Young v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
| Decision Date | 27 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | 1:18-CV-1424 (WBC) |
| Parties | TARA ANNE YOUNG, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of New York |
APPEARANCES:
LAW OFFICES OF KENNETH HILLER, PLLC
Counsel for Plaintiff
ELIZABETH HAUNGS, ESQ.
KENNETH HILLER, ESQ.
VERNON NORWOOD, ESQ.
MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER
The parties consented, in accordance with a Standing Order, to proceed before the undersigned. (Dkt. No. 18.) The court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The matter is presently before the court on the parties' cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff's motion is granted to the extent that it seeks remand, and the Commissioner's motion is denied.
Plaintiff was born in 1969. (T. 194.) She has a Bachelor of Arts in nursing. (T. 661.) Generally, Plaintiff's alleged disability consists of neck injury, back strain, anxiety, and depression. (T. 194.) Her alleged disability onset date is May 21, 2010. (Id.) Her date last insured is December 31, 2013. (Id.) Her past relevant work consists of nurse and videotape editor. (T. 51, 52.)
On November 13, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Title II application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits ("SSD"). (T. 193.) Plaintiff's application was initially denied, after which she timely requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("the ALJ"). On August 15, 2012 and again on January 8, 2013, Plaintiff appeared before the ALJ, Joseph Schloss. (T. 39-65, 66-84.) On July 15, 2013, ALJ Schloss issued a written decision finding Plaintiff not disabled under the Social Security Act. (T. 17-38.) On June 3, 2015, the AC denied Plaintiff's request for review, rendering the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (T. 1-6.) Thereafter, Plaintiff timely sought judicial review in this Court. (T. 1227-1262.) While Plaintiff's case was pending, she filed a subsequent Title II application on June 23, 2015. (T. 1311.)
On February 1, 2018, this Court issued a Decision and Order on the 2010 Title II claim, directing remand of the July 15, 2013 unfavorable decision and directed a new decision be issued by August 31, 2018. (T. 1270-1284); Young v. Berryhill, No. 1:15-CV-0578, 2018 WL 661414 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2018). The AC issued a Notice of Order remanding the case to an ALJ on February 14, 2018. (T. 1286-1290.) The AC Order further consolidated Plaintiff's two claims. (Id.)
On June 21, 2018 Plaintiff appeared before the ALJ, Paul Georger. (T. 1149-1184.) On August 22, 2018, ALJ Georger issued a written decision finding Plaintiff not disabled under the Social Security Act. (T. 1149-1184.) Thereafter, Plaintiff again timely sought judicial review in this Court.
Generally, in his decision, the ALJ made the following five findings of fact and conclusions of law. (T.1124-1136.) First, the ALJ found Plaintiff met the insured status requirements through December 31, 2013 and Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since Mary 21, 2010. (T. 1124.) Second, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the severe impairments of: degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine with disc herniation and radiculopathy, fibromyalgia, rheumatoid arthritis, a depressive disorder, and an anxiety disorder. (T. 1125.) Third, the ALJ found Plaintiff did not have an impairment that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments located in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix. 1. (T. 1126.) Fourth, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform sedentary work, as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a), because:
she was able to lift and/or carry ten pounds occasionally and less than ten pounds frequently, stand and/or walk for two hours in an eight-hour workday, and sit for six hours in an eight-hour workday. [Plaintiff] was able to occasionally climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl as well as occasionally reach in all directions bilaterally. [Plaintiff] was able to tolerate occasional exposure to unprotected heights and moving mechanical parts, extreme heat and cold, humidity and wetness, and dust, odors, fumes and pulmonary irritants, but she was unable to tolerate any exposure to vibration. In addition, [Plaintiff] was able to engage in simple, routine, repetitive tasks and make simple work-related decisions; she was also able to engage in occasional interaction with supervisors, co-workers, and the general public.
(T. 1129.)1 Fifth, the ALJ determined Plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant work; however, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy Plaintiff could perform. (T. 1134-1136.)
Plaintiff makes one argument in support of her motion for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff argues the ALJ's finding Plaintiff could perform the sitting requirement of sedentary work was unsupported by substantial evidence. (Dkt. No. 13 at 22-25.) Plaintiff also filed a reply in which she reiterated her original arguments. (Dkt. No. 17.)
In response, Defendant makes two arguments. First, Defendant argues the ALJ properly assessed Plaintiff's RFC. (Dkt. No. 16 at 13-18.) Second, and lastly, Defendant argues Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. (Id. at 18-21.)
A court reviewing a denial of disability benefits may not determine de novo whether an individual is disabled. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Wagner v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). Rather, theCommissioner's determination will only be reversed if the correct legal standards were not applied, or it was not supported by substantial evidence. See Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir. 1987) (); Grey v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1983); Marcus v. Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1979).
"Substantial evidence" is evidence that amounts to "more than a mere scintilla," and has been defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 1427 (1971). Where evidence is deemed susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the Commissioner's conclusion must be upheld. See Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982).
"To determine on appeal whether the ALJ's findings are supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing court considers the whole record, examining evidence from both sides, because an analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also include that which detracts from its weight." Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988).
If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner's finding must be sustained "even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff's position and despite that the court's independent analysis of the evidence may differ from the [Commissioner's]." Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). In other words, this Court must afford the Commissioner's determination considerabledeference, and may not substitute "its own judgment for that of the [Commissioner], even if it might justifiably have reached a different result upon a de novo review." Valente v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.2d 1037, 1041 (2d Cir. 1984).
The Commissioner has established a five-step evaluation process to determine whether an individual is disabled as defined by the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The Supreme Court has recognized the validity of this sequential evaluation process. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42, 107 S. Ct. 2287 (1987). The five-step process is as follows:
(1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment meets or equals the severity of the specified impairments in the Listing of Impairments; (4) based on a 'residual functional capacity' assessment, whether the claimant can perform any of his or her past relevant work despite the impairment; and (5) whether there are significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform given the claimant's residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience.
The RFC is an assessment of "the most [Plaintiff] can still do despite [her] limitations." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1)2. The ALJ is responsible for assessing Plaintiff's RFC based on a review of relevant medical and non-medical evidence, including any statement about what Plaintiff can still do, provided by any medicalsources. Id. §§ 404.1527(d), 404.1545(a)(3), 404.1546(c). Although the ALJ has the responsibility to determine the RFC based on all the evidence in the record, the burden is on Plaintiff to demonstrate functional limitations that preclude any substantial gainful activity. Id. §§ 404.1512(c), 404.1527(e)(2), 404.1545(a), 404.1546(c).
Here, the ALJ determined Plaintiff could...
To continue reading
Request your trial