Young v. N.Y. State Corr.
| Decision Date | 13 February 2019 |
| Docket Number | 18-CV-5786 (LDH) (RER) |
| Parties | SHAWN YOUNG, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK STATE CORRECTIONS AND COMMUNITY SUPERVISION; NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL; NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH; NEW YORK STATE OFFICE FOR PERSON WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES; JANE DOE, Brooklyn Supreme Court; JANET McFARLAND; JOHN DOES, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Plaintiff Shawn Young, proceeding pro se, commenced this action on October 17, 2018, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. He asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against four state agencies—the New York State Office of Mental Health, the New York Attorney General's Office, the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, and the New York State Office for Persons with Developmental Disabilities (the ")—a Jane Doe state-court judge, his former attorney Janet McFarland, and two John Doe psychologists. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights in connection with his prior criminal sentencing and related sex-offender proceedings. By orders dated October 5 and 9, 2018, the district court granted Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and transferred the case to this Court. For the reasons set forth below, the complaint is dismissed. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint within thirty days of the date of this order.1
Plaintiff's claims arise out of events that occurred between 2010 and 2015 or 2016. (Compl. at 4, ECF No. 2.) Around the time of his release from incarceration at New York's Mid-State Correctional Facility ("Mid-State") on unspecified charges, Plaintiff was interviewed by a "mental health Article 10" psychiatrist who recommended that Plaintiff be committed to a period of Strict and Intensive Supervision and Treatment ("S.I.S.T.").3 (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that the psychiatrist "wrote a whole bunch of stuff to discredit [him] and took [his] history and use[d] it against [him]." (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that his attorney, Defendant Janet McFarland, allegedly "coerced and manipulated [him] into taking . . . parole because she said [he] would [not] have a chance if [he] took [the case] to [trial]." (Id.) It is unclear whether the state court imposed on Plaintiff a regimen of S.I.S.T. in connection with his parole. See generally N.Y. Ment. Hygiene L. § 10.11 ().
After leaving the state in violation of the conditions of his parole, Plaintiff was required to appear before Defendant Jane Doe, (Id.) The judgesentenced Plaintiff to "extra time" in prison, and he is currently serving a sentence of up to three years' incarceration. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that the sentencing judge informed him that "when [he eventually] finish[es] court for S.I.S.T. [he will] either go home or to a hospital." (Compl. 4.) It is unclear whether Plaintiff is subject to a regimen of S.I.S.T. during his current period of incarceration.4
Plaintiff alleges that his designation as a sex offender has caused him "massive amounts of stress"; separated him from his family when he was not incarcerated; and, since re-incarceration, subjected him to death threats, physical harm and delays in receiving his "law work." (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff seeks $2.5 million in damages and an order removing him from the sex-offender registry. (Id.) He also wants the court to "contact the victim" of his prior criminal conviction and "tell what really happen[ed] and let her know she won't get in trouble if she tell[s] the truth." (Id.)
A district court "shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Upon review, a district court shall dismiss a prisoner's complaint sua sponte if it is "(1) frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." Id. § 1915A(b). Moreover,a district court "shall dismiss" an in forma pauperis action where it is satisfied that the action "(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
A complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when the alleged facts allow the court to draw a "reasonable inference" of a defendant's liability for the alleged misconduct. Id. While this standard requires more than a "sheer possibility" of a defendant's liability, id., "[i]t is not the [c]ourt's function to weigh the evidence that might be presented at trial" on a motion to dismiss. Morris v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 37 F. Supp. 2d 556, 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). Instead, "the court must merely determine whether the complaint itself is legally sufficient, and, in doing so, it is well settled that the court must accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true." Id. (citations omitted).
Moreover, where, as here, a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his pleadings "'must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.'" Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006)). A pro se complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 213-14 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 55 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). This rule is "particularly so when the pro se plaintiff alleges that [his] civil rights have been violated." Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004)). Still, "even pro se plaintiffsasserting civil right claims cannot withstand a motion to dismiss unless their pleadings contain factual allegations sufficient to raise a 'right to relief above the speculative level.'" Jackson v. NYS Dep't of Labor, 709 F. Supp. 2d 218, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
As an initial matter, the complaint fails to comply with the dictates of Rule 8 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. Rule 8 "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Instead, a plaintiff must provide facts sufficient to "give the defendant[s] fair notice of what the claim[s] [are] and the grounds upon which [they] rest[]." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (). Here, Plaintiff alleges that the conduct at issue took place over a five- or six-year period between 2010 and 2016, with no further specificity. He does not, for example, identify the approximate dates of his release from Mid-State, his first Article 10 proceeding, his parole-violation hearing, or his subsequent Article 10 proceeding. Nor does he specify the terms of his alleged S.I.S.T. regimen.
Normally, "absolute immunity is an affirmative defense whose availability depends on the nature of the function being performed by the defendant official who is alleged to have engaged in the challenged conduct." Shmueli v. City of New York, 424 F.3d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 2005). But where "the nature of that function is often clear from the face of the complaint. . . . , the absolute immunity defense may be resolved as a matter of law" on the pleadings. Id. ().
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars civil actions against state agencies unless Congress enacts a carve-out or the state waives its sovereign immunity. Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 149 (2d Cir. 2004). "This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought." Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). Congress has not carved out, nor has New York waived, sovereign immunity from § 1983 suits against the state or its agencies. See McMillan v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 449 F. App'x 79, 80 (2d Cir. 2011) (summary order) (affirming dismissal under Eleventh Amendment of § 1983 claims against state agency); Cater v. New York, 316 F. Supp. 3d 660, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against the State Agency Defendants must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) and 1915A(b)(2).
Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Jane Doe, who appears to be a justice of the Supreme Court of Kings County, New York,5 arises out of Plaintiff's allegation that her imposition of a regimen of S.I.S.T. "made [him] do extra time on an illegal sentence." (Compl. at 4.) "It is well settled that judges generally have absolute immunity from suits for money damages for their judicial actions." Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 2009).6
Plaintiff seeks to assert § 1983 claims against the two John Doe psychiatrists who examined him at...
To continue reading
Request your trial