Young v. Com.

• Decision Date: 20 April 2007
• Docket Number: Record No. 060473.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: Gregory Leon YOUNG v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.

643 S.E.2d 491

Gregory Leon YOUNG v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.

Record No. 060473.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

April 20, 2007.

Joseph A. Sadighian, Senior Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Denise C. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General (Robert F. McDonnell, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Present: All the Justices.

OPINION BY Justice BARBARA MILANO KEENAN.

In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in remanding a robbery conviction for a new sentencing proceeding under Code § 19.2-295.1, rather than ordering a new trial on all issues, based on the erroneous admission of evidence of other crimes during the guilt phase of a defendant's trial.

Gregory Leon Young was tried by a jury in the Circuit Court of the City of Danville for robbery, in violation of Code § 18.2-58. Young was convicted of the offense and sentenced, in accordance with the jury verdict, to a term of life imprisonment.¹

Young chose to represent himself at his trial. The evidence at trial showed that in January 2004, a robbery occurred at "Check `n Go," a check-cashing establishment in the City of Danville (the Danville robbery). Shanna D. Jones was the sole cashier in the store when a man entered and handed her a note that read, "I Have a Gun Give me $2,100 you have 10 seconds." The man produced a gun from inside his coat and stated, "Just do what I say and you don't get hurt." Jones gave the man $1,776, the entire contents of her "money drawer."

The Commonwealth offered into evidence several segments of a video recording made of Young in the Henry County Sheriff's Office about one week after the Danville robbery. Young had been taken into custody in Henry County for a separate bank robbery that had occurred in the City of Martinsville (the Martinsville robbery). While Young was in custody at the Henry County Sheriff's Office, City of Martinsville police officers interviewed him for about three hours regarding the Martinsville robbery. When the Martinsville police officers concluded their interview, City of Danville police officers questioned Young for an additional hour regarding the Danville robbery. Both interviews were preserved on a video recording (the Henry County interview). During the Henry County interview, Young confessed that he committed the Danville robbery.

The Commonwealth informed the circuit court that the Commonwealth did not intend to present to the jury any statements in the Henry County interview that would be inadmissible in evidence. The circuit court stated that it would allow the Commonwealth to play the portions of the Henry County interview relating to the Danville robbery, but ruled that other portions of the video recording that were unrelated to the Danville offenses would be inadmissible.

The Commonwealth showed the jury the portion of the Henry County interview in which Young confessed to the Danville robbery. The jury also was shown, however, some inadmissible portions of the Henry County interview, including Young's statements concerning his purchase and use of illegal drugs, his previous robbery charges, and his admission that he had committed other robberies in the past.²

Young repeatedly objected to the introduction of any statements he made in the Henry County interview concerning his prior crimes and drug use. On three occasions, the circuit court instructed the jury to disregard any evidence of Young's prior crimes or other acts that were not related to the Danville robbery.

After the jury found Young guilty on the robbery charge, the circuit court conducted a sentencing proceeding. At the sentencing proceeding, the jury heard evidence presented by the Commonwealth that Young previously had been convicted of armed robbery, common law robbery, statutory burglary, "first degree" burglary, breaking and entering, grand larceny, three other felony convictions of larceny, and misdemeanor larceny.

Young appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals, which concluded that the circuit court erred in allowing the jury to see the portions of the Henry County interview relating to Young's other crimes and drug use. However, the Court of Appeals determined that the circuit court's error was harmless with respect to the issue of Young's guilt because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. Young v. Commonwealth, 47 Va.App. 616, 633-35, 625 S.E.2d 691, 701-02 (2006).

The Court of Appeals further determined that the presentation of Young's statements in the Henry County interview relating to the "Henry County offense," for which Young had not yet been convicted, and of the statements relating to Young's involvement with illegal drugs, introduced into evidence during the guilt phase, did not constitute harmless error with regard to the sentencing proceeding. The Court of Appeals held that because this evidence would have been inadmissible in the sentencing proceeding, its erroneous admission during the guilt phase prejudiced Young in the jury's determination of his sentence. Id. at 637-38, 625 S.E.2d at 701-02.

