Young v. Salt Lake City School Dist.

• Decision Date: 19 July 2002
• Docket Number: No. 20001144.,20001144.
• Citation: Young v. Salt Lake City School Dist., 52 P.3d 1230, 2002 UT 64 (Utah 2002)
• Parties: Eric T. YOUNG, a minor, by and through Priscilla Young, his general guardian and guardian-ad-litem, and Priscilla Young, individually, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SALT LAKE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT and John Does 1-20, Defendants and Appellees.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

52 P.3d 1230

2002 UT 64

Eric T. YOUNG, a minor, by and through Priscilla Young, his general guardian and guardian-ad-litem, and Priscilla Young, individually, Plaintiff and Appellant, v.SALT LAKE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT and John Does 1-20, Defendants and Appellees.

No. 20001144.

Supreme Court of Utah.

July 19, 2002.

Robert B. Sykes, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs.

Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Brent A. Burnett, Barry G. Lawrence, Asst. Att'ys Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendants.

DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice:

¶ 1 This appeal concerns the duties owed by Salt Lake City School District("the District") to Eric Young, an elementary school student who was injured while riding his bicycle to a mandatory parent-teacher-student ("PTS") conference.Because Young's injury occurred at a crosswalk outside the District's control, the district court held that the District owed Young no common law, regulatory, or statutory duties.We affirm, concluding that the District owed Young (1) no common law duties because it lacked a special relationship with him at the time of the accident, (2) no regulatory duties because rule 920-5-2(A)(3) of Utah's Administrative Code does not create a private cause of action, and (3) no statutory duties because the plain language of subsection 41-6-20.1(3) of the Utah Code applies only to entities that have the authority to enact traffic laws.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2"Before we recite the facts, we note that in reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."Higgins v. Salt Lake County,855 P.2d 231, 233(Utah1993).We state the facts accordingly.

¶ 3 On October 15, 1996, a car driven by Linda Frost accidentally struck and injured Young, a minor, while he was riding his bicycle to a mandatory PTS conference at Dilworth Elementary, a school operated by the District.The accident occurred just opposite Dilworth Elementary at a crosswalk located at approximately 1953 South 2100 East, Salt Lake City, Utah.¶ 4 On October 28, 1997, Young, acting through his mother, sued Jennifer Wimmer,¹ claiming that she had parked illegally near the crosswalk and that her vehicle had obstructed both his view of oncoming traffic and Frost's view of pedestrians entering the crosswalk.²Young did not sue Frost because of a prior settlement he had reached with her.

¶ 5 Young later amended his complaint on February 23, 1998, and added the District and Salt Lake City as defendants, alleging that (1) the District had failed to provide a crossing guard and flashing warning lights at the crosswalk and (2)Salt Lake City had failed to erect appropriate road signals (i.e., a "no parking" sign and red curbs).Thereafter, Young amended his complaint a second, third, and fourth time.

¶ 6 In the last of these complaints, Young named the District and its agents as the sole defendants, asserting that the District had caused his injury in two ways.³First, he claimed that the District had neglected to inform Salt Lake City of dangerous parking conditions of which it had knowledge near the crosswalk.Second, he alleged that the District had breached its duty to provide a crossing guard and flashing warning lights.

¶ 7 Subsequently, the District filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that it had no duty to (1) inform Salt Lake City of dangerous parking conditions existing at the crosswalk, (2) supply a crossing guard, or (3) provide flashing warning lights.In response, Young claimed that the District had an obligation to protect him due to his special relationship with it, duties arising at common law, and obligations imposed by statute.The district court granted the District's summary judgment motion, concluding, among other things, that no "duty existed between the defendant and plaintiff with respect to traffic signs and conditions at or around the crosswalk."

¶ 8 Young appeals, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to section 78-2-2(3)(j) of the Utah Code.Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j)(1999).On appeal, Young contends that the district court erred in granting the District's summary judgment motion for three reasons.To begin with, he argues that he had a special relationship with the District that obligated it to inform Salt Lake City of dangerous parking conditions present near the crosswalk.In particular, citing both case law and rule 920-5-2(A)(3) of Utah's Administrative Code, he contends that the District had a duty to prepare a safe routing plan for students attending Dilworth Elementary and that as a result of this duty it was obligated to inform Salt Lake City of hazardous parking conditions of which it had knowledge.⁴Additionally, he alleges that the District had a self-imposed duty to report safety deficiencies to Salt Lake City.⁵Finally, relying on subsection 41-6-20.1(3) of the Utah Code, he maintains that the District had a duty to provide both a crossing guard and flashing warning lights.

