Young v. Heckler, 84-2703

Citation803 F.2d 963
Decision Date29 October 1986
Docket NumberNo. 84-2703,84-2703
Parties, Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 17,140 Louis L. YOUNG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

Alan R. Bergman, Lafayette, Cal., for plaintiff-appellant.

Joseph Stein, Asst. Regional Atty., Dept. of Health & Human Services, San Francisco, Cal., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.

Before SNEED and BRUNETTI, Circuit Judges, and HUPP, * District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

This is an action for judicial review of a final decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services denying appellant Louis L. Young's claim for disability benefits and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court upheld the Secretary's decision that appellant was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Young appeals to this court, and we affirm.

FACTS

Appellant is a skilled laborer with fourteen years of formal education, including college aeronautics courses and specialized schooling in airplane automatic pilots. He has worked in overhauling automatic pilots, engine design, drafting, and, from 1975 to 1978, in disassembling and reassembling aircraft as an aircraft cabin mechanic. He stopped work on October 2, 1978 because of increased back pain. It is undisputed that appellant suffers from degenerative disc disease and that this prevents him from returning to his last position as an aircraft cabin mechanic, a job that involves significant amounts of lifting and medium to heavy exertion. However, the Secretary found that appellant was not disabled from returning to his other former occupations, and on that basis denied appellant's disability claims.

Appellant's medical history indicates that he suffers from degenerative disc disease with osteoarthritis to the lumbosacral spine. In February 1981, appellant underwent a myelogram, which, consistent with earlier diagnoses of appellant, confirmed disc protrusions with bilateral nerve root sleeve defects. There is a consensus in the medical reports that appellant should not perform heavy lifting or consistent bending. However, with one exception, appellant's examining physicians all found that appellant was capable of performing light skilled or semi-sedentary work. Prior to March 1981, this assessment of appellant's condition was shared by appellant's treating physician, Dr. R.D. Collins. On March 26, 1981, however, Dr. Collins filled out a standard insurance form, labelled a "Physician's Statement of Disability," which now stands as the only medical report that declares appellant to be entirely disabled. In filling out the standardized form, Dr. Collins checked boxes on the form indicating that appellant was "totally disabled" from performing work "for any occupation" for an "indefinite" period of time. On the same form, Dr. Collins described appellant's condition as "improved." Further, when asked to give some estimate of when the disability would end, Dr. Collins estimated a disability ending date of September 27, 1981, six months from the date of the report. Although the report was inconsistent with Dr. Collins' earlier assessment that appellant was not disabled from performing light skilled or semi-sedentary work, Dr. Collins did not indicate the basis for his change of opinion on the matter. Appellant did not submit any medical reports concerning his condition subsequent to March 1981.

The administrative record also indicates that appellant has a history of chronic alcohol In addition, Dr. Karis diagnosed a psychophysiological reaction to appellant's lower back problem that may have caused appellant to subjectively experience more intense back pain than would be suggested by physical examination. Dr. Karis, however, did not address the issue of whether appellant's psychophysiologic back pain was so intense as to entirely disable appellant from performing light skilled or semi-sedentary work.

abuse. Appellant underwent one night of alcohol detoxification treatment in 1978 and entered an alcohol abuse program in 1979. In 1978 and 1979, appellant's treating physician advised appellant to limit his use of alcohol, and in 1980 a psychiatrist, Dr. Joseph Karis, noted that appellant engaged in habitual excessive use of alcohol. At the evidentiary hearing before the administrative law judge, appellant testified that he used alcohol frequently but that his use of alcohol had never been a problem in holding a job. There was no conclusive medical evidence on the issue of whether appellant's chronic alcohol abuse disabled him from performing past relevant work. Dr. Karis, however, did express some concern about whether appellant's drinking would interfere with his ability to follow directions from superiors.

Finally, the administrative record contains evidence that appellant also suffered from intermittent depressive neurosis. However, there was no conclusive evidence on the issue of whether that condition, either alone or in combination with appellant's other afflictions, entirely disabled appellant from performing his past relevant work.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

Appellant first filed for disability benefits on October 24, 1979, claiming an inability to work since October 2, 1978 because of problems associated with degenerative disc disease and arthritis. Appellant later alleged that he also suffered from psychophysiologic back pain and moderate, intermittent depressive neurosis. Following an evidentiary hearing, an administrative law judge denied appellant's claims on February 2, 1981. In an administrative appeal, the Secretary's Appeals Council remanded the action, directing the administrative law judge to make specific findings concerning appellant's residual functional capacity in light of appellant's complaints about subjective pain and in light of subsequent clinical findings (including the February 12, 1981 myelogram and the March 26, 1981 report of Dr. Collins). In addition, the Appeals Council directed the administrative law judge to assess the evidence regarding appellant's "emotional impairment."

On remand, the administrative law judge conducted an evidentiary hearing and on March 15, 1982 denied appellant's claims, finding that appellant was not disabled from performing past relevant work. The administrative law judge concluded that "claimant's impairments, considered in combination, including consideration of his subjective complaints, alcohol and drug use, intermittent moderate depression, grip difficulty, blurriness of vision and back pain, do not prevent the performance of past relevant work."

The administrative law judge's denial of benefits was upheld by the Secretary's Appeals Council on September 15, 1982, and this action for judicial review of the Secretary's decision followed.

