Young v. CSL Plasma, Inc.

Decision Date21 July 2022
Docket NumberC. A. 3:21-cv-1208-SAL
PartiesMaurice Young, Plaintiff, v. CSL Plasma Inc., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

Maurice Young, Plaintiff,
v.

CSL Plasma Inc., Defendant.

C. A. No. 3:21-cv-1208-SAL

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Columbia Division

July 21, 2022


OPINION & ORDER

Sherri A. Lydon United States District Judge

This matter is before the court on Defendant CSL Plasma, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 23, Plaintiff Maurice Young's cross-motion for partial summary judgment, ECF No. 27, and Defendant's Motion in Limine, ECF No. 37. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants Defendant's motion for summary judgment in part, denies Plaintiff's partial motion for summary judgment, and grants Defendant's motion in limine.

BACKGROUND

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed this suit against Defendant in the Court of Common Pleas for Richland County, South Carolina, asserting claims of invasion of privacy, defamation, and loss of consortium. See [ECF No. 1.] On April 23, 2021, Defendant removed the action to this court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Id. On May 5, 2021, Defendant filed a motion to consolidate this case with Courtney Young v. CSL Plasma, No.: 3:20-cv-02720, a case filed by Plaintiff's wife, Courtney Young (“Mrs. Young.”). Plaintiff opposed consolidation, and the court denied the motion. See [ECF No. 17.]

On September 2, 2021, Defendant filed its motion for summary judgment on all causes of action. [ECF No. 23.] On October 1, 2021, Plaintiff filed his response in opposition and a partial

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motion for summary judgment on his invasion of privacy and defamation causes of action. [ECF Nos. 26, 27.] Thereafter, Defendant filed its reply in support of its motion for summary judgment and in opposition to Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment. [ECF No. 29.]

On February 28, 2022, Defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude testimony and evidence related to Mrs. Young's employment discrimination claims. [ECF No. 37.] Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition, and Defendant filed a reply. [ECF Nos. 40, 42.]

The court held a hearing on June 17, 2022. All pending motions, therefore, have been fully briefed, heard and are ripe for consideration by this court.

II. Relevant Undisputed Facts

Defendant is a human plasma collection business and operates two donation centers in Columbia, South Carolina, referred to as the Columbia 612 and Columbia 217 centers. Defendant tests every plasma donation for HIV, hepatitis B, and hepatitis C. See [ECF No. 23-3 at 4.] If a donor sample reacts positively on a viral marker it is deemed “unsuitable,” and a deferral is automatically applied to the donor's data profile. Id. Every morning, “quality staff” at the plasma centers run an Unacceptable Test Results Tracking Log Report (“UTRTL”) to identify any new test results posted and determine additional steps to be implemented for donors identified on the report. Donors are informed of their unsuitable test by mail or in person when they return to a center. See [ECF No. 23 at 9]; [ECF No. 23-4 at 4]; [ECF No. 23-2, C. Young Dep. 57:24-58:12.] If a donor's sample reacts to the hepatitis B viral marker, “quality staff” also run an address search to identify potential cohabitants of the donor who may also be plasma donors. If the system identifies an exact address match for the deferred donor in the system, the match is designated as a cohabitant and an “Investigative Address Match” note is placed on the cohabitant's donor profile.

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[ECF No. 23-4 at 6.] Donors deferred based on their cohabitant status are flagged by reception at their next visit for further investigation. [ECF No. 23 at 9 (citing ECF No. 23-4 at 18).]