¶ 9 The District responds that it owed Young no common law duties because it lacked a special relationship with him at the time the accident occurred.It further argues that it did not owe Young any regulatory or statutory duties because (1)rule 920-5-2 of Utah's Administrative Code merely requires it to produce an informative routing plan and (2) the plain language of subsection 41-6-20.1(3) of the Utah Code applies only to entities that have the authority to enact traffic laws.

ANALYSIS

I.STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 10 Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)."When reviewing a court's decision to grant summary judgment, we examine the court's legal conclusions for correctness."Tustian v. Schriever,2001 UT 84, ¶ 13, 34 P.3d 755.Where this review requires us to examine statutory language, we look first to the plain meaning of the statute.State v. Casey,2002 UT 29, ¶ 20, 44 P.3d 756.

II.COMMON LAW DUTIES

¶ 11 Young initially contends that the District had an affirmative common law obligation to inform Salt Lake City of dangerous conditions of which it had knowledge existing at the crosswalk.He further argues that the District had a common law duty to provide both a crossing guard and flashing warning lights at the crosswalk the night of the PTS conference.We conclude that the District owed Young none of the aforementioned duties because it did not have a special relationship with him at the time of the accident.

¶ 12 In reaching this conclusion, we note that to prevail upon a negligence claim under Utah law, a plaintiff must establish, among other things, that the defendant owed him or her a duty of care.Williams v. Melby,699 P.2d 723, 726(Utah1985);Lamarr v. Utah State Dep't of Transp.,828 P.2d 535, 537(Utah Ct.App.1992).Absent a showing that the defendant owed any duty, the plaintiff's claim has no merit, and he or she may not recover.Rollins v. Petersen,813 P.2d 1156, 1159(Utah1991).

¶ 13 Ordinarily, a person has no affirmative common law duty to protect another from harm.Gilger v. Hernandez,2000 UT 23, ¶ 15, 997 P.2d 305.There is an exception to this general rule, however, where a special relationship exists between the parties.Id.Here, Young claims that he had a special relationship with the District at the time he sustained his injury.We disagree.

¶ 14 To be certain, a special relationship may arise between a school district and a child attending one of its schools.SeePratt v. Robinson,39 N.Y.2d 554, 384 N.Y.S.2d 749, 349 N.E.2d 849, 852(1976).The extent of this relationship is limited to the district's custody over that child, however.Id.;see alsoNorton v. Canandaigua City Sch. Dist.,208 A.D.2d 282, 624 N.Y.S.2d 695, 697-98(N.Y.App.Div.1995)(stating that the district's duty is limited by time and space).Indeed, when a school district has custody of a child, it acts as a substitute for the student's parents or guardian, Norton,624 N.Y.S.2d at 697-98, and has a custodial duty of protection, Pratt,384 N.Y.S.2d 749, 349 N.E.2d at 852.As the Restatement puts it, by taking custody of the child, the district has "deprived [the child] of the protection [from] his parents or guardian.Therefore, [it] ... is properly required to give him the protection which [he has lost]."Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 320 cmt. b. By comparison, when a school district lacks custody, it has no protective obligation and no special relationship exists.Id.;see alsoNorton,624 N.Y.S.2d at 697-98.Accordingly, we must ascertain whether the District had custody of Young at the moment he was injured.We hold that it did not.

¶ 15 Our conclusion in this respect is based on several considerations.First, Young's elementary school had adjourned for the day, and he had been released into the care of his parents.Rife v. Long,127 Idaho 841, 908 P.2d 143, 149(1995)(noting that the child was not in the district's custody because his school had adjourned for the day and his parents had resumed control over his well-being).Second, Young's injury did not occur on premises within the District's control.Rather, Salt Lake City had the responsibility to maintain the crosswalk at which Young was injured.Cf.Norton,624 N.Y.S.2d at 697-98(stating that a school district's duty to a child is "limited by time and space").As such, the District had no authority to regulate traffic at or near the crosswalk and could not have ordered any alterations or enhancements in the traffic signals governing the area.Lastly, at the time he sustained his injury, Young was not participating in a curricular, or extra-curricular, school-sponsored event; he was simply in the process of traveling to such an event.Cf.Pratt,384 N.Y.S.2d 749,349 N.E.2d at 853(explaining that the district lacked custody once it safely dropped off a student at his bus stop...