Young v. Hyosung USA, Inc.
| Decision Date | 22 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 5:18-cv-507-LCB |
| Parties | ROY YOUNG, Plaintiff, v. HYOSUNG USA, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
This case is before the Court on Defendant Hyosung USA, Inc.'s (Hyosung) Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiff Roy Young's discrimination allegations. (Doc. 49). Plaintiff also filed a motion for summary judgment in support of his allegations. (Doc. 51). In response to Plaintiff's motion and evidentiary exhibits, Defendant filed three motions to strike. (Docs. 54, 57, 65). For the reasons stated below, Defendant's motions to strike are granted in part and denied in part. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted, and Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied.
Defendant moves to strike several documents Plaintiff has submitted in opposition to summary judgment. Defendant argues that the following materials should be stricken: Plaintiff's briefings; portions of Plaintiff's affidavit; and Plaintiff's evidentiary attachments.1 The Court will address each of these contentions in turn.
Courts will construe "a party's motion to strike certain evidence as an objection to that evidence's admissibility." Taylor v. City of Gadsden, 958 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1291 (N.D. Ala. 2013), aff'd, 767 F.3d 1124 (11th Cir. 2014). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(2) allows a party to object "that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). Evidence that is otherwise admissible can be submitted in inadmissible form at summary judgment. McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1573, 1584 (11th Cir. 1996).
Defendant moves to strike portions of Plaintiff's affidavit because it is a sham affidavit. (See Doc. 54 at 3). A party cannot "give[] clear answers to unambiguous questions which negate the existence of any genuine issue of material fact" then later "create such an issue with an affidavit that merely contradicts, without explanation, previously given clear testimony." Van T. Junkins & Assocs., Inc., v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 736 F.2d 656, 657 (11th Cir. 1984). A so-called "sham affidavit" is not permissible. Id. Defendant asserts that portions of Plaintiff's affidavit contradict his testimony during his deposition. (Doc. 54 at 3). Particularly, Defendant notes thatparagraphs 8, 10, and 11 of Plaintiff's affidavit should be stricken as it directly contradicts his deposition testimony. (Id.). Plaintiff contends that his affidavit is consistent with his remarks during the deposition. (Doc. 61 at 3-7).
During his deposition, Plaintiff testified that he did not ask supervisor Mark Waldron about a position in the warehouse in January 2016. (Doc. 54 at 4). However, in the affidavit Plaintiff submitted, he stated that he asked for the warehouse job. (Id.). Plaintiff's statement in his affidavit clearly opposes his previous testimony. Accordingly, paragraph 8 of Plaintiff's affidavit is stricken.
In paragraph 10 of Plaintiff's affidavit, he stated that he told one of the supervisors that the way the company was distributing jobs was racist. (Id. at 5). Plaintiff testified in his deposition that he did not mention the hiring process was racist in his grievance. (Id. at 5). While the two statements apparently contradict each other, Plaintiff seemingly is describing a personal interaction with his supervisor, not filing a grievance. Therefore, this section of Plaintiff's affidavit will not be stricken.
Finally, Plaintiff testified in paragraph 11 of his affidavit that he filed two grievances on February 1, 2016, and April 10, 2016. (Id.). He testified in his deposition that there were no other grievances than the ones he filed in 2013 and February 2016. (Id.). This statement clearly contradicts his earlier testimony abouthow many grievances he filed. Further, Plaintiff has produced no evidence of another grievance. Accordingly, this statement is stricken.
Defendant also moves to strike different elements of Plaintiff's briefing and evidentiary attachments for a variety of reasons. Particularly, Defendant moves to strike: Plaintiff's briefs2 because they do conform to the Court's initial order and violate Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 56; portions of Plaintiff's affidavit because they are irrelevant and/or immaterial; and Plaintiff's evidentiary attachments generally because they lack foundation and relevance. (See Doc. 54).
