Young v. State

• Decision Date: 04 September 1979
• Citation: 407 A.2d 517
• Parties: Thomas R. YOUNG, Defendant-Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff-Below, Appellee.
• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 517

407 A.2d 517

Thomas R. YOUNG, Defendant-Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff-Below, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted June 14, 1979.

Decided Sept. 4, 1979.

Upon appeal from Superior Court. Affirmed.

Thomas J. Stumpf of the Law Firm of James C. Sabo, Georgetown, and Benjamin F. Shaw, III, Georgetown, for defendant-below, appellant.

James E. Liguori, Deputy Atty. Gen., Georgetown, for plaintiff-below, appellee.

Before HERRMANN, C. J., and McNEILLY and QUILLEN, JJ.

McNEILLY, Justice.

The defendant, Thomas R. Young, appeals his Superior Court jury convictions of murder in the first degree, possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony, conspiracy in the second degree, and robbery in the first degree, all stemming from the stabbing murder of Benjamin F. Snyder at the victim's general store and residence in Milton. The defendant contends that the Trial Judge erred in failing to grant his request for trial by Court; in conducting an inadequate voir dire of the jury panel; in admitting certain prejudicial evidence; in permitting improper cross-examination of defendant; and in failing to grant defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal because of the insufficiency of the State's evidence. We consider each issue seriatim.

I

At arraignment defendant entered a plea of not guilty as to all charges and requested trial by jury. During a pretrial conference defendant expressed his desire through counsel, to waive his right to trial by jury and to be tried by the Court. The State objected and the Trial Judge denied defendant's request under Superior Court Criminal Rule 23(a):

"(a) Trial by Jury. Cases required to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless the defendant waives a jury trial in writing with the approval of the Court and the consent of the State."

There is no record of the pretrial conference, but for purposes of this argument we assume the basis for defendant's request was the possibility of prejudicial media publicity making the selection of an impartial jury unlikely. Defendant asserts that this is sufficient reason to afford him the right to trial by Court as suggested in the following dictum from Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 85 S.Ct. 783, 13 L.Ed.2d 630 (1965):

"We need not determine in this case whether there might be some circumstances where a defendant's reasons for wanting to be tried by a judge alone are so compelling that the Government's insistence on trial by jury would result in the denial to a defendant of an impartial trial. Petitioner argues that there might arise situations where 'passion, prejudice . . . public feeling' or some other factor may render impossible or unlikely an impartial trial by jury. However, since petitioner gave no reason for wanting to forego jury trial other than to save time, this is not such a case, and petitioner does not claim that it is." 85 S.Ct., at 791.

Under the circumstances of this case we cannot agree that a bald assertion of a constitutional right to a Court trial, based upon a casually expressed "desire" at an unreported pretrial conference, required the Trial Court's affirmative ruling on that "desire". This Court in Longoria v. State, Del.Supr., 168 A.2d 695, appeal dismissed 368 U.S. 10, 82 S.Ct. 18, 7 L.Ed.2d 18 (1961) has upheld the constitutionality of Rule 23(a), which requires the State's consent to a non-jury trial, citing Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 50 S.Ct. 253, 74 L.Ed. 854 (1930). In Patton the Court stated:

"In affirming the power of the defendant in any criminal case to waive a trial by a constitutional jury and submit to trial by a jury of less than twelve persons, or by the court, we do not mean to hold that the waiver must be put into effect at all events. That perhaps sufficiently appears already. Trial by jury is the normal and, with occasional exceptions, the preferable mode of disposing of issues of fact in criminal cases above the grade of petty offenses. In such cases the value and appropriateness of jury trial have been established by long experience, and are not now to be denied. Not only must the right of the accused to a trial by a constitutional jury be jealously preserved, but the maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body in criminal cases is of such importance and has such a place in our traditions, that, before any waiver can become effective, the consent of government counsel and the sanction of the court must be had, in addition to the express and intelligent consent of the defendant. And the duty of the trial court in that regard is not to be discharged as a mere matter of rote, but with sound and advised discretion, with an eye to avoid unreasonable or undue departures from that mode of trial or from any of the essential elements thereof, and with a caution increasing in degree as the offenses dealt with increase in gravity." 50 S.Ct., at 263.

