Young v. Prevue Products, Inc.

• Decision Date: 09 November 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86-265,86-265
• Citation: 534 A.2d 714,130 N.H. 84
• Parties: Gini YOUNG v. PREVUE PRODUCTS, INC.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Page 714

534 A.2d 714

130 N.H. 84

Gini YOUNG v. PREVUE PRODUCTS, INC.

No. 86-265.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Nov. 9, 1987.

Moquin & Daley, P.A., Manchester (Richard C. Moquin on the brief, and Edward Moquin orally), for plaintiff.

Hinkley, Donovan, Russell & Desjardins, Lancaster, and James C. Gahan, Jr., Boston Mass., on the brief and orally, Kelliher & Clougherty, Manchester (Thomas W. Kelliher on the brief and orally, and Elizabeth Cazden with him on brief), for defendant.

BROCK, Chief Justice.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the portion of RSA 281:12 which bars consortium actions against an employer by the spouse of an employee injured on the job is unconstitutional under the due process provisions of the New Hampshire Constitution, N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 14, because it eliminates a cause of action previously available to spouses of injured employees without providing an adequate quid pro quo. We uphold the constitutionality of this statutory provision and affirm.

The plaintiff's husband, Daniel Young, was injured during the course of his employment with Prevue Products, Inc. of Manchester (Prevue), on or about March 1, 1982, and again on or about September 6, 1983. Mr. Young received medical benefits and permanent disability compensation from Prevue pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Law, RSA chapter 281. In October 1985, the plaintiff, Gini Young, brought a tort action against Prevue for loss of consortium resulting from her husband's work-related injuries. The plaintiff alleged that Prevue was negligent in failing to provide a safe workplace, and in failing to implement safe work practices. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, citing the exclusive remedy clause, RSA 281:12. The plaintiff objected to the motion on constitutional grounds. The Superior Court (Goode, J.) granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, and this appeal followed.

The current version of the exclusive remedy clause, RSA 281:12, states that "[t]he spouse of an employee entitled to benefits under this chapter ... shall have no direct action whether at common law or by statute or otherwise, to recover for such damages against [the employer.]" The plaintiff does not dispute the fact that the language of RSA 281:12 bars her consortium claim against Prevue. She asserts, however, that the statutory prohibition against spousal claims is unconstitutional with respect to loss of consortium claims. In support of her assertion, the plaintiff cites the 1971 amendment to RSA 281:12 which eliminated the then-existing cause of action for loss of consortium, but did not provide an adequate substitute remedy, or quid pro quo.

Prior to 1971, RSA 281:12 provided that an employee "waived his rights of action at common law to recover damages for personal injuries against his employer...." (Emphasis added.) A wife's right of action for loss of consortium based on her husband's injuries was not recognized at common law. It was not until 1967 that the New Hampshire legislature recognized this new cause of action. Laws 1967, 218:1; RSA 507:8-a. In LaBonte v. National Gypsum Co., 110 N.H. 314, 319, 269 A.2d 634, 638 (1970) this court interpreted RSA 281:12 as barring only an employee's right of action at common law, not an employee's wife's statutory right of action for loss of consortium. Thus, an injured employee's wife was permitted to proceed with her loss of consortium claim against her husband's employer. Id. at 320, 269 A.2d at 638; see Archie v. Hampton, 112 N.H. 13, 17, 287 A.2d 622, 625 (1972) (although a 1972 case, pre-1971 statute applied because injury occurred in 1969).

In response to LaBonte, RSA 281:12 was amended in 1971, and the following sentence was added: "The spouse of an employee entitled to benefits under this chapter shall have no right of action at common law against the employer...." Laws 1971, 539:5. (Emphasis added.) This change, however, was interpreted as preventing only a husband's action for loss of consortium against his wife's employer. Ahern v. Laconia Country Club, Inc., 118 N.H. 623, 625-26, 392 A.2d 587, 588 (1978) (injury in 1972). In Ahern, this court concluded that because a wife's loss of consortium suit was not recognized at common law, but was, rather, created by statute, the bar to any "right of action at common law" did not bar a wife's statutory right. 118 N.H. at 625-26, 392 A.2d at 588; see also DePaolo v. Spaulding Fibre Co., 119 N.H. 89, 90, 397 A.2d 1048, 1049 (1979) (although a 1979 case, pre-1973 statute applied because injury occurred in 1972).

In 1973, RSA 281:12 was amended again, this time to remedy the anomalous result of the Ahern and DePaolo cases. The phrase "right of action at common law" was replaced with the phrase "direct right of action," so that the pertinent statute read: "The spouse of an employee entitled to benefits under this chapter shall have no direct right of action against the employer...." Laws 1973, 481:3. Finally, in 1977, the court held that RSA 281:12 effectively barred a wife's suit for loss of consortium against her husband's employer. O'Keefe v. Associated Grocers, 117 N.H. 132, 136, 370 A.2d 261, 264 (1977) (injury in 1974). In 1978, this provision was clarified further to read: "The spouse of an employee entitled to benefits under this chapter ... shall have no direct action at common law or by statute or otherwise, to recover for such damages...." Laws 1978, 46:1 (current version) (emphasis added).

The plaintiff challenges the provision's constitutionality, alleging that when the legislature attempted to bar the wife's loss of consortium claim in 1971, it failed to provide a corresponding quid pro quo, as required by Estabrook v. American Hoist & Derrick, Inc., 127 N.H. 162, 178, 498 A.2d 741, 751 (1985). In addressing the plaintiff's constitutional challenge, we are mindful of our obligation to interpret the Workers' Compensation Law liberally. Heinz v. Concord Union School Dist., 117 N.H. 214, 219-20, 371 A.2d 1161, 1165 (1977).

In Estabrook, this court held unconstitutional RSA 281:12, II, which bars actions for non-intentional torts by an employee, his spouse, or personal or legal representatives against a fellow employee for personal injury. 127 N.H. at 178, 498 A.2d at 751. Prior to 1978, New Hampshire law permitted an injured employee who had received workers' compensation benefits to bring an action against a fellow employee tortfeasor for the same injuries. In 1978, an amendment to RSA 281:12 deprived the employee of the right to such a remedy. Laws 1978, 46:1. The plaintiffs in Estabrook argued that the amended RSA 281:12, II violated the due process and the equal protection clauses of the New Hampshire Constitution. 127 N.H. at 170, 498 A.2d at 746. The...