Young v. Ershick
| Decision Date | 29 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 4:21-CV-00644-ALM |
| Parties | LINDA YOUNG Plaintiff, v. JAMES ERSHICK, Individually and as Executor of the ESTATE OF CONSTANCE ERSHICK, DECEASED Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
Pending before the Court are Plaintiff Linda Young's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #23) and Defendant James Ershick's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #29). Having considered the motions and the relevant pleadings, the Court finds that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #23) should be GRANTED in part, and Defendant James Ershick's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #29) should be DENIED.
In 2013, Eric James Ershick (the “Decedent”) married Plaintiff Linda Young (“Young”) (Dkt. #30 at p 5). Prior to entering marriage, Decedent and Plaintiff allegedly entered into a premarital agreement (the “PMA”) (Dkt. #29, Exhibit 13). On October 9 2019, the Decedent died without a will (Dkt. #30 at p. 5). On December 12, 2019, Plaintiff filed an Application for Administration of the Estate of Decedent in the Denton County Probate Court (Dkt. #23 at p. 2). On January 16, 2020, James and Constance Ershick-Decedent's parents (the “Ershicks”)-filed an opposition and objection to Plaintiff's application (Dkt. #23 at p. 2). In May 2020 the Ershicks served several discovery requests on Young (Dkt. #32, Exhibit 2 ¶ 10; Dkt. #32, Exhibit 1 pp. 2336). For example, Request for Production #23 stated:
Provide a copy of all estate planning documents (e.g. wills, powers of attorney, directive to physicians, healthcare power of attorney, designation of agent, trusts, bank signature cards, survivorship agreements, marital or premarital agreements, etc.) made or executed from date of marriage to date of death by either you or Decedent.
(Dkt. #32, Exhibit 1 at p. 34). Further, Request for Production #5 requested all “joint signature documents between you and Decedent . . . from date of marriage to date of death” (Dkt. #29-1 at p. 7).
According to Young's attorney, David Chowins (“Chowins”), at the time of the discovery, under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, there was no duty to disclose relevant documents unless properly requested (Dkt. #32, Exhibit 2 ¶ 11). Further, according to him, because of the date restrictions in the requests and based on some objections he made, he believed that no request required the disclosures of the PMA (Dkt. #32, Exhibit 2 ¶ 10). Between June and August 2020, the Ershicks filed three motions to compel regarding the discovery responses-though none specifically related to the PMA (Dkt. #29-9; Dkt. #29-10; Dkt. #29-11). On August 20, 2020, the Denton County Probate Court held a hearing on the motions to compel but did not rule on them (Dkt. #29-14 at p. 5).
On August 31, 2020, Richard Kelsey (“Kelsey”), the Ershick's attorney, took the deposition of Plaintiff (Dkt. #32, Exhibit 1 at p. 41). After Kelsey asked whether Plaintiff and Decedent “ha[d] a premarital agreement of any kind,” Plaintiff responded:
Yes, I guess you could say that. We - - we had this little rinky-dink thing that we printed off. And then we found out later that it was probably no good because we didn't go to a lawyer and have one drawn up and signed and notarized and all of that kind of good stuff, so . . .
(Dkt. #32, Exhibit 1 at p. 41). Kelsey then asked Plaintiff if she still had a copy of the agreement, and Plaintiff responded “Probably” (Dkt. #32, Exhibit 1 at p. 41). At that point, Kelsey asked Plaintiff why he had not received the agreement even though he had “asked for [it],” and Chowins objected to the question on work-product grounds (Dkt. #32, Exhibit 1 at p. 41).
On October 27, 2020, almost two months after Plaintiff's deposition and prior to any ruling on the discovery motions, the parties attended a mediation session via Zoom video conferencing (Dkt. #23 at p. 2; Dkt. #30 at p. 3). At the mediation, the parties entered a Rule 11 Agreement (the “Rule 11 Agreement” or the “Agreement”) pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure (Dkt. #23 at p. 2). The Rule 11 Agreement was signed by all parties and filed with the Denton County Probate Court the same day (Dkt. #23 at p. 2). The Rule 11 Agreement provides that it “will be reduced to a [later-drafted] Family Settlement Agreement (“FSA”),” which “shall recite additional terms necessary to complete the Agreement.” (Dkt. #29, Exhibit 12).[1] However, section nine of the Rule 11 Agreement also provides that the Agreement “is intended to be a complete and final agreement . . . not subject to revocation by the Parties[,] and is intended to be the basis for a final and binding settlement” (Dkt #29, Exhibit 12).
According to the Rule 11 Agreement, Plaintiff agreed to pay the Ershicks $5,000, make the 1979 Chevrolet Camaro available for pickup at 11122 Sugar Mill Lane, Frisco, Texas (“Sugar Mill Lane”), and subsequently transfer title to it, as well as deliver the property in Exhibit A of the Rule 11 Agreement to the Ershicks at Sugar Mill Lane (Dkt. #29, Exhibit 12). In exchange, the Ershicks agreed to make no other claim to any property of Decedent's estate including the real property located at Sugar Mill Lane and agreed to allow Plaintiff to be the independent administrator (Dkt. #29, Exhibit 12). Additionally, under the Agreement, all parties agreed to execute global releases and to execute all documents to affect the terms of the Agreement, and each agreed to pay their own attorney's fees (Dkt. #29, Exhibit 12). Per the Rule 11 Agreement, Chowins was tasked with drafting the initial FSA and Kelsey was given seven days to respond to the FSA draft (Dkt. #29, Exhibit 12).
On November 4, 2020, pursuant to the Rule 11 Agreement, Chowins submitted a draft of the FSA to Kelsey (Dkt. #23 at p. 3; Dkt. #30 at p. 4). On November 6, 2020, Kelsey responded to Chowins' email, redrafting parts of the FSA (Dkt. #23, Exhibit 4). The email exchanges reveal that the parties disagreed over details of the FSA-namely whether the Ershicks would have one or three days to retrieve the property identified in Exhibit A of the Rule 11 Agreement at Sugar Mill Lane and whether the Ershicks would be allowed to walk through the Sugar Mill Lane property to retrieve the personal items, as well as whether additional items of Decedent would be given to the Ershicks in exchange for something of value (Dkt. #23, Exhibit 4; Dkt. #23, Exhibit 5). According to Plaintiff, she was ready, able, and willing to perform every obligation required of her under the Rule 11 Agreement and the proposed FSA, but the Ershicks refused to sign the FSA (Dkt. #23 at p. 3; Dkt. #30 at pp. 4-5). Indeed, Defendant admits that he withdrew his consent to the Rule 11 Agreement via email on November 17, 2020 (Dkt. #30 at p. 6).
On February 24, 2021, Chowins, on behalf of Young, sent the Ershicks a notice of breach letter (Dkt. #23, Exhibit 3 at pp. 58-59). One day letter, Kelsey responded, stating: “There can be no resolution of this case until you and your client produce the premarital agreement your client acknowledged under oath existed and that she had a copy of” (Dkt. #30, Exhibit 5). Moreover, in the letter, Kelsey acknowledged that his “client has repudiated the Rule 11 Agreement” (Dkt. #30, Exhibit 5). On March 25, 2021, the Probate Court ordered Young to produce the PMA, which she later did (Dkt. #29 at p. 3). On April 21, 2021, Young filed suit for breach of contract in the Denton County Probate Court, requesting specific performance, damages, and attorney's fees (Dkt. #2).[2] On July 30, 2021, Defendant James Ershick was served, and, on August 14, 2021, Defendant removed the action from the Denton County Probate Court to the Eastern District Court of Texas based on diversity jurisdiction (Dkt. #1).
On February 10, 2022, Plaintiff filed her motion for summary judgment, requesting that the Court enter judgment on her breach of contract claim (Dkt. #23). On February 28, 2022, Defendant filed his motion for summary judgment, asking the Court to grant him a take nothing judgment and deny Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #29). On March 10, 2022, Defendant filed his response to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #30). On March 17, Plaintiff filed her reply to her summary judgment motion, (Dkt. #31), and on March 24, 2022, Defendant filed his sur-reply (Dkt. #33). On March 21, 2022, Plaintiff filed her response to Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #32). On March 28, 2022, Defendant filed his reply (Dkt. #34), and Plaintiff later filed her sur-reply (Dkt. #35; Dkt. #36).
The purpose of summary judgment is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Summary judgment is proper under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A dispute about a material fact is genuine when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Substantive law identifies which facts are material. Id. The trial court “must resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary judgment.” Casey Enters., Inc. v. Am. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 655 F.2d 598, 602 (5th Cir. 1981).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of its motion and identifying “depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for...
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