Young v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 20 March 2018 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 0265-17-4 |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Virginia |
| Parties | MICHAEL ANTHONY YOUNG v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA |
UNPUBLISHED
Present: Chief Judge Huff, Judges Alston and Russell
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY
Catherine French, Chief Appellate Counsel (Virginia Indigent Defense Commission, on briefs), for appellant.
Christopher P. Schandevel, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Michael Anthony Young (appellant) argues that his right to a speedy trial was violated pursuant to Code § 19.2-243. He specifically contends that neither the enumerated continuance exception nor an implied exception to Code § 19.2-243 excuses the Commonwealth's delay in timely prosecuting appellant. We disagree.
On November 25, 2015, appellant and Lorenzo Huffman (Huffman) allegedly robbed a minor, D.C. Among the items taken were D.C.'s iPhone and money. Appellant and Huffman left the scene in a vehicle driven by S.K. D.C.'s father called 911 to report the robbery. Deputy Osborn first responded to the call, and upon his arrival, began interviewing D.C. Deputy Osborn recorded D.C.'s responses through handwritten notes. Deputy Cote then responded to the scene--he was wearing a body camera. From that point forward, the interview was captured ontape. As D.C.'s interview was taking place, a vehicle matching the description of the vehicle used by the assailants in the robbery was stopped. Inside were S.K., Huffman, and appellant. Huffman and appellant denied involvement and were taken into custody. Later that evening, Huffman and appellant were interrogated in separate rooms by Detective Cunningham. Upon realizing that the recording software malfunctioned, Detective Cunningham briefly interviewed Huffman and appellant again, capturing those interviews on her cell phone. Appellant was charged with robbery (Count 1), conspiracy to commit robbery (Count 2), grand larceny (Count 3), conspiracy to commit a felony (Count 4), and false identification to law enforcement (Count 5). The case was to be heard before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court of Loudoun County (J&DR court) due to D.C.'s minor status. Appellant filed a motion for discovery on December 4, 2015. The Commonwealth provided appellant open file discovery on December 22, 2015. Appellant requested additional information thought to be contained in the file. The Commonwealth then provided the 911 call made by D.C.'s father, which occurred one hour after the alleged robbery. On January 14, 2016, the Commonwealth produced the following evidence: Deputy Cote's body camera footage, recordings of Detective Cunningham's interviews with appellant and Huffman, an analysis of S.K.'s phone, an analysis of appellant's phone, and photographs. The Commonwealth further provided appellant with the ability to review and take notes on Detective Cunningham's report. The preliminary hearing scheduled to be heard on January 20, 2016 was continued on appellant's motion to allow him time to review the evidence.
On February 3, 2016, appellant requested additional information, including an analysis of D.C.'s phone, written statements by Huffman, as well as the substance of the unrecorded statements made by Huffman and appellant in their unrecorded interviews. The parties appeared before the J&DR court on February 10, 2016. Appellant again inquired about the status of ananalysis of D.C.'s phone and was advised that the sheriff's office took the phone, that Deputy Butler met with D.C. to examine the phone's content, that D.C. could not remember the required passcode, and that the phone was then returned to D.C. The Commonwealth represented to appellant that no other analysis had been done. The case was continued on a joint motion to March 2, 2016. On February 21, 2016, appellant requested via email additional discs the Commonwealth was copying for appellant. The Commonwealth responded that appellant had most of them except for footage from Deputy Roque's body camera and Deputy Selby's cruiser. The Commonwealth then allowed appellant to view the footage from Deputy Roque as it was unable to be copied and produced the footage from Deputy Selby.
The preliminary hearing occurred on March 2, 2016. Appellant's robbery charge (Count 1) was bound over to be heard by the grand jury. Appellant was directly indicted on Counts 2-5. The Commonwealth then informed appellant that Deputy Butler was unsuccessful in evaluating D.C.'s phone and subsequently forwarded appellant an email exchange between Deputy Butler and the Commonwealth dated March 6. At the March 15, 2016 scheduling hearing before the Circuit Court of Loudoun County (trial court), the trial court asked when speedy trial circumstances would be implicated. The Commonwealth responded that it was August 2, 2016. By agreement, the cases were set for a jury trial on August 1-3, 2016. The trial court then ordered that appellant would be held without bond pending trial. On the same date, the trial court entered a discovery order, directing the Commonwealth to complete discovery within 30 days and further stated that the Commonwealth had a continuing obligation to "timely provide" evidence in compliance with Brady v. Maryland, 377 U.S. 83 (1963), and its progeny.
