Young v. City of Providence

• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island
• Writing for the Court: Lisi
• Citation: Young v. City of Providence, 301 F.Supp.2d 163 (D. R.I. 2004)
• Decision Date: 11 February 2004
• Docket Number: No. CR 01-288ML.,CR 01-288ML.
• Parties: Leisa YOUNG, in her capacity as Administratrix of the Estate of Cornel Young, Jr. v. CITY OF PROVIDENCE, et al.

301 F.Supp.2d 163

Leisa YOUNG, in her capacity as Administratrix of the Estate of Cornel Young, Jr. v. CITY OF PROVIDENCE, et al.

No. CR 01-288ML.

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

February 11, 2004.

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Barry Scheck, Nicholas Brustin, Cochran, Neufeld & Scheck, LLP, New York City, Robert B. Mann, Esq., Mann & Mitchell, Providence, RI, for Plaintiffs.

Joseph F. Penza, Jr., Olenn & Penza, Warwick, Kevin F. McHugh, City of Providence Law Department, Providence, RI, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LISI, District Judge.

On November 5, 2003, this Court ruled on several motions. The Court's rulings disposed of all of plaintiff's claims. At that time the Court informed the parties that a written decision setting forth the basis for the Court's rulings would be issued at a later date. This memorandum delineates the legal analysis for the Court's November 5, 2003 rulings.

I. Background and Travel.

This action results from the fatal shooting of plaintiff's son, Cornel Young, Jr. ("Young" or "the decedent"), an African-American Providence police officer, on January 28, 2000. The decedent was shot outside Fidas Restaurant in Providence, Rhode Island, by two other Providence police officers, Carlos Saraiva ("Saraiva") and Michael Solitro ("Solitro"). At the time of the incident, the decedent, who was off-duty and clad in plainclothes, had drawn his weapon, in an apparent attempt to assist Saraiva and Solitro in the apprehension of an armed suspect, Aldrin Diaz ("Diaz"). Neither Solitro nor Saraiva recognized the decedent before they shot him. At trial, both Solitro and Saraiva testified that they mistakenly believed that the decedent was a civilian who was about to shoot Diaz.

The plaintiff, Leisa Young, in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of Cornel Young, Jr., seeks redress pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the alleged deprivation of decedent's Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure of his person.¹ In substance, plaintiff's federal claims fall into two categories. First, plaintiff alleges that Saraiva's and Solitro's actions on January 28, 2000, amounted to an unreasonable use of force in violation of Cornel Young, Jr.'s Fourth Amendment rights. Second, plaintiff asserts that decedent's death was the result of the failure of the City of Providence ("the City") and other named defendants to properly screen, hire, train, discipline and supervise the City's police officers.

In addition to her federal claims, plaintiff seeks damages pursuant to Rhode Island's "wrongful death" act and pursuant to state law tort theories of assault and battery, gross negligence, negligence and respondeat superior.

The plaintiff filed the instant action on June 7, 2001. Initially, plaintiff named the City, Solitro and Saraiva as defendants. In addition to bringing suit in her capacity as administratrix of decedent's estate, the plaintiff purported to maintain a § 1983 claim in her individual capacity for alleged interference with her "federally protected liberty and privacy interest ... to maintain a stable family relationship free of intervention from the State." Initial Complaint, ¶ 83. Moreover, plaintiff, individually, sought recovery in tort for defendants'"reckless and negligent" infliction of emotional distress. Id. ¶ 105.

The City filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and the Court conducted a hearing on the matter on February 12, 2002. The Court granted the City's motion to dismiss all of the claims asserted by plaintiff in her individual capacity. The Court denied the motion to dismiss as it pertained to the claims asserted by plaintiff in her capacity as administratrix. On December 5, 2002, the plaintiff was granted leave to amend her complaint to add Urbano Prignano, Jr. ("Prignano"), Richard Sullivan ("Sullivan"), John Ryan ("Ryan") and Kenneth Cohen ("Cohen"), in their individual capacities, as defendants. At all relevant times, including during the training academies attended by Young, Saraiva and Solitro, and through January 28, 2000, Prignano was the City's police chief and, as such, is alleged to have had supervisory responsibility for the investigation and selection of academy candidates, and the training and disciplining of officers. Sullivan was a major with the department and is alleged to have had supervisory responsibility for the screening and selection of academy candidates and for the disciplining of officers. Ryan was the director of the 57th training academy which was attended by Young and Saraiva. Cohen was the director of the 58th training academy, which Solitro attended. As directors of the academy, Ryan and Cohen allegedly bore supervisory responsibility for the training of candidates at the academy and for the on-going training of Providence police officers. The plaintiff filed her first amended complaint on December 16, 2002.²

