Young v. Harmon, Cause No. 1:01-CV-440 (N.D. Ind. 5/13/2003)
| Decision Date | 13 May 2003 |
| Docket Number | Cause No. 1:01-CV-440. |
| Parties | JERRY A. YOUNG Plaintiff, v. DAVID C. HARMON, STATE OF INDIANA, CAROLYN BULLOCK, & INDIANA NATIONAL GUARD HQ 122D FIGHTER WING Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' January 21, 2003 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and the March 11, 2003, response of the Plaintiff, Jerry Young (hereafter, either ("Plaintiff" or "Young") which he styles as his "Motion to Denie [sic] Defendants Motion for Judgement on the Pleadings" (hereafter, "Plaintiff's Response"). No reply has been filed.
The Defendants1 principally argue that all of Young's claims are barred by various statutes of limitations and that in any event, the Plaintiff's perceived disability claim under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and his Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., claim cannot be applied against the State of Indiana or any of its employees or officials. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c).
For the following reasons, Defendants' motion will be GRANTED.
Young was employed as an airport firefighter by the State of Indiana Military Department ("MDI") from January 8, 1989 until June 21, 1999.2 (See Docket #31, ¶1, & EEOC Charge of Discrimination, June 22, 1999). On June 22, 1999, Young, who has chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, was placed on medical disability as a result of failing a physical on June 7, 1999. (See EEOC Charge of Discrimination & Amended Complaint, Exhibit 12, 16).3
By letter dated July 1, 1999, David Harmon ("Harmon") informed Young that since he failed his physical, he could not perform the essential functions of a firefighter and would need to apply for disability by July 9, 1999 or the MDI would assume that he had resigned. (See Amended Complaint, Exh. 5).
After a phone conversation on July 19, 1999, with Carolyn J. Bullock ("Bullock"), a human resources official, Young was given another chance to pass the physical. In a confirming letter, Bullock informed Young that another physical was scheduled for August 11, 1999 and reiterated that the MDI "can not have a firefighter in its employ who is unable to perform the essential functions required by that position . . . all firefighters must be able to wear respirators . .. ." (See Amended Complaint, Exh. 6-7). The letter further explained Young's options as either resigning, applying for disability by August 30, 1999, or passing the respirator physical. Id. Finally, Bullock told Young that if he could not pass the physical, he would be terminated effective September 1, 1999. Id.
Young responded with a letter to Bullock on July 26, 1999, confirming that he would attend the scheduled physical on August 11, 1999 and had made "no decision to resign my employment." (See Amended Complaint, Exh. 8).
Apparently, although it is not entirely clear from the pleadings, Young either did not pass or did not attend the physical on August 11, 1999, and when he failed to file for disability as required by August 30, 1999, he was terminated effective September 3, 1999. (See Amended Complaint, Exh. 25).
On October 29, 2001, more than two years later, Young filed this case4 against Harmon and the State of Indiana in the Allen County, Indiana Superior Court alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et. seq., the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), retaliation for having filed a previous Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC, plus various state tort claims. After removal to this Court on December 6, 2001, Young amended his complaint on April 19, 2002 to add, inter alia, Bullock and the Indiana Air National Guard as defendants. As his Amended Complaint makes clear, he seeks damages from each of the defendants.5 (See Amended Complaint, p. 4).
In his response to the challenge that he filed this case too late, Young argues that he filed it within what he understood to be the appropriate statute of limitations, the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). (See Plaintiff's Response, p. 3).6 He also seems to argue that any statute of limitations should be tolled while he made an "honest effort" to resolve the case before filing a Tort Claim notice. (See Plaintiff's Response, ¶ 4).
Young also argues that the State of Indiana is not entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to the extent he is seeking prospective injunctive relief, that is, reinstatement to his job. (See Plaintiff's Response, pp. 2-3 (citing, Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908))).
"A motion under Rule 12(c) is subject to the same standard as a motion to dismiss under rule 12." Craigs, Inc. v. General Elec. Capital Corp., 12 F.3d 686, 688 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing Thomason v. Nachtrieb, 888 F.2d 1202, 1204 (7th Cir. 1989)). "Therefore, viewing all of the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, National Fidelity Life Ins. Co. v. Karangis, 811 F.2d 357, 358 (7th Cir. 1987), the district court may only grant the motion it if is beyond doubt that the non-movant can plead no facts that would support his claim for relief." U.S. v. Wood, 925 F.2d 1580, 1581 (7th Cir. 1991). "The district court may not look beyond the pleadings, and all uncontested allegations to which the parties had an opportunity to respond are taken as true." Id. "However, the district court may take into consideration documents incorporated by reference to the pleadings [and] may also take judicial notice of matters of public record." Id. at 1582.
The accrual date is when the statute of limitations begins to run. The accrual date for Young's federal claims is not necessarily when the wrong occurred, but the date—often the same, but sometimes later—on which the plaintiff discovers he has been injured.7 Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1261, 111 S. Ct. 2916, 115 L. Ed. 2d 1079 (1991) (citations omitted).
For Young's state tort claims, the cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knew or, in the exercise of ordinary diligence, could have discovered that an injury had been sustained as a result of the tortious act of another. Wehling v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 586 N.E.2d 840, 843 (Ind. 1992).
As Young seems to realize, at least he does not argue otherwise, all his claims began to run on the day his employment was terminated, September 3, 1999, or, at the latest, when he received Harmon's letter, which he contends was September 8, 1999. (See Amended Complaint, ¶12.) Therefore, those dates begin the clock on Young's claims for purposes of applying any statute of limitations.
The ADA was enacted "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). Title I of the ADA covers employment discrimination, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), while Title II covers discrimination by public entities, 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Young clearly states in his amended complaint that his ADA claim is only brought under Title I alleging "employment discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability."8 (See Amended Complaint, ¶4).
As a consequence, Young's ADA claim immediately encounters problems. For instance, he never filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC or an appropriate state agency regarding his September 1999 termination and therefore his ADA claim must be dismissed. See Stewart v. County of Brown, 86 F.3d 107, 110 (7th Cir. 1996) (). The filing deadline acts as a statute of limitations and failure to file a timely charge bars a subsequent action in federal court. Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 256-57, 101 S. Ct. 498, 503-04, 66 L. Ed. 2d 431 (1980). Consequently, Young's ADA claims are barred for failing to file a charge of discrimination.9
In addition, even though Young apparently did file a Charge of Discrimination with the Indiana Civil Rights Commission and the EEOC alleging ADA retaliation, (see the Amended Complaint, Exh.18) that claim is also barred because he failed to file this lawsuit within 90 days of receiving his September 20, 1999, Right to Sue letter from the EEOC. (See Amended Complaint, Exh. 17). See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 285, 122 S. Ct. 754, 759 (2002).
More particularly, the 90 days began to run from the date Young received notice of his right to sue, that is, when the notice was received at the address he provided to the EEOC. See Houston v. Sidley & Austin, 185 F.3d 837, 839 (7th Cir. 1999); St. Louis v. Alverno College, 744 F.2d 1314, 1317 (7th Cir. 1984). Therefore, Young obviously failed to meet the 90 day deadline and his retaliation claim is barred.10 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
In Young's response, he at least mentions the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. The Rehabilitation Act, like the ADA, forbids discrimination against qualified disabled individuals and imposes a duty on employers to make reasonable accommodations to known physical or mental limitations. Unlike the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act applies to the federal government, federal contractors, and recipients of federal financial assistance. It is not entirely clear if the MDI falls into one of these categories, but for purposes of this order, the Court will assume that it does.
As with Title...
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