Young v. City of Council Bluffs, Iowa

• Decision Date: 27 October 2021
• Docket Number: 1:20-cv-30-JAJ
• Citation: 569 F.Supp.3d 885
• Parties: Charles YOUNG, Jr., Plaintiff, v. CITY OF COUNCIL BLUFFS, IOWA; Colton Thompson; Michael Brown ; Corey Sherven, William Perry; Ryan Engle, and United States of America, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

569 F.Supp.3d 885

Charles YOUNG, Jr., Plaintiff,

v.CITY OF COUNCIL BLUFFS, IOWA; Colton Thompson; Michael Brown ; Corey Sherven, William Perry; Ryan Engle, and United States of America, Defendants.

No. 1:20-cv-30-JAJ

United States District Court, S.D. Iowa, Western Division.

Signed October 27, 2021

Jack Bjornstad, Jack Bjornstad Law Office, Spirit Lake, IA, for Plaintiff.

Sara E. Bauer, Council Bluffs City Attorneys Office, Council Bluffs, IA, for Defendants City of Council Bluffs, Iowa, Colton Thompson, Michael Brown.

David L.D. Faith, William C. Purdy, United States Attorney's Office, Des Moines, IA, for Defendants Corey Sherven, William Pettery, Ryan Engle.

ORDER

JOHN A. JARVEY, Chief Judge

This action arises out of a tragic error in arresting the plaintiff based on an arrest warrant that sought a different suspect. This matter is before the Court pursuant to two separate motions for summary judgment. Defendants Corey Sherven, William Perry, and Ryan Engle ("the Deputy Defendants") moved for summary judgment on August 19, 2021 [ECF No. 39], and Young resisted the Motion for Summary Judgment on September 9, 2021 [ECF No. 45]. The Deputy Defendants replied on September 16, 2021 [ECF No. 46]. Defendants City of Council Bluffs, Colton Thompson, and Michael Brown ("the City Defendants") filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on August 30, 2021 [ECF No. 44], and Young resisted the Motion on September 20, 2021 [ECF No. 47]. The City Defendants filed their reply on September 27, 2021 [ECF No. 50]. For the reasons that follow, the Deputy Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted , and the City Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted .

I. Background

This factual background is drawn from the parties’ statements of undisputed facts and responses thereto. In particular, the Court focuses on the admitted portions of each party's response to the statements of undisputed facts. Unless otherwise indicated, the facts here are undisputed as to all defendants.

In May 2018, the Superior Court of Washington in Spokane County, Washington issued an arrest warrant for Charles Young, with a date of birth of XX/XX/XXXX, for rape of a child in the first degree. The exact name that appeared on the warrant is unclear, and the parties did not submit a copy of the original warrant. At the very least, the warrant listed the name "Charles Young" accompanied by the middle initial "L" or middle name "Lee." Plaintiff's name is Charles Lee Young, Jr., his date of birth is July 31, 1984, and he formerly resided in Washington.

Deputy U.S. Marshal William Perry became involved with the criminal case in May 2018 to assist with the arrest warrant and tracking of the suspect. Deputy Perry requested a photograph of the suspect from the Spokane Police Department but was informed that they did not have one but that there was a Washington driver's license. He searched the Washington driver's license database and obtained the Plaintiff's driver's license record. Deputy Perry inputted Plaintiff's information into a national law enforcement database and discovered driver's licenses in Missouri and Iowa, and he also obtained Plaintiff's photograph.

On May 22, 2018, several law enforcement officials participated in the arrest of Young, who was believed to be the suspect, in Council Bluffs, Iowa. U.S. Deputy Marshals Sherven and Engle were present for the arrest along with two Council Bluffs police officers, Colton Thompson and Michael Brown. At some point during the arrest, one of the marshals pointed a rifle at Young. Young was compliant and did not resist the arrest. On May 24, 2018, a Spokane police detective determined Young was not the suspect in the Washington case and requested his release. A Spokane County Superior Court judge signed an order quashing the arrest warrant, and Young was released on May 26, 2018. The charges were dismissed.

