and Mr. Levy stated they were not aware of Plaintiff's previous lawsuit for racial discrimination. (Doc. 49-1, ¶ 5; Doc. 49-2, ¶ 5).
A party in a lawsuit may move a court to enter summary judgment before trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) and (b). Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party establishes there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see also Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (). "[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986); see also Ritchey v. S. Nuclear Operating Co., Inc., 423 F. App'x 955 (11th Cir.) (quoting Anderson)3. Atthe summary judgment juncture, the court does not "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter," but solely "determine[s] whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S. Ct. at 2511. Only disputes about the material facts will preclude the granting of summary judgment. Id.
The movant bears the initial burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S. Ct. at 2552. A party must support its assertion that there is no genuine issue of material fact by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials" or by "showing that the materials...
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