Young v. Povich

• Citation: 116 A. 26
• Parties: YOUNG v. POVICH.
• Decision Date: 14 February 1922
• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)

116 A. 26

YOUNG

v. POVICH.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Feb. 14, 1922.

Report from Supreme Judicial Court, Hancock County, at Law.

Action by Charles Young against Nathan Povich. On report. Judgment for plaintiff.

Argued before CORNISH, C. J., and SPEAR, HANSON, PHILBROOK, MORRILL, and DEASY, JJ.

B. E. Clark, of Bar Harbor, for plaintiff.

H. L. Graham, of Bar Harbor, for defendant.

SPEAR, J. This case involves an action for money had and received, for the recovery of $100, paid in advance upon the following written instrument:

"I, Nathan Povich, of Bar Harbor, lease to Charles W. Young, of Bar Harbor, for the sum of three hundred and fifty dollars ($350) until April 1, 1921, the two furnished flats over the stores in the Povich Block, on Main street, with the agreement that said Charles Young will pay one hundred dollars ($100), and the balance in amounts of thirty-five dollars ($35) or more per month, until the sum of two hundred and fifty dollars ($250) is paid, and that, should any of my family come to Bar Harbor, they shall be entitled to a room for the length of time they wish to stay."

The specifications under the declaration are as follows:

"By reason of said promise and agreement the said plaintiff entered into possession and occupancy of said tenement, but found the bedbugs so amiable and friendly that he was unable to occupy said furnished flat; that they bit him and his family and made said tenement wholly uninhabitable."

The plea is unnoticed, as the case was reported to the law court as follows:

"By agreement of parties this case is reported to the law court: The law court to determine from so much of the foregoing evidence as is legally admissible: (1) Whether said house was fit for occupation as a furnished house. (2) As a matter of law whether there was an implied warranty that said house and furniture therein should be fit for use and occupation.

"If the law court finds from the evidence that said house as furnished was not fit for use and occupation, and that there was an implied warranty that said house and the furniture therein should be fit for use and occupation, judgment to be for the plaintiff for the sum of one hundred dollars ($100) and costs; otherwise, judgment to be for the defendant."

The report first presents a question of fact as to whether the house as furnished was fit for use and occupation. Without rehearsing the testimony, we think it amply sustains the burden of proof that it was not fit for use and occupation.

This brings us to the question of implied warranty. The law is well settled upon the force and effect of a lease in the following respects:

(1) When a landlord leases an unfurnished dwelling house to a tenant, whatever the length of the period, there is no implied warranty that such dwelling house is reasonably lit for habitation, unless he has made a valid agreement to that effect. The common law of caveat emptor is still in force in this state. Bennett v. Sullivan, 100 Me. 118, 60 Atl. 886. We know of no exceptions to that rule.

(2) When a landlord leases a furnished dwelling house for a period of years, there is no implied warranty that the dwelling is fit for use and occupation. The rule of caveat emptor still applies. In Davis v. George, 67 N. H. 393, 39 Atl. 979, it is said:

"In a lease of a furnished house for a term of years, there is no implied covenant that the house is suitable for the lessee's occupation."

(3) In a lease of a furnished dwelling house for a short time and for temporary purposes, there may be an implied warranty that the dwelling is reasonably suitable for use and occupation. The source of this doctrine is found in Smith v. Marble, 11 M. & W. 5, an English case, which holds that—

"In a lease of furnished rooms for a particular season of the year, a warranty may be implied that the rooms are properly furnished and suitably fitted for such purposes."

Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N. E. 286, 16 L. R. A. 51, 32 Am. St. Rep. 460, which is perhaps the leading case in that state, follows the doctrine laid down by the English case, and so fully states its own rule, and the reason therefor, that we quote at length as follows:

"It is well settled, both in this commonwealth and in England, that one who lets an unfurnished building to be occupied as a dwelling house does not impliedly agree that it is fit for habitation. * * * In the absence of fraud or a covenant, the purchaser of real estate, or hirer of it, for a term however short, takes it as it is, and determines for himself whether it will serve the purpose for which he wants it. He may, and often does, contemplate making extensive repairs upon it to adapt it to his wants. But there are good reasons why a different rule should apply to one who hires a furnished room or a furnished house for a few days or a few weeks or months. Its fitness for immediate use of a particular kind, as indicated by its appointments, is a far more important element entering into the contract than when there is a mere lease of real estate. One who lets for a short term a house provided with ail furnishings and appointments for immediate residence may be supposed to contract with reference to a well-understood purpose of the hirer to use it as a habitation. An important part of what the hirer pays for is the opportunity to enjoy it without...