On February 14, 2020, the Court entered an order extending the deadlines for Plaintiff's responses to Defendant's motions. (Doc. 58). Plaintiff's response to Defendant's motion for summary judgment was due by February 28, 2020. (Id. at 1). While Plaintiff's former response to Defendant's motion was untimely, (Doc. 56), Plaintiff's amended response, (Doc. 62), was filed according to the Court's new deadline. As such, Defendant's motions to strike Plaintiff's response to its motion to dismiss is denied as moot.
As the Court explains below, Plaintiff's § 1981 claim cannot succeed because it is barred by the statute of limitations. See infra Part IV. Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment because it is out of compliance with the Court's initial order and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. (Doc. 54 at 1-2).However, this argument is moot because even if the Court allowed the brief, the Plaintiff would still not be entitled to relief. Additionally, Defendant's quibbles with the relevance of portions of Plaintiff's affidavits and the foundation of his evidentiary attachments are unnecessary to the resolution of this motion. Therefore, Defendant's motions to strike based on the relevance of Plaintiff's affidavit and foundation of the evidentiary attachments are denied as moot.
Accordingly, paragraphs eight and eleven of Plaintiff's affidavit are stricken and the corresponding sections of Defendant's motions are granted. The remaining paragraphs of Plaintiff's affidavit and evidentiary attachments are not stricken, and the corresponding sections of Defendant's motions are denied as moot. Finally, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and response to its motion for summary judgment are not stricken and the corresponding sections of Defendant's motions are denied as moot.
Plaintiff Roy Young is an African American male. (Doc. 1 at 2). He began working at Goodyear Tire Company in 1980 and generally performed cable work. (Doc. 52-1 at 21:22-22:1). In 2007, Defendant Hyosung purchased the Goodyear plant. (Id. at 28:9-11). Plaintiff was hired as a cable threader and served as a section coordinator. (Id. at 30:16-22). Defendant condensed two of its production mills inearly 2016, Mills 1 and 2. (Id. at 51:9-13). Instead of conducting a formal hiring process to fill positions, Defendant canvassed employees to stock positions. (Id. at 53:6-12). Mark Walden, Plaintiff's area manager, conducted the canvass and asked different employees what jobs they wanted. (Id. at 53:10-12; 54:12-17). Per the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), employees were canvassed according to seniority. (Id. at 88:4-12). During the canvass, Plaintiff wanted to be chosen for the mechanical, electrical technician - cable corder - ring twisting position (MET) or the weaving technician position. (Id. at 57:4-11). He talked to Mark Walden, his area manager, and told him that he wanted these respective positions. (Id. at 120:9-18). Walden told Plaintiff that he was not qualified for these jobs. (Id.). Because of Plaintiff's knowledge and informal training that he received throughout his years on the job, he believed that he was qualified. (See id. at 68:6-9). Plaintiff was canvassed for the ring twister (RT) machine operator job and received it the same day. (Id. at 82:10-14). The MET and weaving technician jobs were filled by other black and white employees. (See Doc. 52-3 at 3; Doc. 52-5 at 6).
Even though Plaintiff was awarded a new position, he believed that he was not allowed to progress at the company. (Doc. 52-1 at 183:20-184:5). For example, he previously applied for a position as a clerk in the warehouse's supply room in 2013. (Id. at 136:5-8). Again, he was told that he was unqualified for this position because he had not taken a test required for the position. (Id. at 138:1-11). InFebruary 2016, Plaintiff filed a grievance that he was unfairly not awarded the weaving technician position and the job was not posted in accordance with the CBA. (See Doc. 52-2 at 4). Plaintiff also filed an EEO complaint that provided he was discriminated against during the canvassing process. (Doc. 52-2 at 5). The EEO charge was ultimately dismissed because it was untimely. (Doc. 52-1 at 161:4-12). Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant on March 30, 2018. (Doc. 1). He claimed that he was unfairly promoted/demoted because of his race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. (Id. at 5). He argues that because he was not promoted, he was placed in lower paid position than his job before the canvass. (Id. at 6). Plaintiff was originally represented by counsel but now proceeds pro se. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on January 14, 2020. (Doc. 49).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party asking for summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323....
To continue reading
Request your trial