DISCUSSION

In this appeal, claimant argues (1) that the administrative law judge erred as a matter of law by failing to exclude from his consideration Young's own testimony minimizing the effects of his drinking habits on his ability to work; and (2) that the Secretary's finding of no disability was not supported by substantial evidence. 1

A. Standard of Review

Under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 405(g), the Secretary's denial of disability benefits will be set aside only if the Secretary's findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole or if the Secretary applied improper legal standards. Stone v. Heckler, 761 F.2d 530, 531 (9th Cir.1985). Substantial evidence "means more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842, 852 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 216, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)).

In reviewing a district court's decision upholding the Secretary's denial of benefits, our review is essentially the same as that undertaken by the district court. "We consider the district court's decision but the statutory scheme mandates a full review of the facts by our court and an independent determination as to whether the Secretary's findings are supported by substantial evidence." Stone v. Heckler, 761 F.2d at 532.

B. Appellant's Testimony Concerning His Use of Alcohol

The administrative law judge noted that appellant's "testimony shows that he enjoys the use of alcohol, that it never has been a problem regarding holding a job and that he feels he could stop it if he wanted to." Citing Brown v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 441 (9th Cir.1983), appellant argues that it was reversible error for the administrative law judge to consider or rely upon, to any extent, appellant's own testimony concerning his use of alcohol. Brown, however, held only that a finding of nondisability could not be based solely on a claimant's declaration in written interrogatories that she was not disabled by alcoholism. The panel in Brown noted that the administrative law judge erred in not holding a hearing on the issue of the claimant's alcohol-related disability, concluding that the lack of a hearing "denied the ALJ the opportunity to make credibility judgments regarding [claimant's] testimony." Brown, 713 F.2d at 443.

Far from prohibiting administrative law judges from considering testimony from claimants minimizing the effects of their alcohol intake on their job performance, Brown simply cautions that, because of alcoholics' propensity for downplaying the adverse effects of their drinking, such testimony should not be given undue weight in the face of medical evidence to the contrary. Therefore, while appellant's testimony downplaying his use of alcohol was not conclusive on the issue of the claimed...

To continue reading

Request your trial
246 cases
  • Velez v. Berryhill, Case No.: EDCV 16-01304-JDE
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Central District of California
    • 20 Junio 2017
    ..."brief and conclusionary in form with little in the way of clinical findings to support [its] conclusion." Id. (citing Young v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 963, 968 (9th Cir.1986)). Furthermore, where a treating physician's opinion about disability is premised to a significant extent upon the claiman......
  • Fields v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2:18-CV-0001-DMC
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Eastern District of California
    • 10 Julio 2019
    ...v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157,1165(9th Cir. 2001). See also, Payan v. Chater, 959F. Supp. 1197, 1203 (C.D. Cal 1996), citing Young v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 1986).Third, NP Shirikian's assessed limitations were consistent with the medical record and Mr. Fields's diagnosed impairment......
  • Myers v. Colvin
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Court (Western District of Washington)
    • 26 Junio 2013
    ...629, 631 (D.Nev.1989). This “diagnosis” does not equate to disability under the Social Security Act. See, generally, Young v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 963, 968 (9th Cir.1986); Compare, Beecher v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 693, 695–96 (9th Cir.1985). Because Chronic Pain Syndrome is neither a mental diseas......
  • Bunnell v. Sullivan, 88-4179
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
    • 30 Agosto 1990
    ...This might be true if Dr. Orchard had made any clinical findings suggesting a deterioration in Bunnell's condition, see Young v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 963, 968 (9th Cir.1986) ("Where a claimant's condition is progressively deteriorating, the most recent medical report is the most probative."), ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
4 books & journal articles
  • Case survey
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Bohr's Social Security Issues Annotated - Volume I
    • 4 Mayo 2015
    ...medical report is considered the most probative. Payan v. Chater , 959 F. Supp. 1197, 1203 (C.D. Cal. 1996), citing Young v. Heckler , 803 F.2d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 1986). Rejection of Medical Opinion Which is Based on Symptomology § 203.11 a. First Circuit The court also noted that the opini......
  • Assessment of disability issues
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Social Security Issues Annotated. Vol. I - 2014 Contents
    • 2 Agosto 2014
    ...medical report is considered the most probative. Payan v. Chater , 959 F. Supp. 1197, 1203 (C.D. Cal. 1996), citing Young v. Heckler , 803 F.2d 963, 968 (9 th Cir. 1986). § 203.11 Rejection of Medical Opinion Which is Based on Symptomology a. First Circuit The court also noted that the opin......
  • Table of Cases
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Bohr's Social Security Issues Annotated - Volume II
    • 4 Mayo 2015
    ...955 (4th Cir. 1988), § 503.9 Young v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. , 351 F.2d 644, 651-52 (E.D. Mich. 2004), §§ 1107.5, 1210.12 Young v. Heckler , 803 F.2d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 1986), § 203.10 Young v. Secretary of Health & and Human Servs. , 957 F.2d 386, 391-92 (7th Cir. 1992), § 210.12 Young v. Sec......
  • Table of cases
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Social Security Issues Annotated. Vol. II - 2014 Contents
    • 3 Agosto 2014
    ...955 (4th Cir. 1988), § 503.9 Young v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. , 351 F.2d 644, 651-52 (E.D. Mich. 2004), §§ 1107.5, 1210.12 Young v. Heckler , 803 F.2d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 1986), § 203.10 Young v. Secretary of Health & and Human Servs. , 957 F.2d 386, 391-92 (7th Cir. 1992), § 210.12 Young v. Sec......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT