Young v. City of Providence, C.A. No. 01-288S.

• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island
• Writing for the Court: Smith
• Citation: Young v. City of Providence, 396 F.Supp.2d 125 (D. R.I. 2005)
• Decision Date: 02 November 2005
• Docket Number: C.A. No. 01-288S.
• Parties: Leisa YOUNG, in her Capacity as Administratrix of the Estate of Cornel Young, Jr., Plaintiff, v. CITY OF PROVIDENCE, by and through its Treasurer, Stephen Napolitano, Urbano Prignano Jr., individually and in his official capacity as Providence Chief of Police; Richard Sullivan, individually, John Ryan, individually, and Kenneth Cohen, individually, Defendants.

396 F.Supp.2d 125

Leisa YOUNG, in her Capacity as Administratrix of the Estate of Cornel Young, Jr., Plaintiff, v. CITY OF PROVIDENCE, by and through its Treasurer, Stephen Napolitano, Urbano Prignano Jr., individually and in his official capacity as Providence Chief of Police; Richard Sullivan, individually, John Ryan, individually, and Kenneth Cohen, individually, Defendants.

C.A. No. 01-288S.

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

November 2, 2005.

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Barry Scheck, Nicholas Brustin, Cochrane, Neufeld & Scheck, LLP, New York, NY, Robert B. Mann, Mann & Mitchell, Providence, RI, for Plaintiff.

Joseph F. Penza, Jr., Olenn & Penza, Warwick, RI, Kevin F. McHugh, City of Providence Law Department, Providence, RI, Michael J. Colucci, Olenn & Penza, Warwick, RI, for Defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER

SMITH, District Judge.

This case is before the Court upon remand by the First Circuit Court of Appeals for trial on several issues as to which summary judgment was previously granted. Before trial, which will begin on November 7, 2005, various motions for summary judgment require this Court's attention. Defendants Urbano Prignano ("Prignano"), Richard Sullivan, Kenneth Cohen ("Cohen") and John Ryan ("Ryan") have each moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, Prignano has moved for summary judgment on the Monell claim against him, and Ryan asserts an additional ground for summary judgment tied to the jury's prior verdict. Plaintiff Leisa Young ("Plaintiff" or "Young") objects to all of the motions. This Court heard oral argument on September 19, 2005.¹ For the reasons set forth below, all of these motions are denied.

I. Background²

In the early morning hours of January 28, 2000, Cornel Young Jr. ("Cornel") was fatally shot by two of his fellow Providence Police Department ("PPD") officers, Carlos Saraiva ("Saraiva") and Michael Solitro ("Solitro"). Young v. City of Providence, 301 F.Supp.2d 163, 166 (D.R.I.2004), aff'd in part; rev'd in part, 404 F.3d 4 (1st Cir.2005). At the time of the shooting, Solitro and Saraiva were on-duty and Cornel was off-duty. Id. at 9. PPD regulations at the time of Cornel's death required PPD officers to be armed "at all times while off duty," "[e]xcept when on annual leave," and further required PPD officers to "act in [their] official capacity if [they] become [ ] aware of an incident which requires immediate police action and time is of the essence to safeguard life or property." Young, 404 F.3d at 16 (quoting PPD Regs. §§ 202.1, 202.2). Additional regulations mandated that PPD members "be prepared at all times and under all circumstances to perform immediately a police duty whether or not the member is in uniform or off workday duty whenever the member is cognizant of a need for police." Young, 404 F.3d at 16 (quoting PPD Reg. § 201.3).³

In 2003, Judge Mary Lisi, of this Court, presided over the first phase of a bifurcated trial concerning the events related to Cornel's death. 301 F.Supp.2d at 168-169. Phase one required "the jury to determine whether Solitro and/or Saraiva had violated [Cornel's] Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure of his person." Id. at 168. At the end of phase one, the jury found that (1) Solitro violated Cornel's constitutional rights, and (2) Saraiva did not violate his constitutional rights. Id. at 169. Judge Lisi then denied defendants' Rule 50 motions and granted summary judgment on "all supervisory and municipal liability claims... that were premised on Saraiva's actions," "all supervisory and municipal liability claims that were related to Solitro's unconstitutional conduct," all of Young's claims related to Cornel's right to training (because Cornel had no such right), and all state law claims. Id. at 170. Appeals followed.

