Young v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.

• Decision Date: 30 April 1969
• Docket Number: No. LR-68-C-36.,LR-68-C-36.
• Citation: 309 F. Supp. 475
• Parties: Luther M. YOUNG, Jr., Plaintiff, v. SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE CO., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas

309 F. Supp. 475

Luther M. YOUNG, Jr., Plaintiff, v. SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE CO., Defendant.

No. LR-68-C-36.

United States District Court, E. D. Arkansas, W. D.

April 30, 1969.

James E. Youngdahl, Little Rock, Ark., for plaintiff.

Donald K. King and Robert M. Sanderford, Little Rock, Ark., Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. counsel, for defendant.

Memorandum Opinion

HENLEY, Chief Judge.

This is a suit brought by Luther M. Young, Jr., a former employee of Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., stationed at El Dorado, Arkansas, against his former employer charging that the defendant's termination of his employment in August 1967 constituted a breach of a collective bargaining agreement between Bell, on the one hand, and the Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, a labor organization representing certain employees of the company, including plaintiff. The relief sought is reinstatement, back pay, restoration of all other employment rights, benefits, and privileges, costs of the action and all additional appropriate relief. Federal jurisdiction is predicated upon section 301(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C.A. § 185(a).

The case is before the Court on the cross-motions of the parties for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U. S.C.A. The motions have been submitted on the pleadings, voluminous documentary material, full briefs, and oral argument.

It is familiar law that the function of the Court in passing upon a motion for summary judgment is simply to determine whether there exists in the case a genuine issue as to any material fact which would render a live trial necessary. It is not the function of the Court to resolve disputed factual issues. Where, as here, each side moves for summary judgment, each concedes that for purposes of his own motion there is no genuine factual issue; however, the fact that both sides move for summary judgment does not necessarily establish that the case is a proper one for summary disposition under the Rule.

It is the theory of the plaintiff that his discharge was without "just cause" and constituted a breach of an alleged implied covenant in the collective bargaining agreement that the defendant will not discharge employees without such cause. It is the position of the defendant that since plaintiff had worked for the company for less than three years when he was terminated, the defendant under the terms of the contract had an absolute right to terminate him in the exercise of managerial discretion and without regard to cause.

There is no question about the express terms of the labor contract. Perhaps strangely, the contract does not stipulate that employees are not to be discharged without cause. It does specify that all employees of the company faced with possible termination are entitled to certain grievance procedures at various company levels, and that employees with three years or more of service are entitled to compulsory arbitration as the final step of the grievance procedure. Employees with less than three years of service have no right to arbitration.

The plaintiff contends, however, that in the light of the nature of the company's business, its relationship with the Union, and certain provisions of the contract, the Court should read into the agreement an implied covenant that no employee, regardless of length of service, is to be discharged without cause; that he was discharged without cause, and that the discharge amounted to a breach of the implied covenant on which he relies.

With respect to the distinction which the contract makes between employees having three years or more of service and newer employees, the position of plaintiff is that the distinction goes to remedy only; that the remedy of older employees is compulsory arbitration before an arbitrator or panel; and that the remedy of newer employees, such as plaintiff, is a 301 suit in federal court with the District Judge serving in effect as an arbitrator.

There is no dispute about the historical facts of plaintiff's employment and discharge. He was hired as a lineman in May 1965, and his work required him to climb telephone poles. His work in that capacity was satisfactory, in certain respects above average. On May 9, 1966, he sustained an injury while at work. His injury was not thought at first to be serious, but it turned out that he had suffered a herniated intervertebral disc in the lumbar area of his spine. In February 1967 he was hospitalized in Little Rock and was discharged on March 1 after having lost nine days of work; while in the hospital he was fitted with a back brace. After he left the hospital, plaintiff was seen periodically by his physician who discharged him on June 22 with an evaluation of a 10 percent permanent disability to his body as a whole. As of that time, his doctor was of the opinion that plaintiff would not be able to resume his regular duties as a lineman.

Between the time of his discharge from the hospital and the date of his termination in August 1967, plaintiff was assigned to light work which did not involve heavy manual labor or pole climbing. His superiors decided, however, that he was physically unable to perform his job, and he was discharged.

Plaintiff contacted the Union and availed himself of the contract grievance procedure at the "Area...