Young v. City of Albuquerque

Citation77 F.Supp.3d 1154
Decision Date24 December 2014
Docket NumberNo. CIV 13–1046 JB/RHS.,CIV 13–1046 JB/RHS.
PartiesSharissa YOUNG and James Lochhead, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE and the Albuquerque Police Department, Defendants.
CourtUnited States District Courts. 10th Circuit. District of New Mexico

Monnica L. Garcia, Law Office of Monnica L. Garcia, LLC, Albuquerque, NM, for Plaintiffs.

David J. Tourek, City Attorney, Kristin J. Dalton, Stephanie Y. Lopez, Assistant City Attorneys, Albuquerque City Attorney's Office, Albuquerque, NM, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JAMES O. BROWNING, District Judge.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on: (i) Defendant Albuquerque Police Department's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Claims Against the Albuquerque Police Department, filed April 7, 2014 (Doc. 17)(“MTD 1”); and (ii) Defendant City of Albuquerque's Motion and Memorandum to Dismiss Plaintiff's Municipal Liability Claims Against City of Albuquerque, filed April 7, 2014 (Doc. 18) (“MTD 2”). The Court held a hearing on October 28, 2014. The primary issues are: (i) whether Defendant Albuquerque Police Department (“APD”) is a suable entity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; (ii) whether Young may hold the City of Albuquerque, New Mexico, vicariously liable under § 1983 for alleged torts that City of Albuquerque employees committed without alleging that the City of Albuquerque has an official policy, unwritten custom, pattern or practice that caused such torts; and (iii) whether the Court should remand the Plaintiffs' state-law claims to state court if it dismisses all of the federal claims. The Court will grant both motions to dismiss in part and deny them in part. First, the Court will dismiss Young's § 1983 claims against the APD, because the APD is not a suable entity under § 1983. Second, the Court will dismiss Young's § 1983 claims against the City of Albuquerque, because she has not plausibly alleged that a municipal policy, custom, or practice caused her alleged constitutional injuries. Third, the Court will deny the Defendants' requests in the MTD 1 and the MTD 2 to dismiss the Plaintiffs' state law claims. The Court will give the Plaintiffs until 5:00 p.m. MST on December 31, 2014, to amend the Complaint for Replevin, Conversion, Deprivation of Due Process, Negligence, and Negligence Per Se, filed October 28, 2013 (Doc. 1–1) (“Complaint”), to allege causes of action against APD Detective John Dear and any other individuals. If the Plaintiffs fail to do so, however, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' state-law claims and will remand those claims to state court.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court takes its facts from the Complaint, as it must when considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). This case arises out of Dear's alleged seizure of the Plaintiffs' Harley Davidson motorcycle. See Complaint ¶¶ 7–36, at 2–8.

On or about August 24, 2014, Plaintiff Sharissa Young purchased a 1975 Harley Davidson motorcycle (“Motorcycle”) from Plaintiff James Lochhead in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Complaint ¶ 7, at 2. The Motorcycle is a red and gray customized FX model with a shovelhead engine and VIN number 2C22898H5. See Complaint ¶ 8, at 2. Lochhead had lawfully purchased the motorcycle from the widow of his friend, Joel Null, on or about October 25, 1997. See Complaint ¶ 9, at 2. Lochhead had also secured the required Arizona inspections and registrations at regular intervals between when he purchased the Motorcycle from Null and sold it to Young. See Complaint ¶ 10, at 2.

When she purchased the Motorcycle from Lochhead, Young obtained the Motorcycle's valid Arizona title, insurance for the Motorcycle, and had a VIN inspection done at the New Mexico Motor Vehicle Division to register the Motorcycle in New Mexico. Complaint ¶ 12, at 2. On or about September 11, 2012, Dear performed an additional inspection on the Motorcycle. See Complaint ¶¶ 13–14, at 3. During this time, Dear was working in his capacity as an APD detective and a City of Albuquerque employee.See Complaint ¶ 20, at 20. When Dear inspected the Motorcycle, he told Young that three numbers in the VIN number stamped on the aluminum engine case on top of the Motorcycle's motor appeared to be in a different font than the rest of the numbers. See Complaint ¶ 14, at 3. Dear also informed Young that, when he removed the skid plate under the engine, he discovered a different VIN number that matched a 1979 Harley Davidson motorcycle that was stolen in 1980. See Complaint ¶ 14, at 3.

