Young v. Oakland General Hosp.

• Decision Date: 10 April 1989
• Docket Number: Docket No. 99285
• Citation: 175 Mich.App. 132,437 N.W.2d 321
• Parties: Lawrence K. YOUNG, Personal Representative of the Estate of Clara E. Tucker, and Lawrence K. Young, individually, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. OAKLAND GENERAL HOSPITAL and Ms. Varga, R.N., Defendants-Appellees, and Michael Laffer, D.O., Defendant. 175 Mich.App. 132, 437 N.W.2d 321
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 321

437 N.W.2d 321

Lawrence K. YOUNG, Personal Representative of the Estate of Clara E. Tucker, and Lawrence K. Young individually, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. OAKLAND GENERAL HOSPITAL and Ms. Varga, R.N. Defendants-Appellees and Michael Laffer, D.O., Defendant.

Docket No. 99285.

175 Mich.App. 132, 437 N.W.2d 321

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Jan. 4, 1989.

Decided Feb. 22, 1989.

Released for Publication April 10, 1989.

[175 MICHAPP 134] Frank R. Langton & Associates, P.C. by Charles E. Langton, Sterling Heights, for plaintiff.

Williams, Schaefer, Ruby & Williams, P.C. by Margaret A. Suma, Bloomfield Hills, for defendants.

Before GILLIS, P.J., and SHEPHERD and SAWYER, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals by leave granted the circuit court's order reversing the district court's order denying, in part, defendants-appellees' motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm.

Plaintiff filed suit in circuit court on October 24, 1983, for events arising from Clara Tucker's hospitalization in 1982. Clara Tucker was plaintiff's grandmother. Briefly, plaintiff is a Jehovah's Witness and, as an adherent of that religion, is opposed to blood transfusions. While Tucker was in defendant hospital, she received a blood transfusion and, later, died. Thereafter, plaintiff was appointed the personal representative of Tucker's estate.

Plaintiff filed a suit claiming that defendants had deprived Tucker of her rights pursuant to 42 [175 MICHAPP 135] U.S.C. Secs. 1985(3) and 1986 because they were aware that she was "a Jehovah's Witness or followed the tenants [sic] of that religion prohibiting blood transfusions." Plaintiff alleged that these same acts constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff further claimed that Tucker was incompetent from the time of her hospitalization and that defendants committed a battery upon her by performing the blood transfusion without permission from her family or legal guardian. Finally, plaintiff claimed that defendant hospital, through its employee, contracted with him not to give Tucker blood and that defendants breached this contract.

After mediation, the case was remanded to the district court and defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Defendants claimed that discovery revealed that Tucker was not a Jehovah's Witness and did not have a religious belief concerning blood transfusions consistent with those held by Jehovah's Witnesses. Defendants also argued that, given these facts, they did not intentionally intend to inflict emotional distress upon Tucker. Defendants further argued that they did not commit a battery upon Tucker because she was alert and responsive on the day they gave her blood and she did not object to the transfusion. Finally, defendants argued that the "contract" signed by plaintiff was against public policy.

Plaintiff responded, claiming that his daughter-in-law's testimony demonstrated that Tucker's beliefs were religiously based. Plaintiff also claimed to be Tucker's legal representative, relying on this Court's decision in Edwards v. St. Mary's Hospital (On Remand), 135 Mich.App. 753, 356 N.W.2d 255 (1984).

On January 21, 1986, the district court issued its [175 MICHAPP 136] opinion. The court held that there was testimony that Tucker shared a belief consistent with Jehovah's Witnesses' beliefs regarding blood transfusions. Therefore, the district court denied defendants' motion to dismiss Count I. However, the district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's Count II, which involved intentional infliction of emotional distress, finding defendants did not intend to injure plaintiff or Tucker. The district court also denied defendants' motion to dismiss the battery count, ruling that there was a question of fact whether Tucker or one authorized to act for her, if she was incompetent, consented to the blood transfusion. The district court also noted that whether the circumstances constituted a medical emergency, excusing the need for consent, was also in dispute. Finally, the district court found that there was a question of fact as to whether plaintiff was Tucker's legal representative at the time he signed the contract stating that Tucker was not to receive blood products.