Young filed this action based on his allegedly wrongful arrest. The defendants seek summary judgment on all counts.

II. Legal Standard

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[a] party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). It provides, further, that a "court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit explained:

"The movant ‘bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion,’ and must identify ‘those portions of [the record] ... which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.’ " Torgerson v. City of Rochester , 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (alterations in original) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ). "If the movant does so, the nonmovant must respond by submitting evidentiary materials that set out ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ " Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ). "The nonmovant ‘must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.’ " Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ).

Mensie v. City of Little Rock , 917 F.3d 685, 688 (8th Cir. 2019).

More specifically, "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Villanueva v. City of Scottsbluff , 779 F.3d 507, 510 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ). Once the parties have met their burdens, the court may grant summary judgment only "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Torgerson , 643 F.3d at 1042–43 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Also, "[w]here ... the unresolved issues are primarily legal rather than factual, summary judgment is particularly appropriate." Ritchie Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Stoebner , 779 F.3d 857, 861 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Cochrane , 124 F.3d 978, 981–82 (8th Cir. 1997) ).

III. Analysis: Deputy Defendants

The Court first considers the Deputy Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Counts VII and VIII.¹

A. Whether Counts VII and VIII May Proceed as Bivens Actions

Count VII alleges the Deputy Defendants violated Young's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure and excessive force, and Count VIII alleges the Deputy Defendants violated Young's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law. Young brings these Counts pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents. 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). In Bivens , the U.S. Supreme Court authorized a direct cause of action against federal officials for damages based on a deprivation of constitutional rights. Id. at 397, 91 S.Ct. 1999. The U.S. Supreme Court has only recognized a cause of action under Bivens on three occasions. Farah v. Weyker , 926 F.3d 492, 497 (8th Cir. 2019) ; see Carlson v. Green , 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980) ; Davis v. Passman , 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979) ; Bivens , 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619. In 2017, the Supreme Court stated expanding Bivens is "now a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity." Ziglar v. Abbasi , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857, 198 L.Ed.2d 290 (2017) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 675, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ). There is a presumption against expanding Bivens . Neb. Beef, Ltd. v. Greening , 398 F.3d 1080, 1084 (8th Cir. 2005).

Courts employ a two-step inquiry when determining whether to recognize a Bivens action. Ahmed v. Weyker , 984 F.3d 564, 567 (8th Cir. 2020). First, courts consider whether the case falls within one of the three Bivens claims recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court. Farah v. Weyker , 926 F.3d at 498. If the Supreme Court has recognized the context previously, the case may proceed. Id. If the case does not fall within one of the recognized actions, courts assess whether "any special factors counsel hesitation before implying a new cause of action." Ahmed , 984 F.3d at 567 (quoting Farah , 926 F.3d at 498 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). Courts must reject the new cause of action if there is reason to hesitate before applying Bivens to a new context. Id. at 567–68.

The U.S. Supreme Court has set forth the following criteria for determining whether a case presents a new Bivens context:

If the case is different in a meaningful way from previous Bivens cases decided by this Court, then the context is new. Without endeavoring to create an exhaustive list of differences that are meaningful enough to make a given context a new one, some examples might prove instructive. A case might differ in a meaningful way because of the rank of the officers involved; the constitutional right at issue; the generality or specificity of the official action; the extent of judicial guidance as to how an officer should respond to the problem or emergency to be confronted; the statutory or other legal mandate under which the officer was operating; the risk of disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning of other branches; or the presence of potential special factors that previous Bivens cases did not consider.

Ziglar , 137 S. Ct. at 1859–60. A modest extension of Bivens is still an extension. Id. at 1864.

As to the second consideration, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated:

This Court has not defined the phrase "special factors counselling hesitation." The necessary inference, though, is that the inquiry must concentrate on

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