Young v. Mason

Decision Date22 November 1893
Citation35 N.E. 521,8 Ind.App. 264
PartiesYOUNG v. MASON.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from circuit court, Grant county; R. T. St. John, Judge.

Action by Louisa Young against Charles R. Mason to recover damages alleged to have resulted from defendant's unskillful surgical treatment of plaintiff. There was judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

A. J. Remy and Carroll & Dean, for appellant. Brownlee & Paulus, for appellee.

DAVIS, J.

In her complaint, appellant alleges that on the 8th day of July, 1891, she suffered the following injuries, to wit: (1) Broke and fractured the radius of her left fore arm, near the wrist joint; (2) dislocated laterally both bones of her left fore-arm at the elbow joint; (3) fractured the inner condyle of the humerus of the left elbow. It is further alleged that she employed the appellee, a practicing physician and surgeon of Hartford City, Ind., to attend and treat her said injuries. This action is to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by appellant as the result of alleged unskillfulness and negligence on the part of appellee in the treatment of her said injuries in the following respects, namely: (1) That he did not exercise due care and skill in setting and reducing said fractures and dislocations, and in the treatment of said injuries; (2) that he negligently, carelessly, unskillfully, and unprofessionally pretended to set and reduce said fracture and dislocations; (3) that he failed to properly reduce said dislocations of said elbow joint, and to properly bandage the same, so as to hold said bones to their proper places; (4) that he too frequently changed the bandages and splints on said wounds, and prevented the union of the fragments of said broken bones by frequently manipulating and moving the same; (5) that he prevented the proper relocation and adjustment of said dislocated elbow by too frequently manipulating and moving it. Whereby it is charged: (1) That said bones of said joints, by adhesion to the surrounding parts, became stiff at said joints; (2) that said left arm became permanently stiff, and crooked at said joints; (3) and because of the negligence and carelessness and unskillfulness of appellee in improperly reducing the dislocation of the elbow joint, and in bandaging and treating said arm and hand, the appellant's hand and fingers have become stiff and permanently crooked. The venue of the cause was changed from the Blackford to the Grant circuit court, where it was tried by a jury. The jury returned a general verdict in favor of appellant for $1,000, and they also returned answers to 40 interrogatories submitted by appellee. Upon motion of appellee the court rendered judgment in his favor on the answers to the interrogatories. This ruling is the basis of the only error assigned.

The question presented is whether the facts disclosed by the answers to the interrogatories can in any way be reconciled with the general verdict. The general verdict necessarily decided all material questions in favor of appellant. As was well said by Judge New in Gaar Scott & Co. v. Rose, 3 Ind. App. 269, 29 N. E. 616: “The answers to interrogatories override the general verdict only when both cannot stand together, the antagonism being such upon the face of the record as is beyond the possibility of removal by any evidence admissible under the issues in the cause.” In the language of Judge Elliott in another case: “If there is no irreconcilable conflict between the general verdict and the special answers, the former must prevail; and it is likewise true that intendment will not be made in favor of the special answers. It is also true that the answers to the interrogatories cannot control the general verdict if they are contradictory, although the verdict may be in irreconcilable conflict with some of these answers.” Matchett v. Railway Co., 132 Ind. 334, 31 N. E. 792. In the light of these authorities, the first proposition to be determined is whether the answers to the interrogatories conclusively show that appellee was not guilty of negligence resulting in any of the injuries for which recovery is sought in this action. It is clearly shown by the answers that the appellee did possess the fair and ordinary knowledge and skill, (Jones v. Angell, 95 Ind. 376;Gramm v. Boener, 56 Ind. 497;) also, that the manner in which he dressed and treated appellant's injuries was, with one exception, such as is approved and followed by the most skillful surgeons in that vicinity, and which is approved by the standard authors and text writers upon the subject of surgery. The exception is that the answers do not conclusively show that appellee exercised due skill and care in reducing the fracture near the wrist joint. The most that can be said in behalf of appellee in this respect is that the answers are contradictory. Counsel for appellee, however, contend that, “granting, for the time being, that this fracture was not reduced, there is nothing in the entire record indicating that the appellant was injured, or even inconvenienced, by this omission.” All we deem it necessary to say on this subject is that when we refer to the allegations in the complaint to which we have heretofore called attention, which, in view of the general verdict, so far as the question now under consideration is concerned, we must regard as having been proven on the trial, the court cannot say as a matter of law, in the absence of an express finding to the contrary, that the appellant was not injured or inconvenienced by reason of the alleged negligence of the appellee in failing to reduce the fracture near the wrist joint. Conceding that the answers to the interrogatories fail to show that appellee was not guilty of the unskillfulness or negligence charged in the complaint in the respect last mentioned, does it appear from these answers that the alleged injuries which are made the basis of the action were in any degree caused by the want of proper care on the part of appellant? In other words, is appellant shown to have been guilty of any act of negligence which was the proximate cause of the injuries of which complaint is made? The interrogatories and answers thereto bearing on this branch of the case are as follows: “Did not the defendant, at his first visit, after having properly examined, reduced, adjusted, bandaged, and dressed the arm, and at divers other times, order and direct plaintiff not to remove her arm from the sling, but to keep it in the sling at rest? A. Yes.” “If you answer question 18 [the preceding question] in the affirmative, state if such orders and directions given the plaintiff by the defendant were proper, and whether a strict observance of...

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