Young v. Clinchfield Railroad Company
| Decision Date | 05 April 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. 8236.,8236. |
| Citation | 288 F.2d 499 |
| Parties | Charles Wing YOUNG, Appellee, v. CLINCHFIELD RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
E. P. Dameron, Marion, N. C., and H. Dennis Erwin, Erwin, Tenn. (A. K. McIntyre, Erwin, Tenn., on the brief), for appellant.
Harry DuMont, Asheville, N. C. (Uzzell & DuMont, Asheville, N. C., and Warren H. Pritchard, Spruce Pine, N. C., on the brief), for appellee.
Before SOBELOFF, Chief Judge, and HAYNSWORTH and BOREMAN, Circuit Judges.
This is an action for personal injuries, brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq., by Charles Wing Young, a former employee of the defendant, Clinchfield Railroad Company. The plaintiff sought recovery for silicosis, attributed to the inhalation of silica in the course of his work for the defendant. Upon a jury verdict, judgment for $6,000.00 was entered in favor of the plaintiff by the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. The defendant's appeal asserts that the trial court erred in three respects: first, it should have directed a verdict for the railroad because the evidence that Young was not provided with a safe place to work was insufficient to raise a jury question; second, the court should have directed a verdict because as a matter of law the plaintiff's action, which was commenced more than three years after he left the defendant's employ, was barred by limitations; and third, in the alternative, assuming that a directed verdict was properly denied, the court should have submitted the issue of limitations to the jury.
There was testimony tending to show the following: Young was employed by the railroad from August, 1945, to July 7, 1954, as a member of a section gang engaged in repairing and replacing rails and ties. He worked as a "dead head hunter," that is to say, it was his job to find such portions of spikes as remained in the ties after removal of the spikeheads. In performing his work, the plaintiff was forced to bend over, bringing his face within two feet of the track. He worked immediately behind a cribbing machine which removed ballast from between the ties and an adzing machine which smoothed the ties. The ballast was described by witnesses as consisting of river rock, limestone rock, flint, granite and sand, and there was explicit expert testimony that granite is 34% silica and flint is pure silica.1 This testimony refutes the defendant's contention that the plaintiff failed to present evidence sufficient for the jury to find the presence of silica in the ballast.
There was further testimony that the cribbing machine crushed the rocks between the ties and both the cribbing and adzing machines stirred up dust which was described as "heavy." The plaintiff testified that he reported these working conditions to his foreman and specifically complained about the "dust on the job." Nevertheless he was never furnished "any equipment or respirator." As a measure of self-help, to guard as well as he could against the dust, which the plaintiff said got into his nostrils and throat, he would tie a handkerchief over his mouth during the work. It was testified by a physician that such exposure could cause silicosis in the plaintiff.
It was also shown that before coming to work for the railroad the plaintiff had worked in a feldspar mine in western North Carolina and had mined and hauled mica.2 The physician testified that feldspar contains 47% silica, and that if the plaintiff had initially contracted silicosis from such exposure, his condition could have been aggravated by his work for the railroad under the conditions described. There was, to be sure, testimony from which it could be inferred, as the defendant contended, that the plaintiff's disability was unrelated to his employment by the defendant. This could raise, but it does not dispose of, the fact question which was for the jury.
We think the evidence easily sufficient to require the jury to resolve the issue whether the defendant was negligent in failing to furnish a safe place to work. Urie v. Thompson, 1949, 337 U.S. 163, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 93 L.Ed. 1282; Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 1957, 352 U.S. 500, 77 S.Ct. 443, 1 L.Ed.2d 493.
The applicable statute of limitations in an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act reads as follows: "No action shall be maintained under this chapter unless commenced within three years from the date the cause of action accrued." 45 U.S.C.A. § 56. The parties disagree over the meaning of the word "accrued" as it is used in this enactment. The defendant company's position is that as a matter of law the cause of action "accrued" no later than the date on which the plaintiff terminated his employment in July, 1954, and that accordingly, as the present action was not filed until April 23, 1958, it is barred by limitations.
Underlying this argument is the theory that a cause of action accrues the moment the injury is inflicted. The defendant is willing to recognize that when silicosis is the claimed injury, its onset is so gradual that it cannot be determined with certainty when the injury happened. Nevertheless, the defendant maintains that any injury for which it might have been liable was caused, of necessity, no later than July, 1954. From this the defendant would have us conclude that the cause of action must have accrued by that date and should be barred by limitations. We think that this contention is unsound.
Many personal injuries are of such a character that the symptoms become immediately detectable. This is commonly the case when one suffers burns, cuts, broken bones, etc. Almost from the moment that such injury is inflicted the victim is aware of his condition and the wrongful act which caused it. While he may not always know the extent of his disability he is in no doubt that he was injured. Where such knowledge exists upon the occurrence of the injury we have an immediate accrual of the cause of action and the statutory period begins at that time.
On the other hand, other types of injuries are not immediately detectable. Since the effects are usually long delayed, the victim does not know that he has been injured till he observes definite symptoms referrable to the injury. Moreover, when the injury becomes apparent it may be totally impossible to determine precisely when it was inflicted. Silicosis falls in this latter category, and characteristically its onset is insidious and does not come "with the suddenness of lightning," Urie v. Thompson, 1949, 337 U.S. 163, 187, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 1033, 93 L.Ed. 1282. A rule of law that focuses on the occurrence of the wrongful act in determining when the cause accrued is totally inapplicable in such a case.
In Urie v. Thompson, supra, a locomotive fireman who had contracted silicosis brought an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act and the Boiler Inspection Act. The condition was diagnosed in 1940 and suit was filed on November 25, 1941. The applicable statute of limitations was, as it is today, three years. However, the defendant company interposed the defense of limitations on the theory that, having been exposed to silica dust since about 1910, Urie must have contracted silicosis more than three years before suit was filed and that, therefore, his cause of action was barred by limitations. Simply stated, the defendant company's argument was that Urie's cause of action "accrued" when the silicosis was contracted or when the wrongful act which caused the injury was done, although he did not learn of it till much later. This contention was rejected, the Supreme Court pointing out that to adopt the defendant company's reasoning would mean:
"* * * that at some past moment in time, unknown and inherently unknowable even in...
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