Appellant filed a Brady motion on May 10, 2016. On May 31, 2016, the trial court heard that motion in addition to several others. The Commonwealth agreed to provide a written response by June 3. The Commonwealth complied and noted that there were issues in acquiringsome of the requested information. Appellant emailed the Commonwealth on June 16, 2016 again requesting information related to the case, such as Huffman's statements to Deputy Cunningham, Huffman's written statement, and initial descriptions given to Deputy Osborn. The Commonwealth responded on June 22, indicating that the information was forthcoming. By June 29, appellant still had not received the requested information, so appellant again contacted the Commonwealth and received the same reply. The parties appeared for a hearing on appellant's motion to compel on July 7, 2016. There, the Commonwealth produced Deputy Cote's and Deputy Osborn's handwritten notes. The Commonwealth stated that the sheriff's office was unable to locate Huffman's written statement.
Also on July 7, the Commonwealth for the first time provided over 1,000 recorded telephone calls made by appellant while incarcerated. On July 12, appellant was given access to Huffman's statements. Appellant was also informed for the first time that there was a certificate of analysis completed on D.C.'s phone. Results were "inconclusive" when comparing the found latent print to appellant's fingerprints. Appellant complained that this late disclosure prevented appellant from additional investigation of the phone as it was ultimately returned to D.C. On July 14, the Commonwealth responded to appellant's motion for discovery and inspection and provided appellant a recording of a July 13 "proffer session" with Huffman; Huffman had agreed to the proffer session with the Commonwealth and to testify against appellant in exchange for a lighter sentence. The session was supposed to occur on June 1. Huffman provided inconsistent statements in his proffer. Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the indictments on July 15, 2016, arguing that appellant is "forced . . . to choose between his right to a speedy trial and his right to the effective assistance of counsel" due to the Commonwealth's discovery failures.
On July 19, 2016, the trial court heard appellant's motion to dismiss in which appellant argued that the Commonwealth's alleged discovery violations merited dismissal. TheCommonwealth acknowledged that its most egregious failure was not divulging the certificate of analysis on D.C.'s phone. The Commonwealth noted that law enforcement personnel indicated that no analysis had been done on D.C.'s phone and that the Commonwealth had relied on that statement. The Commonwealth recalled receiving the certificate but not when. The certificate was dated January 26. The Commonwealth had previously represented to appellant on multiple occasions that no such analysis had been done. The Commonwealth suggested a stipulation or a continuance as remedies but argued that dismissal was not appropriate. The Commonwealth also suggested granting a bond and continuing the case would be appropriate to put appellant "at liberty."
Conversely, appellant argued for dismissal. Appellant noted that the Commonwealth's late disclosures forced appellant to choose between asserting "his rights to a speedy trial [or] go[ing] to trial on August 1 and be[ing] unprepared and put[ting] himself in a position to not be able to redevelop his defense . . . [and] reinvestigate his case." Appellant stated on two occasions that if the trial court did not grant the motion to dismiss "regardless of whatever other remedies the [trial c]ourt chooses to fashion . . . , [appellant's] position is . . . that we're certainly not in a position to go forward with trial on August 1." The trial court then took the matter under advisement and continued the hearing to July 25, 2016 for its ruling.
In its ruling, the trial court found that this was not "a comprehensive failure to provide discovery but because of the way the discovery has occurred or not occurred, it [i]s clear that concerns such that [appellant] has brought to the [trial court's] attention . . . are valid concerns." The trial court denied the motion to dismiss but sanctioned the Commonwealth for its discovery violations; the Commonwealth was prohibited from using the jail calls for any purpose, and it was bound by its stipulation offer regarding the certificate of analysis. Appellant reiterated thathe should not be required "to forfeit his rights to a speedy trial in light of his rights to have the...
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