Young v. Commissioners of Mahoning County

• Citation: 53 F. 895
• Decision Date: 05 December 1892
• Docket Number: 4,699.
• Parties: YOUNG v. COMMISSIONERS OF MAHONING COUNTY et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

53 F. 895

YOUNG v. COMMISSIONERS OF MAHONING COUNTY et al.

No. 4,699.

United States Circuit Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

December 5, 1892

Statement by TAFT, Circuit Judge:

This was an action in ejectment by Young against the commissioners of Mahoning county to recover lot No. 96 on the original plat of the town of Youngstown, which is now occupied by the courthouse and other county buildings of Mahoning county. The case was submitted to the court on the evidence, a jury being waived, and the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the land. The opinion is reported in 51 F. 585. Judgment was entered for the recovery of the land, and for mesne profits on the 25th day of July, 1892. Thereupon the defendants filed a petition for the benefits conferred, by section 5786 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio, upon occupying claimants. A jury having been impaneled, and evidence introduced, the question arose whether, conceding the absence of fraud or collusion in the county commissioners of their grantors in the erection of the buildings upon the lot, they had such color of title as to give them a right to claim the value of the improvements under the occupying claimant law.

The facts fully appear in the report of the case of Young v Commissioners, 51 F. 585. It is sufficient to state here that lot No. 96, in question, together with lot No. 95, were originally used by the city of Youngstown as a burying ground, under a common-law dedication by John Young, the ancestor of the plaintiff, Charles Young, that, in 1867 Charles Young conveyed to the city of Youngstown a legal title to said lots 95 and 96, which, in the opinion already referred to, the court held to be a determinable or base fee, with a reverter to the grantor on a lawful abandonment by the city of the lot for burial purposes; that by ordinance forbidding the interment of further bodies in the lot, and ordering the removal of those already interred there, the city lawfully abandoned the lot as a burying ground about 1870; that Charles Young, a nonresident of the state, had no knowledge of such abandonment until shortly before the bringing of this suit, in 1889; that the city remained in possession of the lot until 1875; that in 1874 an act of the legislature was passed providing that, on compliance with certain conditions, the county seat of Mahoning county should be removed from Canfield to Youngstown; that one of the conditions was that the citizens of Youngstown should provide a suitable lot in the city of Youngstown, and erect thereon a courthouse, to cost not less than $100,000, and should donate the same to the county commissioners for use as a courthouse; that in compliance with this condition the citizens of Youngstown raised a fund somewhat exceeding $100,000 and placed it in the hands of a building committee consisting of five citizens, Chauncey H. Andrews, Joseph H. Brown, Hugh B. Wick, Matthew Logan, and Henry Tod, that they might erect a courthouse, within the terms of the act; that the council of the city of Youngstown by ordinance directed the mayor by proper conveyance to convey these lots to the building committee; that the mayor accordingly signed and acknowledged a deed which, in the name of the city as grantor, purported to convey to the building committee and their successors forever, in trust, in fee simple, lot No. 95 and lot No. 96, with power to sell either or both if they should see proper, and devote the proceeds thereof to the purchase of another lot suitable for a courthouse, or to exchange said lots, or either of them, for another lot, or to use said lots, or either of them, as a courthouse lot, and, when so used, to convey the same to the county commissioners in accordance with an act of the legislature under which the courthouse was to be erected. The word 'heirs did not follow the names of the grantees as a word of limitation, either in the granting or habendum clause of the deed. The testatum clause read as follows: 'In witness whereof the said city of Youngstown and the said council have caused said William M. Osborn, mayor aforesaid, to subscribe his name, and have caused the corporate seal of said city to be affixed, to these presents. William M. Osborn, Mayor. (City of Youngstown Seal.) ' The acknowledgment was in the name of William M. Osborn as mayor, and in the name of the city of Youngstown.

The deed was executed March 30, 1875. Somewhat more than $100,000 was spent in the erection of the courthouse upon lot No. 96. By deed of August 10, 1876, the building committee by proper deed conveyed by Joseph M. Jackson and others the fee to said lot No. 96, with the improvements thereon, in consideration of $10. The county commissioners took possession, and themselves added improvements costing upwards of $15,000. The county has been in possession of the courthouse ever since.

A. W. Jones, George F. Arrel, and Disney Rogers, for county commissioners.

F. E. Hutchins and Sanderson & Norris, for Young.

Before TAFT, Circuit Judge, and RICKS, District Judge.

TAFT Circuit Judge, (after stating the facts.)

The persons who may have the benefit of the occupying claimant law are pointed out in section 5786 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio, which reads as follows:

'Sec. 5786. A person in the quiet possession of lands or tenements, and claiming to own the same, who has obtained title thereto, and is in possession of the same, without fraud or collusion on his part, shall not be evicted or turned out of possession by any person who sets up and proves an adverse and better title, until the occupying claimant or his heirs are fully paid the value of all the lasting and valuable improvements made on the land by him, or by the person under whom he holds, previous to receiving actual notice by the commencement of suit on said adverse claim, whereby such eviction may be effected, unless such occupying claimant refuse to pay to the person so setting up and proving an adverse or better title the value of the land without improvements made thereon as aforesaid, upon demand of the successful claimant or his heirs, as hereinafter provided, when (1) such occupying claimant holds a plain and connected title, in law or equity, derived from the records of a public office; or (2) holds the same by deed, devise, descent, contract, bond or agreement, from and under a person claiming title as aforesaid derived from the records of a public office, or by deed duly authenticated and recorded; or (3) under sale on execution, against a person claiming title as aforesaid derived from the records of a public office, or by deed duly authenticated and recorded; or (4) under a sale for taxes authorized by the laws of this state, or the laws of the territory northwest of the Ohio river; or (5) under a sale or conveyance made by executors, administrators, or guardians, or by any other person or persons, in pursuance of an order of court or decree in chancery, where lands are or have been directed to be sold.'

It is clear that the county commissioners in this case do not come within the section just quoted unless, in accordance with subdivision 2, they have been in quiet possession of the courthouse lot, 'by deed * * * from and under a person claiming title as aforesaid * * * by deed duly authenticated and recorded. ' It has been held by the supreme court of Ohio in Beardsley v. Chapman, 1 Ohio St. 118, that the words 'by deed duly authenticated and recorded' mean a deed to a person under whom the occupant claims, and not a deed to the occupant himself; and in the same case it was held that the deed to the occupant and the deed to the grantor of the occupant must both apparently convey an estate which would justify the holder of it in making permanent and lasting improvements. It was held as a corollary that an occupying claimant will not be presumed to know any defects or recitals that appear in deeds prior to that under which his grantor holds. It follows that the county commissioners must show a title in them by a deed in fee to them from a grantor whose title was also by a deed in fee; and the question here to be decided is whether the deeds introduced in evidence comply with this requisite of the statute.

Counsel for Young contend that the commissioners did not come within section 5786, for the following reasons: (1) Because the deed from the city to the building committee was not properly executed to the city, so as to pass any title whatever to the committee. (2) Because the deed, not containing the word limitation, 'heirs,' in the granting or habendum clause, conveys only a life estate, which under the decision in Beardsley v. Chapman, 1 Ohio St. 118, would not authorize the erection of lasting and permanent improvements. (3) Because the deed from the city is void on its face for want of power in the city to make such a conveyance. (4) That the deeds from the city to the building committee, and from the building committee to the county commissioners, constitute in fact but one conveyance from the city to the commissioners, the building...