Young v. Davis

• Decision Date: 09 March 2020
• Docket Number: CIVIL NO. 2:18-CV-109
• Parties: JOE P. YOUNG, Plaintiff, v. LORIE DAVIS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

JOE P. YOUNG, Plaintiff, v. LORIE DAVIS, Defendant.

CIVIL NO. 2:18-CV-109

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION

March 9, 2020

ORDER

The Court is in receipt of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. No. 33; Plaintiff's Response to the Motion, Dkt. No. 34; the Magistrate Judge's Memorandum and Recommendation ("M&R"), Dkt. No. 35; and Plaintiff's Objections to the M&R, Dkt. No. 37.

After independently reviewing the filings, the record, and applicable law, the Court ADOPTS IN PART and DECLINES TO ADOPT IN PART the M&R, Dkt. No. 35. Accordingly, the Court DENIES IN PART and GRANTS IN PART Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. No. 33.

I. Background

The Court adopts Magistrate Judge Jason B. Libby's description of the procedural background:

Plaintiff is a prisoner at the McConnell Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Criminal Institutions Division (TDCJ). Plaintiff was convicted in Tarrant County of murder with a deadly weapon and sentenced on May 22, 1998 to life imprisonment. He was subsequently convicted in Van Zandt County of burglary of a habitation and sentenced on October 6, 1998 to ten years in prison. Plaintiff's allegations arise in connection with his current assignment to the McConnell Unit.

Plaintiff sued the following defendants in their individual and official capacities: (1) Assistant Warden Corey Furr; (2) Veronica Inmon, member of the Unit Classification Committee (UCC); and (3) Warden Sifuentes.

Plaintiff, a practitioner of the Jewish faith, alleges he was denied the right to wear a religious beard after being classified as a security risk. Plaintiff alleges, however, that his security classification was based on a false charge that he attempted to escape from prison in 1999. Plaintiff asserts violations of his right to practice his faith under the RLUIPA [Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, et seq] as well as the First Amendment. He seeks injunctive relief in the form of being allowed to grow a religious beard.

A Spears hearing was conducted on May 23, 2018. On June 4, 2018, the undersigned issued a Memorandum and Recommendation (M&R), recommending that the Court: (1) retain Plaintiff's First Amendment claim against Warden Sifuentes in his official capacity for injunctive relief; (2) dismiss all remaining claims against the remaining Defendants for failure to state a claim and/or as frivolous. (D.E. 9). The undersigned ordered service of Plaintiff's complaint on Warden Sifuentes. (D.E. 10). Senior United States District Judge Hilda G. Tagle subsequently adopted the M&R. (D.E. 14).

On July 19, 2018, Warden Sifuentes filed a Motion to Dismiss, contending in part that he "lack[ed] the authority to change or make exceptions to TDCJ's security and religious policies that would allow [Plaintiff] to wear a religious beard." (D.E. 12, p. 3). During a telephone hearing conducted on October 11, 2018, counsel for Warden Sifuentes acknowledged that Director Lorie Davis is the proper party capable of granting the injunctive relief requested by Plaintiff in this case. The parties then agreed to the substitution of Director Davis in place of Warden Sifuentes as the proper defendant in this case. In two Orders entered on October 11, 2018, the undersigned substituted Director Davis for Warden Sifuentes and denied Warden Sifuentes's Motion to Dismiss as moot. (D.E. 20, 21).

After being served with the complaint, Director Davis filed her answer on November 26, 2018. (D.E. 23). On May 28, 2019, Director Davis filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (D.E. 33). Plaintiff subsequently filed his response. (D.E. 34).

Dkt. No. 35 at 2-3. On October 22, 2019, Magistrate Judge Libby published the M&R, recommending that the Court grant summary judgment for Defendant and dismiss the case. Dkt. No. 35. On November 18, 2019, Plaintiff filed objections to the M&R. Dkt. No. 37.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

"[A] court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). "A genuine issue of material fact exists when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-movant." Piazza's Seafood World, LLC v. Odom, 448 F.3d 744, 752 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial and mandates the entry of summary judgment for the moving party." United States ex rel. Farmer v. City of Houston, 523 F.3d 333, 337 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The movant bears the burden of identifying those portions of the record it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. Reyna, 401 F.3d 347, 349 (5th Cir. 2005); see FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). "If the burden lies with the nonmoving party, the movant may either (1) submit evidence negating the existence of some material element of the opponent's claim or defense, or (2) if the crucial issue is one on which the opponent will bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial, demonstrate that the evidence in the record insufficiently supports the essential element or claim." Pena v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 32 F. Supp. 3d 792, 796 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (citing Celotex, 447 U.S. at 330).

The Court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Piazza's Seafood World, 448 F.3d at 752. Factual controversies must be resolved in favor of the non-movant, "but only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). "When assessing whether a dispute to any material fact exists, [courts] consider all of the evidence in the record but refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence." Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008).

"Once the moving party has initially shown 'that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's cause,' the non-movant must come forward with 'specific facts' showing a genuine factual issue for trial." TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James of Wash., 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325). The non-movant may not merely rely on conclusory allegations or the pleadings. See Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990). The non-movant's burden is not satisfied by "conclusory allegations," "unsubstantiated assertions," or "by only a scintilla of evidence." Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

III. Undisputed Facts¹

a. Plaintiff's Attempts to Wear Religious Beard

Plaintiff arrived at the McConnell Unit in August 2003. He has been actively practicing the Jewish faith since 2005 and has designated the Jewish faith with the TDCJ as his religious preference. He has been seeking to wear a religious beard since 2014 when the TDCJ changed its policy to allow inmates with sincere religious beliefs to wear a beard to a certain length. According to Plaintiff, his faith requires him to grow a religious beard. See Dkt. No. 35 at 4-5.

Before arriving at the McConnell Unit, Plaintiff was housed in the Allred Unit. In September 1999, Plaintiff was charged with possession of tobacco products and possession of contraband materials that could aid him in an escape attempt. Dkt. No. 26-1. In a hearing conducted on September 21, 1999, a disciplinary hearing officer found Plaintiff guilty of both charges. Id. at 5. Due to the incident, Plaintiff's classification record contains an "EA" code ("Escape Attempt"). Dkt. No. 33-1 at 3.

In 2014, Plaintiff filed an Inmate Request to an Official ("I-60") to wear a religious beard, which was later denied due to the EA code on his record. Dkt. No. 1-1 at 3. In a Step 1 Grievance, dated December 15, 2017, Plaintiff complained about being denied a religious beard and disputed his EA code which caused him to receive a "security precaution" designation. Id. His Step 1 Grievance was denied on January 24, 2018, concluding the "security precaution designator" was correct and that, pursuant to agency policy, he was ineligible to grow a religious beard. Id. at 4.

In a Step 2 Grievance, dated January 28, 2018, Plaintiff complained again about the EA designation. Id. at 1. He asserted that he was improperly denied a religious beard, as he never had a history of escape or attempted escape. Id. His Step 2 Grievance was denied, concluding that those with "security precaution designator for escape and/or attempted escape . . . are not allowed to grow a religious beard." Id. at 2.

b. Relevant TDCJ Policies

The TDCJ Security Memorandum 6.16 ("SM-6.16"), dated December 1, 2017, sets forth the "grooming standards for offenders and ensures compliance for reasons related to security, safety, and sanitation." Dkt. No. 26-2 at 3. "The only exceptions are due to a medically documented issue[]." Id. SM-6.16 specifies that "[r]eligious beards shall be no more than fist length and not exceed four inches outward from the face." Id. at 4. "Offenders with a security precaution designator for escape and/or attempted escape in accordance with AD-4.11, 'Security Precaution Designators,' are not allowed to grow a religious beard." Id. at 5.

The TDCJ Unit Classification Procedure 6.03 ("UCP-6.03"), dated March 2018, provides that offenders with "any ES, EA or EZ codes" in their records have security precaution designators for escape. Dkt. No. 26-3 at 3. "An offender will be denied [religious beard approval] if he has a history of escape." Id.

The TDCJ Administrative Directive 4.11 (AD-4.11) defines "Escape Attempt (EA)" as "a code used to...