Young v. Konz

• Decision Date: 05 January 1979
• Docket Number: 44214,No. 44071,44071
• Citation: 588 P.2d 1360,91 Wn.2d 532
• Parties: Gary Robert YOUNG, Richard James Martin, and Gary Roger Jones, Respondents, v. Stephen S. KONZ, as district court judge, Appellant. Oseas MUNOZ, Jose Angel Castro, and Eddie Elizondo, Petitioners, v. Cecil HARPHAM, as police judge, Respondent.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 532

91 Wn.2d 532

588 P.2d 1360

Gary Robert YOUNG, Richard James Martin, and Gary Roger

Jones, Respondents, v. Stephen S. KONZ, as district court judge, Appellant.

Oseas MUNOZ, Jose Angel Castro, and Eddie Elizondo, Petitioners, v. Cecil HARPHAM, as police judge, Respondent.

No. 44071, 44214.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Jan. 5, 1979.

Terry Austin, Yakima Valley Legal Services, Sunnyside, Mark E. Wilson, University Legal Asst., Robert N. Burley, Jr., Legal Intern, Gonzaga University School of Law, Spokane Slade Gorton, Atty.Gen., Olympia, for appellant.

Cecil Harpham, Police Judge, Granger, R. P. Reid, Toppenish, Colville Tribal Legal Services, Nespelem, Mansfield, Morissey & Thomas, David S. Edwards, Okanogan, for respondents.

HAMILTON, Justice.

A rehearing was granted in Young v. Konz, 88 Wash.2d 276, 558 P.2d 791 (1977) (Young I ). At issue in the original appeal, as well as the rehearing, is the constitutionality of the state's judicial structure insofar as it permits the utilization of nonlawyers judges in certain courts of limited jurisdiction. These courts exercise jurisdiction over criminal misdemeanor matters which may result in a defendant's loss of liberty.

We held in Young I that our statutory scheme permitting such lay judges did not violate constitutional due process and equal protection guaranties. We reaffirm our conclusion.

Briefly, the background giving rise to Young I and this rehearing is: Respondents Young, Martin, and Jones were charged in Ferry County District Court with a misdemeanor. The judge of that court is not a lawyer and is not statutorily required to be a lawyer since the district has a population of less than 10,000. RCW 3.34.060. Petitioners Munoz, Castro, and Elizondo, among others, were charged in the municipal court of the town of Granger, Yakima County, with a violation of a municipal ordinance. The municipal court judge of Granger (a municipality with a population of less than 5,000) is a nonlawyer appointed by the mayor pursuant to RCW 3.50.040.

The Superior Court for Ferry County granted a writ prohibiting the state from proceeding to trial in the district court before the nonlawyer judge. Further action in the Granger Municipal Court was stayed pending consolidation of the two causes and resolution on appeal.

As indicated heretofore, the primary issue decided in Young I and to be decided on rehearing is whether the defendants in the respective causes are denied due process of law under Const. art. 1, § 3 ¹ and U. S. Const. amend. 14, if required to go to trial before a nonlawyer judge of a court of limited jurisdiction for a misdemeanor, from which trial a loss of liberty could result. A secondary issue is whether such proceedings would constitute a denial of equal protection of the laws.

As we noted in Young I, the judicial structure, insofar as here pertinent, constitutionally requires judges of the supreme and superior courts to be admitted to the practice of law. Const. art. 4, § 17. Statutorily, the same requirement applies to judges of the intermediate appellate courts. RCW 2.06.050. The constitution does not expressly specify the qualifications for judges of courts of limited jurisdiction, but, rather, as we will hereafter note, implicitly leaves such up to the legislature. Statutory enactments over the years provide that justices of the peace in cities with a population of 5,000 or more must be attorneys. RCW 3.12.071. Municipal court judges in municipalities of less than a population of 5,000 need not be lawyers. RCW 3.50.040. District court or "justice court" judges and justices of the peace must, if not attorneys, either have served as a justice of the peace or as a municipal or police court judge. In districts with a population of less than 10,000, they are allowed to serve as judges if they pass an examination provided by the Supreme Court. ² RCW 3.34.060. Recently, by Laws of 1973, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 14, § 3, p. 535, the legislature abolished nonattorney judges in certain counties, I. e., second-class counties with populations of 70,000 or more. This abolition was, however, subsequently repealed by Laws of 1975, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 197, § 1, p. 654. The effect of the repeal is that any nonattorney who has served as a justice of the peace, municipal court judge, or police court judge prior to 1961 may remain on the bench or refile for the position without taking a qualifying examination. ³

De novo review is available to misdemeanor defendants, which review is in the superior court before lawyer judges. RCW 3.50.410, RCW 35.22.560, RCW 35.27.540.