The Court of Appeals affirmed Young's conviction, but remanded the case to the circuit court for a new sentencing proceeding under Code § 19.2-295.1, which provides for such a proceeding when a sentence is "set aside or found invalid solely due to an error in the [original] sentencing proceeding." Id. The Court of Appeals concluded that because the error in the guilt phase of the trial affected the sentencing proceeding but was harmless with respect to the issue of Young's guilt, the sentence was invalid "solely due to an error in the sentencing proceeding" within the meaning of Code § 19.2-295.1. Young appeals from the Court of Appeals' judgment.

Young contends that the Court of Appeals set his sentence aside only because of evidentiary error during the guilt phase of his trial, not because of an error "in the sentencing proceeding." Therefore, Young argues, the Court of Appeals erred in ordering a new sentencing proceeding under Code § 19.2-295.1, which only affords a remedy for errors that occur in the sentencing phase of a trial. Young asserts that because the evidentiary error occurred during the guilt phase of his trial, his case should be remanded for a new trial on all issues.

In response, the Commonwealth argues that the Court of Appeals properly concluded that because the evidentiary error was harmless with regard to the issue of Young's guilt, the error affected only the sentence imposed by the jury. Thus, the Commonwealth contends that the erroneous admission of evidence occurred "in the sentencing proceeding," within the meaning of Code § 19.2-295.1, and the Court of Appeals properly remanded the case for a new sentencing proceeding under Code § 19.2-295.1, rather than for a new trial on all issues. We disagree with the Commonwealth's arguments.

An issue of statutory interpretation presents a pure question of law, which we review de novo on appeal. Conyers v. Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 178 (2007); Washington v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 449, 455, 634 S.E.2d 310, 313 (2006); Ainslie v. Inman, 265 Va. 347, 352, 577 S.E.2d 246, 248 (2003). We determine the meaning of certain statutory language from the express words contained in the statute. Washington, 272 Va. at 449, 455, 634 S.E.2d at 313; Alger v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 255, 259, 590 S.E.2d 563, 565 (2004); Tucker v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 490, 493, 604 S.E.2d 66, 68 (2004).

We consider the disputed language in the context of the entire statute, rather than by isolating particular words or phrases. Carpitcher v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 335, 345, 641 S.E.2d 486, 492 (2007); Cummings v. Fulghum, 261 Va. 73, 77, 540 S.E.2d 494, 496 (2001); Earley v. Landsidle, 257 Va. 365, 369, 514 S.E.2d 153, 155 (1999). When statutory language is unambiguous, we are bound by the plain meaning of that language and may not give the words a construction that amounts to holding that the General Assembly did not mean what it actually stated. Gunn v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 580, 587, 637 S.E.2d 324, 327 (2006); Tucker, 268 Va. at 493, 604 S.E.2d at 68; Alger, 267 Va. at 259, 590 S.E.2d at 565.

The statute we examine in the present case, Code § 19.2-295.1, provides in relevant part:

In cases of trial by jury, upon a finding that the defendant is guilty of a felony . . . a separate proceeding limited to the ascertainment of punishment shall be held as soon as practicable before the same jury. At such proceeding, the Commonwealth shall present the defendant's prior criminal convictions. . . . After the Commonwealth has introduced such evidence of prior convictions, or if no such evidence is introduced, the defendant may introduce relevant, admissible evidence related to punishment. . . . If the sentence imposed pursuant to this section is subsequently set aside or found invalid solely due to an error in the sentencing proceeding, the court shall impanel a different jury to ascertain punishment. . . .

Id.

We conclude that this statutory language is plain and unambiguous. The statute refers to the sentencing proceeding as a "separate proceeding limited to the ascertainment of punishment," and specifies the evidence that the parties may present "[a]t such proceeding." Id. Thus, as set forth in the statute, "the sentencing proceeding" is a distinct phase of a criminal trial that follows a jury's determination of a defendant's guilt. Accordingly, an error "in the sentencing proceeding" can occur only after the jury determines the issue of the defendant's guilt and in the stage of the trial when the jury considers the separate issue of the defendant's punishment.

We find no support in the language of Code § 19.2-295.1 for the Court of Appeals' contrary interpretation, that any error occurring during the guilt phase of a trial but affecting the sentence a defendant receives, is an error "in the sentencing proceeding." That rationale would render any part of a criminal trial, even...