Young v. Keohane, Civ. No. 88-1995.
Decision Date | 13 November 1992 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 88-1995. |
Citation | 809 F. Supp. 1185 |
Parties | Richard YOUNG, a/k/a Todd Devine; and Raymond Minnick, a/k/a Ray A. Minnick, Plaintiffs, v. P.W. KEOHANE, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
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Richard Young, pro se.
Ray A. Minnick, pro se.
Kim Douglas Daniel, U.S. Attorney's Office, Harrisburg, PA, Robert J. DeSousa, U.S. Attorney's Office, Lewisburg, PA, for defendants.
This is a "Bivens" — type civil rights action1 in which the plaintiff, Richard Young, alleges federal prison officials violated his constitutional rights during his period of confinement as a pre-trial detainee at the United States Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania ("Lewisburg"). This matter comes before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment.2 For the following reasons, summary judgment will be granted in favor of some defendants, but will be denied with respect to all other parties.
Young filed the complaint on December 9, 1988 seeking injunctive and monetary relief for a wide assortment of constitutional violations alleged to have occurred during his period of incarceration as a pretrial detainee at Lewisburg. The named defendants are the United States Bureau of Prisons, Bureau of Prisons Director J. Michael Quinlan, former United States Attorney General Edwin Meese, the United States Marshal for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, and numerous present and former Lewisburg employees and officials: Warden Patrick W. Keohane, W.C. Wells, William W. Thompson, G.W. Thomas, R. Conrath, B.B. McDermott, K. Spangler, Larry Womer, Richard Wagner, John J. Steppie and Leroy L. Blanks.3
Young's complaint challenges the constitutional adequacy of almost every aspect of his pretrial confinement at Lewisburg. He alleges he generally experienced greater deprivations of liberty than convicted inmates confined at the same institution. He also claims Lewisburg officials opened his legal and personal mail improperly, while affording him little or no opportunity to exercise, limited telephone privileges, no laundry service, no opportunity to have his hair cut, no reading material, no sanitary clothing and inadequate medical care.
More specifically, Young alleges that from June, 1988 through October, 1988, Lewisburg officials confined him in a room he refers to as a "fishtank", a converted gymnasium 31 feet long and 11 feet wide. Young was restricted to the fishtank 23 hours per day on Mondays through Fridays, and for 24 hours a day on Saturdays and Sundays. The fishtank housed up to 11 pretrial detainees at a time, all of whom were forced to sleep on folding cots that had no mattresses. At times, convicted inmates allegedly boarded with detainees in the fishtank.
The fishtank itself had no toilet or sink, no tables or chairs, no drinking fountain and no television. Detainees confined in the fishtank were limited to drinks provided with their three daily meals, contained in cups "the size one would find in a dentist's office". While a toilet was located in an adjacent shower area separated from the fishtank by a steel gate, detainees had access to the toilet on a limited basis only because Lewisburg officials locked the gate from 8:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays while convicted inmates showered. Detainees were sometimes left with no alternative but to urinate in cups inside the fishtank while the showers were being used. Moreover, because water drained from the shower area into the fishtank, the detainees were forced to remain on their cots while other inmates used the showers to avoid getting wet.
On October 26, 1988, Young and fellow detainee Raymond Minnick were moved to a cell six feet wide by 10 feet long, and confined there twenty-four hours per day for a period of time not specified in the complaint. The bunk bed provided was damaged "so that it had to be used upside down", and freedom of movement was severely constrained by the limited living space. Young claims that he was suffering with a diagnosed hernia during the period when he was double-celled with Minnick and that prison officials were aware of his condition yet did nothing about it.
After a period of discovery, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, alleging in support thereof that the case should be dismissed on the basis of qualified immunity, and, alternatively, because Young has not marshaled enough facts in support of his complaint to convince a reasonable jury that he is entitled to a verdict. The defendants also sought a stay of further discovery in order for the court to rule on the immunity issue. Young filed two motions for summary judgment, arguing in both that a judgment should be entered in his favor because the record establishes as a matter of law that he was subjected to unconstitutional overcrowding and other violations of his federally protected rights as a Lewisburg detainee.4
The court subsequently relieved the defendants from complying with Young's outstanding discovery requests pending disposition of their motion to dismiss or for summary judgment and denied their motion insofar as it sought a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The court also informed the parties that the motion will be disposed of as a motion for summary judgment under Fed. R.Civ.P. 56, and ordered the parties to submit statements of undisputed material facts as required by M.D.Pa.Local Rule 401.4. The statements of material fact have been submitted and the motions for summary judgment are ripe for the court's consideration.
The relevant undisputed material facts are as follows:
There is little else agreed upon in the record, and there is obvious disagreement about the facts that do not appear on the face of the parties' statements of material fact.8 Indeed, the defendants' statement was largely unrefuted by Young's statement. In evaluating the record for present purposes, however, the court considered all parties' statements of material fact, as well as factual conflicts and agreements manifested elsewhere in the record. Because Young is proceeding without the benefit of counsel, he is entitled to such deference when the sufficiency of his case is called into question. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). He is also entitled to have all reasonable inferences about the facts resolved in his favor as the nonmoving party on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. White v. Westinghouse Electric Company, 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir.1988).9
Because qualified immunity is considered just as much an immunity from suit as it is from liability, questions of immunity should be...
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