Young v. Isola
| Decision Date | 23 November 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15-cv-00108-GHD |
| Parties | TRACY YOUNG PLAINTIFF v. ISOLA, MISSISSIPPI, By and Through Its Mayor, Bobby Miller; OFFICER MICHAEL KINGDOM, Individually; and ISOLA POLICE DEPARTMENT, By and Through Its Chief of Police, Charles Sharkey DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
Presently before the Court are the following: a motion for summary judgment [46] filed by Municipal Defendant,2 a motion for leave [49] to file excess pages filed by Municipal Defendant, a motion to strike [52] the reply to the motion for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Tracy Young ("Plaintiff"), two motions in limine [58 & 59] filed by Municipal Defendant, and a motion in limine [65] filed by Plaintiff. Upon due consideration, the Court finds that the motion for summary judgment [46] must be granted in its entirety, and the motionfor leave [49], motion to strike [52], and motions in limine [58, 59, & 65] must be denied as moot.3
On June 29, 2015, Plaintiff filed this suit against Municipal Defendant and Officer Michael Kingdom ("Kingdom"), who was at all times relevant to this action employed as an officer of the Town of Isola's police department (the "IPD"). See Pl.'s Compl. [1] ¶ 2; Mun. Defs.' Answer [8] ¶¶ 2, 18. On August 31, 2015, Municipal Defendant filed an answer [8] to the complaint.4 On July 12, 2016, Municipal Defendant filed the motion for summary judgment [46] that is presently before the Court; the motion concerns only the claims asserted against Municipal Defendant. Plaintiff subsequently filed a response, and Municipal Defendant filed a motion for leave to file excess pages [49] in its reply, as well as a reply in support of its motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff then filed a motion to strike [52] Municipal Defendant's reply, and Municipal Defendant filed a response to that motion. On November 21, 2016, the parties' Final Pretrial Order [72] was entered; the pleadings in the case sub judice are amended to conform to the Final Pretrial Order.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff asserts the following claims: (1) violation of right to procedural and substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment, (2) violation of right to procedural and substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, (3) violation of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, and (4) unreasonable seizure under the FourteenthAmendment. Final Pretrial Order [72] ¶ 4.5 Plaintiff further asserts a claim for conspiracy to interfere with civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, as well as the following state law claims: (1) assault; (2) violation of equal protection under the Mississippi Constitution; (3) violation of right to procedural and substantive due process under the Mississippi Constitution; and (4) breach of the duty to exercise reasonable care in the hiring, training, and supervision of a sworn officer of the Isola Police Departments. Id.
It is undisputed that the Double Quick convenience store is located on Highway 49 in Humphreys County, Mississippi, outside the corporate limits of the Town of Isola, and that Plaintiff is employed as a store clerk there and was so employed in 2014, when the alleged events giving rise to this case occurred. Id. ¶ 8(a), (b); 9(a)(1). Municipal Defendant maintains that the IPD has no authority outside the corporate limits of the Town of Isola. Id. ¶ 8(b). Plaintiff alleges that the IPD has a common practice of using the Double Quick to gas up their city police vehicles and of receiving one free drink per day per officer while on duty. Id. ¶ 8(a). Plaintiff further alleges that while on duty, Kingdom entered the Double Quick "in accordance with his capacity as a law enforcement officer with the [IPD], pursuant to the aforesaid practice, and proceeded to sexually harass [Plaintiff] verbally, . . . ma[king] comments to [Plaintiff] such as 'all that a--'; 'bet your husband don't know what to do with that'; and [']I'll lick all up in that.' " Id. Plaintiff further alleges that "[o]n one occasion between the period of October 9th, 2014 and October 17th, 2014[,] [Kingdom] sexually harassed and assaulted the Plaintiff while she was working at the Double Quick convenience store" in that while "Plaintiff was coming from cleaning the bathroom," Kingdom "forcefully grabbed her by her left arm, thereby detaining andpreventing Plaintiff from carrying on with her assigned duties, and stated to Plaintiff that 'her husband ain[']t hitting it right.' " Id.
Plaintiff next alleges that on or about Friday, October 17, 2014, Plaintiff was at work at the Double Quick when Kingdom "enter[ed] the store pursuant to the practice of the [IPD] as stated beforehand, and then[,] again[,] sexually harassed/assaulted Plaintiff in that while Plaintiff was "helping a customer at the register, . . . Kingdom came into the store and stood next to the ice machine watching [Plaintiff]" and "[w]hen the customer [Plaintiff] was helping left the store, [Kingdom] walked over to [Plaintiff] and stated 'what did I tell you about having n------ in your face . . . let me catch another m----- f------ n----- in your face and you are going to make me do something to you.' " Id.
Plaintiff then cites to deposition testimony by Mayor Miller that Kingdom was brought on as an emergency hire with the IPD, that Mayor Miller "could not recall the statute that would have given her the ability to make an 'emergency hire,' " and that the Board of Aldermen did "not officially hire[]" Kingdom until several months after the emergency hire. Id. It is undisputed that "[a]t the time of his employment by the Town of Isola, [Kingdom] was certified as a Law Enforcement Officer under Mississippi law and had completed the state[-]mandated law enforcement training." Id. ¶ 9(a)(3). It is further undisputed that "Mayor Miller's background check for hiring [Kingdom] consisted of calling the references he listed." Id. ¶ 9(a)(4). Plaintiff cites to Mayor Miller's deposition testimony that "she was unaware of any prior complaints of misconduct by [Kingdom] prior to him being hired as a police officer for [Isola]," and that she was "unaware of all of the different law enforcement agencies [Kingdom] worked for prior to him being hired as a police officer with the [IPD]." Id. ¶ 8(a). Finally, it isundisputed that "[t]he Town of Isola has a written policy against sexual harassment by any Town Employee." Id. ¶ 9(a)(2).
With these allegations and undisputed facts in mind, the Court turns to the motion for summary judgment standard and then to the summary judgment motion before it.
Summary judgment "should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Johnston & Johnston v. Conseco Life Ins. Co., 732 F.3d 555, 561 (5th Cir. 2013). The rule "mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a sufficient showing to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548.
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the Court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. See id. at 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548. "An issue of fact is material only if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action." DeBlanc v. St. Tammany Par. Sch. Bd., 640 F. App'x 308, 312 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (quoting Manning v. Chevron Chem. Co., LLC, 332 F.3d 874, 877 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Wyatt v. Hunt Plywood Co., 297 F.3d 405, 408 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
Under Rule 56(a), the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to "go beyond the pleadings and by . . . affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,'designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.' " Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S. Ct. 2548; Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 282 (5th Cir. 2001); Willis v. Roche Biomedical Labs., Inc., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1995).
It is axiomatic that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment "[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed[ ] and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Tolan v. Cotton, — U.S. —, —, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1863, 188 L. Ed. 2d 895 (2014) (per curiam) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see, e.g., Ard v. Rushing, 597 F. App'x 213, 217 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (). The Court " 'resolve[s] factual controversies in favor of the nonmoving party, but only where there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.' " Thomas v. Baldwin, 595 F. App'x 378, 378 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (quoting Antoine v. First Student, Inc., 713 F.3d 824, 830 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). "[T]he nonmoving party cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence.' " Id. at 380 (quoting Hathaway v. Bazany, 507 F.3d 312, 319 (5th Cir. 2007)).
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