Young v. Rutkin
| Decision Date | 09 September 2003 |
| Docket Number | (AC 23239). |
| Parties | RICHARD YOUNG v. ARNOLD RUTKIN |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Schaller, Flynn and West, Js.
John R. Williams, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Paul E. Pollock, for the appellee (defendant).
The plaintiff, Richard Young, appeals from the judgment of the trial court directing a verdict for the defendant, Arnold Rutkin, an attorney, in this legal malpractice action. The plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) held that his expert witnesses were not qualified to offer opinion evidence and (2) directed the verdict when the evidence was sufficient for submission to the jury even in the absence of expert testimony. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts are necessary to our resolution of the plaintiff's appeal. The defendant initially represented the plaintiff in divorce proceedings in 1989. Pursuant to the settlement of that divorce action, the plaintiff agreed to pay his former wife $13,000 per month. The settlement agreement also provided that the plaintiff's former wife and the couple's children would have the use of the marital home, but that in the event of a sale, the proceeds would be divided evenly between the plaintiff and his former wife. The settlement agreement also provided that in the event that the wife married or cohabited, alimony and certain other payments would cease and the marital home would be sold.
In 1993, the defendant represented the plaintiff in seeking a modification of the plaintiff's financial obligations to his former wife. Following settlement discussions between the parties to the divorce, they agreed on a modification of the divorce settlement that reduced the plaintiff's financial obligations to $30,000 per year. In exchange for that reduction, the plaintiff agreed to surrender his one-half interest in the marital home and expunge from the settlement agreement the cohabitation clause governing the use of the house.
The parties also negotiated an agreement concerning the use of an outstanding balance of a home equity line of credit that the plaintiff previously had taken out on the marital home. Of the original $150,000 equity line, $90,000 had been drawn on the account prior to the 1993 negotiations. The modification agreement provided that the plaintiff's former wife could use the remaining $60,000 balance of the credit line for "any reasonable purpose for her or [the parties'] children's needs . . . ." The plaintiff would remain responsible for paying the interest on that loan and was obligated to repay any outstanding balance on the loan in the event that the house was sold.
During the negotiations leading to the modification agreement, the defendant, at the plaintiff's suggestion, inquired of the plaintiff's former wife whether she was dating anybody or was planning on having anyone move into the house in the immediate future. According to the defendant, the attorney representing the plaintiff's former wife replied that she was seeing a few people, one more than the others, but that she had no plans to cohabit or to remarry at that time. The plaintiff remained somewhat apprehensive, realizing that if his former wife moved someone into the house in the near future, the terms of the proposed modification agreement would cost him more than he saved. According to the plaintiff, however, the defendant assured him that the modification could be overturned on the ground of fraud in the event that the representations made by the former wife proved false.
Three weeks after finalizing the modification agreement, the plaintiff's former wife informed the plaintiff that she was living with someone. Three months after that, she wrote to the plaintiff to inform him that she had used the remainder of the available funds from the home equity loan.
Following those revelations, the plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the modification agreement on the basis of fraud or misrepresentation. At the hearing on that motion, the plaintiff testified that a representation was made that his former wife was seeing several people, one more than the others, but that she had no plans to cohabit. The plaintiff testified that he relied on that representation in agreeing to the proposed modification of the settlement agreement. The attorney for the plaintiff's former wife also testified at the hearing. He indicated that he had stated at the time of the modification agreement that his client had been seeing only one person. Faced with that contrary testimony at the hearing and the absence of any writing memorializing the representations that actually had been made, the attorney representing the plaintiff in the fraud action, David J. Scully, recommended that the plaintiff settle the matter. That decision was founded on Scully's belief that the absence of concrete proof would make it impossible to satisfy the burden of proof with respect to the alleged fraud. The parties did subsequently settle the fraud action.
The plaintiff then filed an action against the defendant, alleging that the defendant had been negligent in his representation during the negotiations leading to the modification of the divorce settlement. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that he had relied on the defendant's oral representation that the modification agreement could be overturned in court on the ground of fraud in the event that the plaintiff's former wife had misrepresented her intentions and did cohabit or remarry within a brief period of time following the modification. The defendant failed, however, to document the representations of opposing counsel regarding the future plans of the plaintiff's former wife. The plaintiff argued that that failure to obtain written assurances made it impossible to prevail in the fraud case.
The legal malpractice case was tried to the jury. Following the close of evidence, the defendant sought a directed verdict, and the motion was granted by the court. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
We first address the claim that the court improperly ruled that the plaintiff's expert witnesses were not qualified to offer opinion evidence regarding the relevant standard of care.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Henry, 72 Conn. App. 640, 654, 805 A.2d 823, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 917, 811 A.2d 1293 (2002).
Section 7-2 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence provides that "[a] witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, education or otherwise may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise concerning scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge, if the testimony will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue." In Davis v. Margolis, 215 Conn. 408, 576 A.2d 489 (1990), our Supreme Court discussed the contours of the qualification of experts as applicable specifically to attorneys. The court held that to be qualified as an expert witness in a particular matter, an attorney "must be found to possess special knowledge beyond that exhibited by every attorney simply as a result of membership in the legal profession." Id., 417. The court stressed, however, that such special knowledge properly may "emanate from [any of] a myriad of sources, such as teaching, scholarly writings, study or practical experience." Id.1 Nevertheless, the standard regarding expert qualification requires more than casual familiarity with the area of law about which the witness seeks to testify. Id., 416.
The following additional facts are necessary for our resolution of the plaintiff's claim. The plaintiff called Scully as an expert witness. Scully had represented the plaintiff in his fraud action against the plaintiff's former wife. During direct examination, Scully comprehensively testified regarding the fraud proceedings. The defendant objected, however, when the plaintiff inquired whether Scully had a professional opinion regarding the defendant's failure to document the representations that allegedly had been made regarding the modification agreement. The court allowed the witness to answer that he did have such an opinion. The defendant then renewed his objection as to the witness stating that opinion. The court then excused the jury and allowed both parties to question the witness as to his experience in the area of domestic and family law.
During that examination, Scully...
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