Young v. Nave

Decision Date09 April 1932
Docket Number30122.
Citation10 P.2d 23,135 Kan. 23
PartiesYOUNG et al. v. NAVE et al. [*]
CourtKansas Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court.

Attorney fee provision of Indiana notes held not enforceable in action on notes brought in Kansas, notwithstanding rule of comity (Rev. St. 1923, 67--312).

In mortgage to mortgagees as trustees for certain of mortgagor's creditors, provision for benefit of reimbursement of trustees held to create no liability against mortgagors or burden on mortgaged realty.

1. Promissory notes, made in the state of Indiana and payable there, provided for payment of principal sums, with interest "and attorney's fees." The attorney fee provision was valid under the law of Indiana. In an action in this state to recover on the notes and to foreclose the mortgage securing them, the judgment included an attorney fee of five percent. of the principal sum of each note. Held, the judgment was forbidden by a statute of this state, R. S 67--312, which the district court was not at liberty to disregard for the sake of comity.

2. The mortgage was given to mortgagees as trustees for various creditors of the mortgagors. The trustees agreed to administer the trust without compensation, except to reimburse themselves for costs and expenses and time actually employed. Held, the provision for reimbursement created no liability on the part of the mortgagors, or burden on the mortgaged real estate.

Appeal from District Court, Sedgwick County, Division No. 2; Thornton W. Sargent, Judge.

Action by Daniel R. Young and another, as trustees, and others against J. Shannon Nave and others. From the judgment rendered, the defendants appeal.

Modified and, as modified, affirmed.

V Harris and M. P. Shearer, both of Wichita, for appellants J. Shannon and Raymond Nave.

Robert C. Foulston and George Siefkin, both of Wichita, for appellant William Zeigler.

Benj. F. Hegler, A. V. Roberts, and Roger P. Almond, all of Wichita, and Charles McCabe, of Crawfordsville, Ind., for appellees.

BURCH J.

The action was one to recover on a number of promissory notes and to foreclose a mortgage securing them. The notes were executed in the state of Indiana, and were payable there. Each note provided for payment of a principal sum, with interest, "and attorney's fees." The judgment which was rendered included an attorney fee of five percent. of the principal sum of each note, and the appeal was taken to secure a modification of the judgment in that and another respect.

A provision in a promissory note for payment of an attorney fee is valid under the law of Indiana. It is often said a contract valid in the state where made and to be performed is valid everywhere. It does not follow, however, from the fact that a contract is valid in the state where made and to be performed, that another state will enforce it by appropriate legal remedy. If the contract is contrary to the law or public policy of the forum, remedy will be denied. This is the general rule, supported by reason and authority, and it is not necessary to review the cases.

In this state we have a statute which reads as follows:

"That hereafter it shall be unlawful for any person or persons, company, corporation or bank, to contract for the payment of attorney's fees in any note, bill of exchange, bond or mortgage; and any such contract or stipulation for the payment of attorney's fees shall be null and void; and that hereafter no court in this state shall render any judgment, order or decree by which any attorney's fees shall be allowed or charged to the maker of any promissory note, bill of exchange, bond, mortgage, or other evidence of indebtedness by way of fees, expenses, costs or otherwise: Provided, That in all existing mortgages wherein no amount is stipulated as attorney's fees, not more than eight percent. on sums of two hundred and fifty dollars or under, and not more than five percent. on all sums over two hundred and fifty dollars, shall be allowed by any court as attorney's fees: And provided further, That this act shall not apply to existing mortgages wherein any sum has been stipulated as attorney's fees. [L. 1876, ch. 77, § 1; March 1.]" (R. S. 67--312.)

Of course the Legislature did not attempt to regulate, by this statute, the making of contracts in other states. But the Legislature condemned attorney fee agreements in notes and mortgages, forbade the appropriation of Kansas property given as security, to the satisfaction of such agreements, and closed the courts of this state to their enforcement. This definitely fixed the policy of this state with respect to attorney fee agreements, and...

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11 cases
  • De Lano's Estate, In re
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • 13 d5 Setembro d5 1957
    ...No. 1, 191 U.S. 373, 24 S.Ct. 92, 48 L.Ed. 225; McElmoyle for Use of Bailey v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 38 U.S. 312, 10 L.Ed. 177; and Young v. Nave, 135 Kan. 23, 10 P.2d 23; and second, that the second forum may also refuse full faith and credit upon a determination that the first forum did not have......
  • Iola State Bank v. Biggs
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • 29 d5 Abril d5 1983
    ...has been stipulated as attorney's fees." Our court has relied upon the statute when striking attorney's fees in notes: Young v. Nave, 135 Kan. 23, 10 P.2d 23 (1932); Marksheffel-Sill Motors v. Popejoy, 135 Kan. 624, 11 P.2d 693 (1932); and Leach v. Urschel, 112 Kan. 629, 212 P. 111 (1923), ......
  • In re Skyler Ridge
    • United States
    • United States Bankruptcy Courts. Ninth Circuit. U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Central District of California
    • 15 d2 Dezembro d2 1987
    ...clauses in notes or mortgage documents. The Kansas Supreme Court has stated that this is a strong Kansas public policy. Young v. Nave, 135 Kan. 23, 10 P.2d 23, 24 (1932). However, this public policy has apparently eroded somewhat in the years since Young was decided: a number of Kansas stat......
  • Benedictine College v. Century Office Products
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Kansas
    • 26 d3 Outubro d3 1994
    ...even though the substantive law of another state otherwise applied. See Rubenstein v. Nourse, 70 F.2d 482 (8th Cir.1934); Young v. Nave, 135 Kan. 23, 10 P.2d 23 (1932). More recently, the Kansas Supreme Court used the public policy exception in refusing to apply the substantive law of anoth......
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