In April 2005, the Court of Appeals issued its decision. The Court (1) affirmed the jury's verdict that Solitro violated Cornel's constitutional rights but that Saraiva did not, (2) affirmed summary judgment "against Young on a claim that Providence's screening of Solitro before hiring him constituted deliberate indifference by the City to Cornel's constitutional rights," and (3) reversed "summary judgment for the City on a claim that it is responsible for inadequately training Solitro on how to avoid on-duty/off-duty misidentification in light of the department's policy that officers are always armed, and always on-duty." Young v. City of Providence, 404 F.3d 4, 9-10 (1st Cir.2005). In addition, the District Court's grant of summary judgment against Young on the "supervisory claims," which was premised upon the grant of summary judgment on the municipal claims, was vacated and remanded to this Court. Therefore, remanded to this Court for trial is "Young's claim that the City [and Prignano, Ryan, and Cohen] violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by failing to adequately train Solitro on issues relating to on-duty/off-duty interactions in a manner that was both causally related to Solitro's deprivation of Cornel's constitutional rights and deliberately indifferent to those constitutional rights." Id. at 10.

The First Circuit's opinion frames the issues now before this Court for resolution:

We have reversed entry of summary judgment against Providence on the failure to train claim, a consideration pertinent to qualified immunity analysis. The district court never dealt with qualified immunity issues-it made no rulings on the second prong of qualified immunity analysis, whether both the underlying constitutional violation of Solitro and the basis for liability of the various supervisors were clearly established, nor did it make any rulings on the third prong, whether the supervisors' actions were otherwise objectively reasonable. Further, the record on qualified immunity issues is not well developed and the briefing on appeal is inadequate. Thus, the most prudent course is to vacate the grant of summary judgment in favor of the four supervisory defendants, premised on the erroneous grant of summary judgment to Providence, and remand. We do not address the issue of supervisory liability here.

Id. at 32 (citation omitted). Prignano, Cohen, and Ryan (collectively, "Defendants") now seek summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, as well as on other grounds.

II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is warranted when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "Where a qualified immunity defense is advanced by pretrial motion, `normal summary judgment standards' control". Amsden v. Moran, 904 F.2d 748, 752 (1st Cir.1990) (quoting Rogers v. Fair, 902 F.2d 140, 142 (1st Cir.1990)). This Court must "review the record in a light most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment and ... indulge in all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Sheehy v. Town of Plymouth, 191 F.3d 15, 18-19 (1st Cir.1999).

The burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests with the moving party. National Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 735 (1st Cir.1995). If the moving party meets this burden, then "the nonmovant must contradict the showing by pointing to specific facts demonstrating that there is, indeed, a trialworthy issue." Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). In other words, the nonmovant must establish that sufficient evidence exists for a jury to find in its favor. DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 306 (1st Cir.1997) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-325, 106 S.Ct. 2548).

III. Qualified Immunity and Supervisory Liability

"Qualified immunity is `an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.'" Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)). Thus, courts must consider questions of qualified immunity early in the proceedings "so that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided where the defense is dispositive." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200, 121 S.Ct. 2151. Generally speaking, qualified immunity exists to protect public officials performing discretionary functions "from civil damages liability as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated." Hegarty v. Somerset County, 53 F.3d 1367, 1373 (1st Cir.1995). Here, Prignano, Ryan, and Cohen all maintain that the doctrine of qualified immunity renders them immune from suit.

Courts considering qualified immunity claims follow a three pronged approach, and must analyze the issues in a particular order. Savard v. Rhode Island, 338 F.3d 23, 27 (1st Cir.2003); Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200, 121 S.Ct. 2151. First, the court inquires whether, "[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right?" Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. If the answer is affirmative, the court must then determine if the right allegedly violated was "clearly established" at the time. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 125 S.Ct. 596, 599, 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004). If the right was clearly established, then the court reaches the final query: "whether a reasonable official, situated similarly to the defendant(s), would have understood that the conduct at issue contravened the clearly established law." Savard, 338 F.3d at 27 (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151). Even if an official is mistaken regarding whether his conduct violated clearly established law, qualified immunity protects the official when his "mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable."⁴ Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205, ...