Plaintiff and his wife, Mrs. Young, periodically donated plasma at Defendant's centers. See C. Young Dep. 52-54. Plaintiff donated exclusively at the Columbia 217 center, and his wife donated at the Columbia 612 center where she was also employed. See id. 54-55. On or about March 20, 2019, Plaintiff's donor sample reacted positively for the viral marker for hepatitis B. [ECF No. 23-10 at 3.] Subsequently, Gregory Hines (“Hines”), Assistant Center Manager for Columbia 217, searched the CSL system for cohabitants of the Plaintiff and placed an Investigative Address note on Mrs. Young's donor profile. See id.; [ECF Nos. 23-9, 23-11.] The next day, while at work at the Columbia 612 Center, Mrs. Young was informed by Dr. Jennings in a private office that she had been deferred based on her status as a “cohabitant” of a donor, her husband, who had received reactive test results for Hepatitis B. See C. Young. Dep. 72-76. Mrs. Young stated she understood that the test result was not a diagnosis and that her husband should seek further testing with an outside physician. Id. 76:11-77:14.

Thereafter, Mrs. Young called Plaintiff and informed him of the unsuitable test result. [ECF No. 23-8, Pl. Dep. 9:13-20.] Defendant had not notified Plaintiff of the test result at that point. See id. Plaintiff was subsequently tested for Hepatitis B at the VA hospital, and the test came back negative. See [ECF No. 26-1.]

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if a party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “In determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities in favor of the nonmoving party.” HealthSouth Rehab. Hosp. v. American Nat'l Red Cross,

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101 F.3d 1005, 1008 (4th Cir. 1996). The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

Once the moving party makes this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials averred in the pleading, but rather must, by affidavits or other means permitted by the Rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; see also Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. A party asserting that a fact is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A). A litigant is unable to “create a genuine issue of material fact through mere speculation or the building of one inference upon another.” Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985). “[W]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, disposition by summary judgment is appropriate.” Teamsters Joint Council No. 83 v. Centra, Inc., 947 F.2d 115, 119 (4th Cir. 1996).

“When faced with cross-motions for summary judgment, the court must review each motion separately on its own merits ‘to determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law.'” Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Philip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, 122 F.3d 58, 62 n.4 (1st Cir. 1997)). “[T]he court must take care to ‘resolve all factual disputes and any competing, rational inferences in the light most favorable' to the party

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opposing that motion.” Id. (citing Wightman v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 100 F.3d 228, 230 (1st Cir. 1996)).

ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION

Plaintiff makes two arguments in support of summary judgment in his favor: (1) Defendant wrongfully intruded into and publicized his private affairs when Defendant notified Mrs. Young of the unsuitable test result and made the test results public to other employees; and (2) Defendant defamed Plaintiff by publicizing false statements about a disease he does not have and speculating about his personal life. [ECF No. 27-1 at 3.]

Defendant argues the opposite position and asserts: (1) Plaintiff's invasion of privacy claims fail as a matter of law because Defendant rightfully possessed Plaintiff's medical records and never made Plaintiff's test result or deferral status public; and (2) Plaintiff's defamation claim fails as a matter of law because Plaintiff's test result reacted positively for Hepatitis B, even if he did not have the disease, and communications to other employees are subject to a qualified privilege. [ECF No. 23 at 5.] Additionally, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's loss of consortium claim fails as a matter of law because he does not advance evidence of intentional or tortious conduct by Defendant against Mrs. Young. Id.

For the reasons set forth herein, the court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff's claims for invasion of privacy and defamation fail as a matter of law but disagrees that Plaintiff's claim for loss of consortium fails as a matter of law. And regarding Defendant's motion in limine, the court agrees with Defendant that evidence concerning Mrs. Young's discrimination claims is excluded. Plaintiff may, however, introduce the fact of her termination.

I. Invasion of Privacy

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South Carolina recognizes three separate and distinct causes of action arising “under the rubric of invasion of privacy: (1) wrongful appropriation of personality; (2) wrongful publicizing of private affairs; and (3) wrongful intrusion into private affairs. Snakenberg v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 383 S.E.2d 2, 5 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989). Here, Plaintiff has identified claims arising under the latter two causes of action-wrongful intrusion into private affairs and wrongful publication of private affairs. The court will address each cause of action in turn, below.

A. Wrongful Intrusion into Private Affairs

“To prevail on an action for the wrongful intrusion into private affairs, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) an intrusion; (2) into that which is private; (3) which is substantial and...

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