Referring to Patton v. United States, supra, the Court in Singer v. United States, supra, said:

Thus, there is no federally recognized right to a criminal trial before a judge sitting alone, but a defendant can, as was held in Patton, in some instances waive his right to a trial by jury. The question remains whether the effectiveness of this waiver can be conditioned upon the consent of the prosecuting attorney and the trial judge.

The ability to waive a constitutional right does not ordinarily carry with it the right to insist upon the opposite of that right."

"A defendant's only constitutional right concerning the method of trial is to an impartial trial by jury. We find no constitutional impediment to conditioning a waiver of this right on the consent of the prosecuting attorney and the trial judge when, if either refuses to consent, the result is simply that the defendant is subject to an impartial trial by jury the very thing that the Constitution guarantees him. The Constitution recognizes an adversary system as the proper method of determining guilt, and the Government, as a litigant, has a legitimate interest in seeing that cases in which it believes a conviction is warranted are tried before the tribunal which the Constitution regards as most likely to produce a fair result." 85 S.Ct., at 790.

There is nothing in the record of this case to furnish a factual basis for the granting of trial by Court over the State's objection.

II

Defendant argues that the Trial Court's voir dire of the jury panel was conducted in such a manner as to substantially prejudice him in the selection of an impartial and unbiased jury. The substance of the questions themselves are not objected to, apparently because counsel for defendant were allowed substantial imput into the preparation of the questions.

The Trial Judge made the following introductory remarks to the jury panel:

"I am going to be asking you a series of questions. In fact, there are a great number of questions. At the conclusion of all the questions, I will ask any of you who have a response to a particular question or questions to merely raise your hand so we have some idea how many of you will be responding, and then we will take it from there."

The Trial Judge then asked the jurors thirty-eight questions, two of which specifically requested if any members of the panel were acquainted with any of eighty-six named people. At the conclusion of the questions the Trial Judge requested the panel, "all those who have a response to one or more of the questions which I have asked, please raise your hand." Those panel members who raised their hands were then questioned individually, apart from the other members of the jury panel.

Defendant contends that the Judge should have either: (1) questioned each panel member individually, or, at the least, (2) recorded the name of each panel member who had an affirmative response to a question after each question was posed to the panel collectively. Otherwise, it is inconceivable that each juror could recollect all his responses to the thirty-eight questions, including the eighty-six mentioned names.

"The purpose of Voir dire examination of prospective jurors is to give the trial judge sufficient information to determine whether or not a prospective juror is qualified. In addition, it aids the State and the defendant by eliciting facts upon which they can exercise intelligently rights to peremptory challenges." Parson v. State, Del.Supr., 275 A.2d 777, 780-1 (1971).

"The extent of a Voir dire examination of prospective jurors and the questions to be permitted lie within the broad discretion of the Trial Court, subject to the essential demands of fairness." (citations omitted) Wright v. State, Del.Supr., 374 A.2d 824, 829 (1977).

The need for a searching voir dire to ensure impartiality is reflected by the following general conclusions about jurors' behavior: (1) that "the processes by which (jurors') beliefs are found and adhered to, and their effect on perception, appear to take place to a large extent below the level of consciousness" and (2) whether they are conscious of it or not, "jurors often fail to be truthful on matters of possible prejudice." A.B.A. Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press, General Commentary at 58, 64.

Consequently, the Trial Judge should not merely go through the form of obtaining jurors' assurances of impartiality, but rather, he should conduct an examination designed to elicit answers which provide an objective basis for his evaluation. Silverthorne v. United States, 9 Cir., 400 F.2d 627 (1968), Later appeal, 430 F.2d 675 (1970), Cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1022, 91 S.Ct. 585, 27 L.Ed.2d 633 (1971).

To provide such an objective basis, it seems that regardless whether collective or individual voir dire is used, the Court should adopt " . . . such plan as will assure a response to Each question from each individual juror." Padgett v. Padgett, Ga.App., 63 Ga.App. 70, 10 S.E.2d 127, 128 (1940). See Government of Virgin Islands v. Hendricks, 3 Cir., 476 F.2d 776,...