On August 13, 2003, Solitro and Saraiva filed a motion for a separate trial pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(b). Specifically, Solitro and Saraiva sought to have the plaintiff's claims against them severed from the plaintiff's claims against the other named defendants. The Court scheduled a hearing on the matter and certain other pending motions for September 5, 2003. The plaintiff filed an objection to Solitro's and Saraiva's bifurcation motion.

On September 4, 2003, the day before the scheduled hearing on the bifurcation motion, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a motion "out-of-time." Specifically, plaintiff sought leave to file a motion to voluntarily dismiss, with prejudice, all of the claims which she had asserted against Saraiva and Solitro in their individual capacities. The proposed motion for voluntary dismissal was conditioned, inter alia, on Solitro's and Saraiva's withdrawal of their pending bifurcation motion.

On September 5, 2003, the Court granted plaintiff's motion for leave to file her motion to voluntarily dismiss Solitro and Saraiva out-of-time.³ The Court set the motion for voluntary dismissal down for hearing for September 12, 2003, and continued the hearing on the bifurcation motion until that same date. In the interim, on September 8, 2003, the City, Prignano, Ryan, Sullivan and Cohen, formally joined in the bifurcation motion. The City also filed an objection to the plaintiff's motion to voluntarily dismiss.

On September 12, 2003, the Court conducted a hearing on the matter and granted the plaintiff's motion for voluntary dismissal.⁴ Accordingly, Count I of the amended complaint, which was directed against Solitro and Saraiva in their individual capacities for their alleged violation of decedent's constitutional rights was dismissed in its entirety. Count II, which asserted a claim of supervisory liability under § 1983 against Saraiva, Ryan, Cohen, Prignano and Sullivan, was dismissed to the extent that the count contained allegations directed against Saraiva.⁵ Count VI, which alleged that Solitro and Saraiva were negligent and "grossly negligent" in shooting the decedent, was dismissed in its entirety. Counts VII and IX were dismissed to the extent that the state law claims alleged in those counts were directed against Solitro and/or Saraiva.

The Court then proceeded to hear oral argument on the bifurcation issue. After hearing argument, the Court, exercising its discretion pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(b), ordered that the matter be bifurcated for trial. Specifically, the first phase of the trial would require the jury to determine whether Solitro and/or Saraiva had violated decedent's Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure of his person. All remaining issues, including the municipal and supervisory liability claims and plaintiff's state law claims, were reserved for determination following completion of the first phase. All phases were to be tried before the same jury. The reasons for the Court's bifurcation order were fully set forth on the record on September 12, 2003, and need not be restated here.

A jury was empaneled on October 7, 2003. The trial's first phase commenced on October 8, 2003. Pursuant to the Court's bifurcation order, presentation of evidence during the first phase of the proceeding was limited to that which was relevant to the jury's determination of whether Solitro and/or Saraiva had violated Cornel Young, Jr.'s Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure of his person when they shot and killed him on January 28, 2000.

At the conclusion of plaintiff's presentation of her case in phase one, the defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50. The Court reserved determination of the motion. Following the close of all evidence, the defendants renewed their Rule 50 motion and the Court again reserved decision.

At the conclusion of the trial's first phase, the jury was instructed with regard to the law applicable to its determination of whether Solitro and/or Saraiva had violated the decedent's Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure of his person. Two special interrogatories were propounded to the jury:

1. Do you find by a fair preponderance of the evidence that Carlos Saraiva shot Cornel Young, Jr., in violation of Mr. Young's constitutional rights?

2. Do you find by a fair preponderance of the evidence that Michael Solitro shot Cornel Young, Jr., in violation of Mr. Young's constitutional rights?

On October 31, 2003, following deliberation, the jury returned its unanimous responses to each question. The jury responded in the negative as to special interrogatory number one, which pertained to Saraiva. With regard to interrogatory number two, the jury determined that Solitro had violated Cornel Young Jr.'s constitutional rights.

On November 3, 2003, the Court conducted a hearing on motions for summary judgment that had been filed by defendants the City, Ryan and Cohen.⁶ In their joint motion, Ryan...