According to Dear, police never recovered that stolen motorcycle and there was no record of it being reported as a loss to an insurance company. See Complaint ¶ 15, at 3. Consequently, Dear refused to return the Motorcycle or any of its parts to Young. See Complaint ¶ 16, at 3. Dear also refused to return the Plaintiffs' personal property that was in the Motorcycle, which included a leatherman tool bag. See Complaint ¶ 17, at 3. Dear had no legal basis for seizing the Motorcycle. See Complaint ¶ 24, at 4. There was never any notice of seizure, impoundment, or anything else sent to either Lochhead or Young about Dear's seizure of the Motorcycle. See Complaint ¶ 18, at 3. Neither Young nor Lochhead stole or otherwise unlawfully obtained the Motorcycle or any of its parts. See Complaint ¶ 19, at 3. The Plaintiffs were, and are, lawful, innocent owners and bona fide purchasers. See Complaint ¶ 19, at 3.

“Despite many demands from Plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel for the return of the vehicle, Defendants refused.” Complaint ¶ 34, at 5. The Defendants have not filed a petition in a District Court for the State of New Mexico requesting the Motorcycle be declared contraband. See Complaint ¶ 29, at 5. No New Mexico court has declared the Motorcycle or any of its parts to be contraband. See Complaint ¶ 30, at 5. On July 10, 2013, the City of Albuquerque notified Young's attorney via electronic mail transmission, and without any citation to law, that it would not release the Motorcycle or any of its parts without a court order. See Complaint ¶ 36, at 6.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Young1 alleges three counts against the Defendants: (i) replevin, see Complaint ¶¶ 37–41, at 6 (Count I); (ii) conversion, see Complaint ¶¶ 42–46, at 6–7 (Count II); and (iii) violations of her substantive and procedural due-process rights2 under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America and the Constitution of the State of New Mexico, see Complaint, ¶¶ 47–54, at 7 (Count III). Young and Lochhead together allege one count against the Defendants: negligence and negligence per se (Count IV). See Complaint ¶¶ 55–59, at 7–8. Regarding the replevin claim, Young asserts that the Defendants wrongfully seized the Motorcycle, that she lawfully owns the Motorcycle, and that the Court should grant her an Order of Replevin requiring the Defendants to return the Motorcycle to her. See Complaint ¶¶ 38–41, at 6. Regarding the conversion claim, Young alleges that the Defendants converted her Motorcycle intentionally, willfully, and with gross and deliberate disregard for her rights. See Complaint ¶¶ 43–44, at 6.

As to her due-process claim, Young argues that the Defendants acted under color of state law and caused her to be deprived of her rights under the Constitutions and laws of the United States and the State of New Mexico. See Complaint ¶ 48, at 7. Young asserts that the Defendants have deprived her of her property rights without due process of law—by, for example, failing to give her proper notice and an opportunity to be heard before seizing her property.See Complaint ¶¶ 50–51, at 7. Young alleges that the Defendants conduct violated her “rights to procedural and substantive due process under the United States Constitution and New Mexico Constitution.” Complaint ¶ 52, at 7.

Regarding their negligence and negligence per se claim, the Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants owed them a duty to exercise ordinary care. See Complaint ¶ 56, at 8. The Plaintiffs contend that the Defendants breached this duty by negligently seizing and then converting the Motorcycle. See Complaint ¶ 57, at 58. The Plaintiffs assert that the Defendants also breached their duty of care by violating N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66–3–507. See Complaint ¶ 57, at 8.

1. MTD 1.

The APD filed the MTD 1 on April 7, 2014. See MTD 1 at 1. In the MTD 1, the APD asks the Court to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims against it, because it is not a suable entity. See MTD 2 at 2. The APD asserts that it is an administrative department of the City of Albuquerque, which is a municipal corporation. See MTD 2 at 2. According to the APD, administrative departments of municipal corporations lack legal identities apart from the municipality, and, therefore, are not suable entities. See MTD 2 at 2 (citing, e.g., Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir.1992) ; Stump v. Gates, 777 F.Supp. 808 (D.Colo.1991)aff'd 986 F.2d 1429 (10th Cir.1993) ; Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 750 F.Supp. 1131 (S.D.Fla.1990) ). The APD also states:

In a non-precedential opinion, the Tenth Circuit indicated that APD is not a “suable entity under Section 1983 because it lacks a legal identity apart from the municipality. Ketchum v. Albuquerque Police Department, 958 F.2d 381 (table, 1992 WL 51481 (10th Cir. March 12, 1992) ). The Ketchum decision is consistent with decisions reached in the New Mexico District Courts which conclude that APD is not a suable entity. See Maxwell v. City of Albuquerque Police Department et al., CIV No. 02–0568 LH/LFG (D.N.M. Memorandum Opinion and Order filed August 1, 2001); and Montoya v. City of Albuquerque et al., CIV No. 96–341 JC/DJS (D.N.M. Memorandum Opinion and Order filed October 4, 1994). Thus, Plaintiffs' cause of action against APD is improper because the police department, as an administrative department of the City of Albuquerque, is not a suable entity.

MTD 1 at 3.

The Plaintiffs responded...

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