In Young I, we premised our decision upon the decision of the United States Supreme Court in North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 96 S.Ct. 2709, 49 L.Ed.2d 534 (1976). In that case, the high court considered challenges to Kentucky lay judges virtually identical to those advanced here. To illustrate, we quoted the following from North In Young I, 88 Wash.2d at pages 282-83, 558 P.2d at page 794:

Appellant argues that the right to counsel articulated in Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972) and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), is meaningless without a lawyer-judge to understand the arguments of counsel. Appellant also argues that the increased complexity of substantive and procedural criminal law requires that all judges now be lawyers in order to be able to rule correctly on the intricate issues lurking even in some simple misdemeanor cases. In the context of the Kentucky procedures, however, it is unnecessary to reach the question whether a defendant could be convicted and imprisoned after a proceeding in which the only trial afforded is conducted by a lay judge. In all instances, a defendant in Kentucky facing a criminal sentence is afforded an opportunity to be tried De novo in a court presided over by a lawyer-judge since an appeal automatically vacates the conviction in police court. Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 23.032 (1971); Ky. Rule Crim.Proc. 12.06. The trial De novo is available after either a trial Or a plea of guilty in the police court; a defendant is entitled to bail while awaiting trial De novo. 516 S.W.2d 103 (Ky.1974).

To avoid the patent impact of North, it is first urged that this state, unlike the Kentucky system considered in North, makes no provision for de novo appeals from pleas of guilty in courts of limited jurisdiction. We do not, however, conceive that the failure to provide such an appeal in all cases significantly or critically distinguishes this state's system from that reviewed in North. Initially, it should be noted that a Voluntary plea of guilty normally waives the right of appeal whether entered before a lawyer or nonlawyer judge or whether entered in an inferior or superior court. State v. Eckert, 123 Wash. 403, 212 P. 551 (1923); State v. Rose, 42 Wash.2d 509, 256 P.2d 493 (1953). Next, it should be observed that this court has outlined proper safeguards to insure that courts of limited jurisdiction accept only truly voluntary pleas of guilty. In re Vensel, 88 Wash.2d 552, 564 P.2d 326 (1977); JCrR 3.06(1); CrR 4.2(d) and (g). Furthermore, in this respect, it has long been recognized that where collateral questions, such as the validity of the statute or ordinance under which a charge is made, the sufficiency of the complaint, the jurisdiction of the court, or the circumstances under which a guilty plea was made are raised, then appeal and de novo review can follow. State v. Eckert, supra; State v. Alberg, 156 Wash. 397, 287 P. 13 (1930); State v. Haddon, 179 Wash. 669, 38 P.2d 227 (1934); State v. Rose, supra. Finally, it would be a rare instance, indeed, where a defendant would not be afforded release on bail or his own recognizance pending appeal. Given these factors, we find no substantive merit to the contention that either the judicial system reviewed or the rationale of North is distinguishable.

In this same vein, it is asserted that the procedure which must be followed in order for a defendant to obtain a trial before a law-trained judge violates due process. It is claimed that before a defendant is entitled to a trial de novo, he must plead not guilty, endure a full trial before a nonlawyer judge, and be convicted in a court of limited jurisdiction. Aside from the fact that some defendants appearing before a nonlawyer judge are acquitted, and others may not desire to appeal, it is simply not an immutable fact that every defendant must endure a Full trial to preserve an appeal and secure a second trial. It is not an uncommon practice in courts of limited jurisdiction, be the court manned by a lawyer or nonlawyer judge, for defendants to enter a plea of not guilty and stipulate to the prosecution's case or submit the matter to the court on a mere reading of the arresting officer's written report. These procedures consume a modicum of time, fully preserve appeal rights, and expedite trial de novo. In addition, defendants and their counsel have the benefit of previewing the evidence which will be used against them in superior court should they desire to appeal. Nevertheless, in whatever manner the trial proceeds in the justice or district court, we find no significant due process violation flowing from the double trial theory advocated in support of the proposition that nonlawyer judges in courts of limited jurisdiction should be judicially abolished. As we properly pointed out in Young I, 88 Wash.2d at pages 280-81, 558 P.2d at page 793:

Due process of the law requires a fair trial for each defendant; the fair trial guarantee is protected Through the appeals process. It is conceded that a fair trial may in certain cases not be afforded by a non-lawyer judge; but we may properly point out that it is also true that a lawyer judge may commit error and thereby deny a fair trial. The due process safeguard in both cases is appeal, the one critical difference being that a...