Defendants applied for leave to appeal to the circuit court. The circuit court consolidated defendants' appeals, granted defendants' applications for leave to appeal and then exercised superintending control over the matter to rule on defendants' motions. The court ordered the parties to submit the same briefs that they had filed with the district court. On February 25, 1987, after reviewing the briefs and supporting evidence, the circuit court held that defendants' motion for summary disposition should be granted because plaintiff admitted in his deposition that he was not Tucker's legal representative and that Tucker was not a Jehovah's Witness. Consequently, the circuit court granted defendants' motion for summary disposition and dismissed defendants' appeal.

[175 MICHAPP 137] Plaintiff then filed for leave to appeal to this Court. After plaintiff stipulated to dismissing defendant Laffer from the suit, this Court granted leave to appeal.

Plaintiff first claims that the circuit court erred when it exercised superintending control. Plaintiff also claims that the circuit court erred when it considered only the parties' briefs and supporting evidence rather than all of the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence then filed in the action in making its decision. See MCR 2.116(G)(5). We agree that the circuit court improperly exercised superintending control because leave to appeal was available. See MCR 3.302, 7.101 and 7.103. Moreover, we are unable to determine what "supporting evidence" the circuit court reviewed, even though we note that the circuit court indicated that it would review the depositions filed before ruling. Nevertheless, we believe that a court's duty to review evidence extends to affidavits, depositions, admissions and documentary evidence referred to by the parties in support of their positions regarding the motion for summary disposition. MCR 2.116(G). In any event, we will review the merits of the case because the circuit court would have reached the same result had it granted defendants' application for leave to appeal.

A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support for a claim. Boyle v. Odette, 168 Mich.App. 737, 742, 425 N.W.2d 472 (1988). Summary disposition is appropriate under this subrule only if the court is satisfied that it is impossible for the nonmoving party's claim to be supported at trial because of a deficiency which cannot be overcome. The trial court must give the benefit of any reasonable doubt to the nonmoving party. Id. at 742-743, 425 N.W.2d 472. This Court is [175 MICHAPP 138] liberal in finding a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 743, 425 N.W.2d 472. Nevertheless, where the opposing party fails to come forward with evidence, beyond its allegations or denials in the pleadings, to establish the existence of a material factual dispute, the motion is properly granted. Id.; MCR 2.116(G)(4).

In Count I, plaintiff alleged that defendants had conspired to deprive Tucker of her First Amendment rights to practice her religion. As noted above, plaintiff alleged that Tucker "was a Jehovah's Witness or followed tenants [sic] of that religion prohibiting blood transfusions." In his answers to interrogatories as well as in his deposition, plaintiff conceded that Tucker was not a Jehovah's Witness. Nonetheless, plaintiff contends that his deposition testimony as well as his daughter-in-law's deposition testimony demonstrate that Tucker's opposition to blood transfusions was religiously based, even though Tucker was not a confirmed Jehovah's Witness.

The First Amendment protects claims rooted in religious rather than philosophical or personal, beliefs. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-219, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1533-1535, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972). Having reviewed plaintiff's deposition, we conclude that while he believed that Tucker, in general, had an aversion to blood transfusions, he did not know if this aversion was religiously based. In fact, despite plaintiff's deposition testimony, we note that Tucker signed a form agreeing to a blood or blood-component transfusion on November 9, 1970, with another hospital. Moreover, reviewing plaintiff's daughter-in-law's deposition testimony in context, it is clear that plaintiff's daughter-in-law believed that Tucker's alleged aversion to blood transfusions was not religiously based. As such, plaintiff has failed to present evidence which raises a genuine issue of material fact and defendants' motion for [175 MICHAPP 139] summary disposition as to Count I should have been granted.

In Count II, plaintiff alleged that defendants intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon Tucker by giving her a blood transfusion contrary to her religious beliefs and upon him by giving Tucker a transfusion contrary to his contract with defendant hospital. Defendants claim that this issue is not preserved for appeal because plaintiff never appealed the district court's order on this issue to the circuit court. We disagree. Once the circuit court dismissed plaintiff's suit, its order became a final order and plaintiff was entitled to appeal other previously entered orders. In any event, given our discussion of Count I, we agree that Count II was properly dismissed insofar as it involved Tucker's estate's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. For reasons discussed infra, the district court also properly granted defendants' motion for summary disposition as to plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

In Count III, plaintiff alleged that defendants committed a battery upon Tucker by not obtaining consent from her or, in the...