Young v. Consolidated Implement Co.

• Decision Date: 20 June 1901
• Citation: 23 Utah 586,65 P. 720
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: HATTIE H. YOUNG, Appellant, v. CONSOLIDATED IMP. CO., Respondent

65 P. 720

23 Utah 586

HATTIE H. YOUNG, Appellant, v. CONSOLIDATED IMP. CO., Respondent

Supreme Court of Utah

June 20, 1901

Appeal from District Court, Salt Lake County.--Hon. Ogden Hiles Judge.

Suit to quiet title by Hattie H. Young against the Consolidated Implement Company. From a judgment in favor of defendant plaintiff appeals.

On the twenty-seventh day of March, 1891, plaintiff, Young, being the owner of certain real estate, consisting of fifty feet by eleven rods on State street, in Salt Lake City, entered into a written agreement whereby she leased it to the defendant company for a term commencing on the first day of May, 1891 to and including the first day of January, 1898, for a monthly rental of $ 150 per month, to be paid in advance on the first day of each month. By the terms of the lease, it was agreed that the defendant company should have the privilege of putting up such additional buildings, sheds, and improvements on the land as it might consider necessary for the conduct of its business during the continuance of the lease, and pay all taxes assessed against it, and at the expiration of the lease remove all such buildings, sheds, and improvements without let or hindrance from the plaintiff. At the time of the lease there was an old building standing on the north twenty-six feet of the premises, built of adobe which was called the "Blacksmith Shop," in the south part of which there were four windows, and a stairway leading to the second story, on the outside. The defendant company, on the first day of May, 1891, entered into possession of the said premises under its lease, and built a building over the south twenty-four feet of land by constructing a wall in front, and also a wall in the rear about seventy feet, parallel with the front wall, and also built against the adobe wall of the building on the south fifty feet, which was then leased by the defendant, and which was owned by Dunbar. The north side of the building was the adobe wall of the blacksmith shop. This structure was roofed, and inclosed by the defendant, the joists supporting the roof being attached to the adobe wall. During the terms of the lease the rental agreed to be paid was reduced, by consent, to $ 125 per month. In December, 1897, and prior to the expiration of the lease, it was agreed between the parties that until different arrangements were entered into the lease should be extended beyond January 1, 1898, and that the defendant company might remain in possession of said premises, in accordance with the terms, covenants, and agreements of the written lease under which they occupied the same from month to month, at the same monthly rental that had been paid, and that either party was to give the other a reasonable notice of their desire to terminate the lease. Respondent company continued to hold possession of the premises and pay the rent under the extension of the original lease from January 1, 1898, until February 28, 1900. It also appears that on January 28, 1898, the defendant company wrote to the plaintiff respecting its rights under the lease to remove the buildings it had erected at a cost of $ 3,680, and offered to sell the same for $ 1,000, and apply the rent upon its payment at a reduced rental. On February 3, 1898, Mr. Young discussed the matter of the purchase of the improvements, but said he did not have the money to purchase them, but made no claim to the same, and said the defendant company could remain in possession of the premises under the old lease at $ 125 per month, each to give notice of its termination. On August 7, 1899, defendant's manager again wrote plaintiff concerning the improvements and the sale of them. Plaintiff replied that defendant had better write to Mr. Young concerning the matter, which was done, but no reply was received. In January, 1900, defendant's agent had a talk with Mr. Rossiter, plaintiff's authorized agent, with reference to the sale of the improvements, or, if the premises were rented to others, to allow each party a share of the rental. Mr. Rossiter said he would submit the matter to Young, and said he thought some arrangement could be made, and requested that defendant make no effort to remove the improvements. In January, 1900, Mr. Rossiter informed defendant company, through its secretary, at a time when they were discussing the sale of the improvements, that when the defendant company vacated the premises he would communicate with Mr. Young, and that undoubtedly some arrangements would be made either to purchase or rent them, and divide the income, and that the defendant company should make no arrangements to remove the improvements. On the twenty-eighth of February, 1900, Mr. Rossiter requested defendant's officers not to disturb the improvements. The defendant company vacated the premises on the twenty-eighth day of February, 1900. On March 1, 1900, defendant company again wrote Rossiter, claiming the improvements, with a right to remove them, and suggesting an amicable arrangement. Rossiter saw Snow the same day, and requested that nothing be done towards removing the improvements until he could write to Mr. Young, who was in New York. Rossiter also spoke of renting the property for a saloon, and asked his opinion concerning it. On March 31, 1900, defendant's manager again wrote Rossiter, saying, if no arrangements could be made, he would remove the improvements on the following Monday. On April 2, 1900, Rossiter said to Snow that he had not yet heard from Young, and requested him not to take any steps to disturb the property, and he would arrange with his attorney for a conference. On April 3, 1900, this proceeding to quiet title was commenced, and an injunction served. A showing was made on the part of the defendant that the reason the company did not take away the improvements before it vacated the premises was because of the negotiations pending for a settlement of the claim, and because Rossiter, plaintiff's agent, had requested it not to remove them until Mr. Young could be heard from, and that it relied upon the request being made in good faith. The plaintiff, in rebuttal, gave testimony tending to show its possession since the twenty-eighth of February, 1900, and that it had improved the property. Testimony was given tending to show that in December, 1899, notice was given to the defendant company that it should not remove any of the improvements on the property. Defendant gave notice that it would vacate the property on February 28, 1900. In January, Rossiter notified defendant not to remove any of the improvements, and in February, 1900, Rossiter says he notified defendant not to remove the property, but that he did not know at that time that the lease gave the defendant a right to remove the improvements, or that it claimed any interest in them. Other portions of the defendant's testimony were disputed. It also appears that defendant Moritz had rented the premises from plaintiff, with notice of the facts herein, but he did not appear, and was in default. Upon the findings made a decree was entered granting the defendant company the right to take and remove the improvements in question, and all parties were enjoined from interfering therewith. From this decree the plaintiff appealed.

AFFIRMED.

Messrs. Young & Moyle for appellant.

Messrs. Stephens & Smith for respondent.

MINER C. J., delivered the opinion of the court. Baskin and Bartch, JJ., concur.

OPINION

MINER, C. J.

This case presents several important questions, and they have been presented in a manner that is very creditable to the counsel representing the respective litigants. The appellant insists that the court erred in holding that the improvements belonged to the respondent company, and claims that, admitting a new verbal lease was entered into at the expiration of the first, with the same conditions except as to time, the rental being payable from month to month until notice was given, then the respondent lost all claim it had to the improvements under the written lease which expired January 1, 1898. It must be conceded that the tenant had the right to remove the improvements it placed upon the property, under the conditions of the lease, during or before the expiration of the same. The lease provides that the lessee "shall have the privilege of putting up such additional buildings, sheds, and improvements as it may consider necessary for the conduct of its business during the continuance of this lease, and pay all taxes that may be assessed against the same, and at the expiration of this lease may remove all buildings, sheds, and improvements from said premises, without let or hindrance from the party of the first part." The lease was extended by the parties in December, 1897, and before its expiration it was agreed between them, an the court found, that "it was mutually agreed by the plaintiff and the defendant company that said lease should be extended beyond the term for which it was originally entered into, to wit, January 1, 1898, and that the defendant company might...