Young v. Robertshaw Controls Co.

• Decision Date: 07 March 1983
• Docket Number: No. 81-CV-1371.,81-CV-1371.
• Citation: 560 F. Supp. 288
• Parties: Gail E. YOUNG, Administratrix of the Goods, Chattels and Credits of John A. Young, Deceased, and Gail E. Young, Individually, Plaintiff, v. ROBERTSHAW CONTROLS COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

560 F. Supp. 288

Gail E. YOUNG, Administratrix of the Goods, Chattels and Credits of John A. Young, Deceased, and Gail E. Young, Individually, Plaintiff, v. ROBERTSHAW CONTROLS COMPANY, Defendant.

No. 81-CV-1371.

United States District Court, N.D. New York.

March 7, 1983.

DeGraff, Foy, Conway, Holt-Harris & Mealey, Albany, N.Y., for plaintiff; Frederick C. Riester, Albany, N.Y., of counsel.

Fischer, Hughes, Bessette & Edwards, Malone, N.Y., for defendant; Henry A. Fischer, Malone, N.Y., of counsel.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER

MINER, District Judge.

I

This action is brought pursuant to § 23 of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2072,¹ to recover for the personal injuries and subsequent death of plaintiff's decedent. Jurisdiction in this Court is invoked pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Before the Court is defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Fed.R. Civ.P. 12(b)(1), and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Alternatively, defendant contends that punitive damages are not available in this action and seeks to limit plaintiff's recovery to compensatory damages only.

II

On August 4, 1977, an explosion and fire occurred in the home of plaintiff's decedent, John Young. As a result, Mr. Young suffered extensive burns and died approximately two weeks later, survived by his wife (plaintiff) and three infant children. Plaintiff contends that the fire and explosion resulted from a defective water heater control device manufactured by defendant.

During the period 1955-1957, defendant (hereinafter "Robertshaw") manufactured several million of these water heater control devices ("Unitrols"). In 1957, and again in 1960, Robertshaw effected certain design changes in the Unitrol controls, and, some time after 1957, Robertshaw attempted to modify those Unitrols actually produced during the 1955-1957 period. Plaintiff contends that Robertshaw made these design changes and modifications when it became apparent that the Unitrol controls were dangerously defective.²

By letter dated April 19, 1974, pursuant to the mandatory disclosure requirements of the Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972 (hereinafter "Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 2064,³ Robertshaw informed the Consumer Product Safety Commission (hereinafter "Commission") of the potential hazards associated with the Unitrol controls. Specifically, Robertshaw informed the Commission that, "after May 14, 1973, Robertshaw has been informed of one fatality and one injury possibly connected with the potential product hazard." (Exhibit B to plaintiff's opposition to motion to dismiss, p. 2). Based upon this information, the Commission acquiesced in Robertshaw's proposed program to "locate the controls for inspection and modification or replacement at no cost to the consumer." (Id.)

Eventually, however, the Commission filed an administrative complaint⁴ alleging that

Robertshaw knowingly and willfully filed inaccurate information with the Commission on April 18 and 19, 1974, and further, since the time of its notification, Robertshaw has failed to apprise the Commission of other incidents associated with the referenced controls, which incidents were known by Robertshaw to have involved severe personal injury or death and should have been made known to the Commission.

(Letter from David Schmeltzer to Joseph A. Howell, Jr.; Ex. C to plaintiff's opposition). The Commission further alleged that Robertshaw's failure to provide this information constituted a violation of § 19(a)(4) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2068(a)(4).⁵

The parties herein do not dispute that a failure to disclose information pursuant to § 2068(a)(4) entitles the Commission to recover civil penalties from the violator. 15 U.S.C. § 2069.⁶ However, defendant contends that a failure to disclose information in accordance with the Commission's regulations does not entitle a private party to maintain a civil action against the recalcitrant manufacturer. In support of this contention, defendant argues that the seemingly broad language of § 2072 is not intended to encompass the violation of a mere disclosure rule of the Commission. Defendant also contends that, since the Commission has been empowered expressly to impose penalties on a non-disclosing manufacturer, a comparable right should not be implied on behalf of an injured consumer. Finally, defendant argues that to allow a private action against a manufacturer before the Commission determines that the manufacturer's product contains a defect which creates a substantial product hazard is a denial of the manufacturer's right to due process of law.

In contrast, plaintiff argues that the language of § 2072 should be given its plain meaning. Moreover, plaintiff argues that her decedent's death could have been prevented had Robertshaw promptly provided full and accurate information to the Commission. More specifically, plaintiff contends that the Commission would have instituted more effective measures to protect the public against injury had it been aware of the true extent of the dangers presented by the Unitrol controls. According to plaintiff, this is exactly the type of situation which Congress intended to prevent when it enacted § 2072.

III

The Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2083, was passed, in part, to "protect the public against unreasonable risks of injury associated with consumer products." 15 U.S.C. § 2051(b). The Act also established the Consumer Product Safety Commission, and granted the Commission broad powers to achieve the Act's underlying objectives. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 2053, 2054, and 2056. In carrying out its statutory duties,

the Commission has issued rules which, for purposes of this case, may broadly be classified into two major categories: `consumer product safety rules' and administrative rules. The former is comprised of rules promulgated in order to halt or restrict the sale or manufacture of consumer products deemed unreasonably dangerous to the public....

The other major category of rules comprises regulations promulgated in order to facilitate the administration of the Commission and its statutory duties.

Butcher v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 550 F.Supp. 692 at 695 (D.Md.1981).

Title 15 U.S.C. § 2064 provides that a manufacturer who obtains information indicating that its product contains a defect which could create a "substantial product hazard" must disclose that information to the Commission. The Commission's regulations, found at 16 C.F.R. Part 1115,⁷ interpret and implement this statutory provision and reiterate the manufacturer's duty of disclosure. 15 U.S.C. § 2072 provides, in part:

(a) Any person who shall sustain injury by reason of any knowing (including willful) violation of a consumer product safety rule, or any other rule or order issued by the Commission may sue any person who knowingly (including willfully) violated any such rule or order.... (emphasis supplied).

The Supreme Court, in construing another section of the Consumer Product Safety Act, has stated, "we begin with the familiar canon of statutory construction that the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980). Here, § 2072 is expressed in clear and unequivocal terms. A private damage remedy is available to one who sustains injury by reason of a violation of a consumer product safety rule, "or any other rule or order issued by the Commission." Defendant's contention that the violation of a disclosure rule does not entitle plaintiff to maintain a private action to recover damages for the injuries to her decedent flies in the face of this unambiguous language. Having examined the Act's legislative history, see, e.g., 1972 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News, p. 4573, et seq., and finding no indication to the contrary, this Court determines that the statutory language must be regarded as conclusive.⁸

Defendant's reliance on Riegel Textile Corp. v. Celanese Corp., 493 F.Supp. 511 (S.D.N.Y.1980), affirmed, 649 F.2d 894 (2d Cir.1981), for a contrary result is misplaced. Unlike the situation at bar, Riegel involved the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1261, et seq. (FHSA). Moreover, plaintiff there sought to have a private cause of action implied⁹ under the FHSA. In deciding that plaintiff could not rely, by analogy, on the provisions of § 2072, the district court stated:

The private damage remedy provisions of the related Consumer Product Safety Act are also inapplicable by their terms. The cause of action created by Section 2072 does not arise in the absence of valid regulatory action by the Commission under the Consumer Product Safety Act. In the case of Tris-treated garments and fiber, the Commission has issued no regulations under the Consumer Product Safety Act (and is, in fact, required to proceed by means of the Federal Hazardous Substances Act rather than the Consumer Product Safety Act unless it finds good reason not to do so). Further, once the initial Tris regulations which the Commission had issued under the Federal Hazardous Substances Act were found to be without effect, see Springs Mills Inc. v. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 434 F.Supp. 416 (D.C.S.C.1977), supra, the Commission indicated that it would proceed by individual enforcement action rather than by regulation under the Hazardous Substances Act, so that Section 2072 cannot be applied by analogy to create a private cause of action for violation of Commission regulations governing Tris-treated objects. Moreover, Section 2072's provisions have been construed to limit the available private cause of action under that section to actions brought by members of the consuming

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