Young v. Northern Terminals, Inc.
| Decision Date | 05 February 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 24-73,24-73 |
| Citation | 315 A.2d 469,132 Vt. 125 |
| Parties | Sidney E. YOUNG and Elaine P. Young v. NORTHERN TERMINALS, INC. |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
Bloomer & Bloomer, Rutland, for plaintiffs.
Donald E. O'Brien, Burlington, for defendant.
Before SHANGRAW, C. J., and BARNEY, SMITH, KEYSER and DALEY, JJ.
This is an appeal taken by both plaintiffs and defendant from a judgment of the Rutland County Court which awarded plaintiffs' attorneys' fees in the amount of $2,000.00 and their cost of action.
The subject matter of this appeal involves the determination of reasonable attorney's fees by nature of a note which reads in part: 'the maker will pay . . . a reasonable attorney's fee . . . as well as other costs of collection.'
The matter at issue is the claim for this fee collected through litigation. The attorneys for the plaintiffs are the real parties in interest. Their client, the named plaintiffs, held a note against the defendant which was in default; the note was given to their present attorney for collection. The note itself secured by a mortgage had its payment provisions accelerated as its terms provided for, and, by the efforts of the attorneys, full payment was arranged through an agreement between the parties. The note involved was in the principal sum of $33,600, payable in four installments of $8,400 each. On default of the first installment, the plaintiffs invoked the acceleration clause and declared the whole note due and payable.
Suit was brought on the note-a collection suit under former County Court Rule 9. The defendant did not enter an appearance nor did it file any pleadings, but as a result of an exchange of fifteen letters and telephone calls between the attorneys for the plaintiffs and the attorney for the defendant, a compromise was reached without the necessity of further court proceedings. The settlement agreed upon resulted in three principal payments and accelerating of the fourth and last payment scheduled for July, 1973, to be paid on January 2, 1972.
The amount of the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees not being agreed upon was left for a judicial decision by the court by agreement of the parties.
The plaintiffs' attorneys brought the matter of fees before the Rutland County Court which refused to enlarge the fee of $1,115.50 paid by the defendant, based on the lack of supporting evidence; the only evidence as to reasonable fees adduced at the hearing having been the minimum fee schedule of the Rutland County Bar. On appeal to this Court, we concurred in the action of the trial court, but remanded the cause so that the plaintiffs' attorneys could reopen the issue of proof of the value of their services and present further evidence in that regard if they be so advised. See Young v. Northern Terminals, Inc., 130 Vt. 258, 290 A.2d 186 (1972).
Now the plaintiffs' attorneys come before us after a de novo factual determination in which the Rutland County Court found the sum of $2,000.00 to be a reasonable fee. They contend that this sum is not supported by the evidence and that the court failed to completely follow the factors set forth in Platt, Admx. v. Shields and Conant, 96 Vt. 257, 269, 119 A. 520 (1923).
It is evidence from the whole record that plaintiffs' attorneys sought to have the court award to them twenty-five per cent of $24,834.40, the amount actually paid in cash settlement. They make no claim for a fee upon the last $8,400 accelerated payment.
Although the plaintiffs' attorneys made no such request to the court nor did they at any time present the court with any stated figure which in their opinion would constitute a reasonable fee, the tenor of their evidence is to that effect. They claim that the matter was a collection suit and that such matters are not handled by them or any other Rutland attorney on a time basis; such claims find support in the evidence. The Rutland County Bar Association's minimum fee schedule provides the following collections: 50% of the first $100; 25% of the balance costs.
Such schedule is not an absolute, but is merely a guide in charting the uncertain path to adequate, fair and reasonable fees. It is not binding upon the attorney, his client, or the court. The testimony introduced by the plaintiffs' attorneys' witness, an attorney and a member of the Rutland County Bar, so stated in effect. It may or may not be helpful in determining the charge to be agreed upon for particular services with a client. It is some evidence of the usual charges made by the attorneys in the county in various legal matters. The evidence of the witness taken as a whole reveals that it is a starting point in the consideration of a charge for legal services rendered in the cause handled, then adjustments are made upward or downward, depending on the circumstances involved, the amount of work, and the difficulty of the work.
At no point did the witness give an opinion that a reasonable attorney's fee for the services rendered by the plaintiffs' attorneys would be 25% of the amount collected by them. At all times material, the plaintiffs' attorneys proceeded under the formula set forth in Platt, Admx. v. Shields and Conant, supra, which we affirm to be the correct rule where reasonable attorney fees are to be set by the court. They introduced evidence as to their high professional standing, which is undisputed.
The importance of the litigation to the plaintiff, the importance of the business, the amount at stake, the result secured to their client, and the responsibility assumed by them as attorneys were all factors which were considered by the court, in addition to the provisions of the minimum fee schedule. The court was unable to find the usual charges for services rendered by the plaintiffs' attorneys due to the lack of such evidence introduced by them.
Having before it factors and the minimum fee schedule as well as the agreement by plaintiffs' counsel that he had spent approximately fifteen hours prior to May, 1971, upon the matter including initial conferences with his client, bringing a complaint in the common courts, fifteen letters, plus telephone calls to defendant's attorney, the court found $2,000.00 to be a reasonable fee.
On appeal, plaintiffs' attorneys point out that the Rutland County Court found that he had expended fifteen hours of time prior to May 18, 1971, the...
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...We review the trial court's ruling on attorney's fees and prejudgment interest for abuse of discretion. Young v. N. Terminals, Inc., 132 Vt. 125, 130, 315 A.2d 469, 472 (1974). ¶ 4. The court denied the parties' requests for attorney's fees for two reasons. First, the court held that "to ba......
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