Young v. State

• Decision Date: 22 April 1970
• Docket Number: No. 37186,37186
• Citation: Young v. State, 234 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1970)
• Parties: Roy Lee YOUNG, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 341

234 So.2d 341

Roy Lee YOUNG, Appellant, v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 37186.

Supreme Court of Florida.

April 22, 1970.

Jack J. Taffer and Jerome Weisberg, Miami, for appellant.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Raymond L. Marky, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

DREW, Justice.

The appellant was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to death.His appeal is properly before this Court under Article V, Section 4(2), Florida Constitution, F.S.A., permitting appeals directly from trial court judgments imposing the death penalty.

It is our considered opinion that appellant's conviction and sentence must be reversed and remanded for a new trial.We discuss herein those points raised on appeal which lead us to this conclusion.

The appellant first asserts that the trial court should not have allowed the state to impeach appellant with pre-trial statements obtained in violation of the guidelines appearing in Miranda v. Arizona.¹Disposition of this point rests upon the answers to four subordinate questions, the first being whether the Miranda test is applicable to interrogations which took place before rendition of Miranda.The United States Supreme Court in Johnson v. New Jersey, ² has held that Miranda applies to cases in which the Trial began after rendition of Miranda, even though the interrogations may have taken place prior thereto.The interrogations here occurred on January 15 and February 3, 1966, while Miranda was not handed down until June 13, 1966.Appellant's trial commenced January 29, 1968.Inasmuch as appellant's trial began some one and one-half years after rendition of the Miranda decision, the trial court was bound to test objectionable evidence by Miranda guidelines.

The second subordinate issue is whether all Miranda warnings were given to appellant.The Record clearly shows, and the state concedes, that although appellant was advised of his right to the presence of an attorney and of his right to remain silent, he was not advised that if he could not afford an attorney one would be appointed for him, as required by Miranda.

The third subordinate question is whether the interrogations were conducted amid circumstances which constituted an 'in custody' or 'custodial' atmosphere.The Miranda opinion itself purports to define such 'in custody' interrogation:³

'By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.'

'The principles announced today deal with the protection which must be given to the privilege against self-incrimination when the individual is first subjected to police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.'

The Supreme Court throughout its opinion described the type of environment that it had in mind with such phrases as 'in a room in which he(defendant) was cut off from the outside world,''incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere,' and 'in isolation and unfamiliar surroundings.'

In the case sub judice, the crime was allegedly perpetrated between the 27th day of April and the 2nd day of May, 1962.Appellant was first interrogated concerning the crime on January 15, 1966, at Belle Glade Prison Camp, in which appellant was then confined for unrelated offenses.He was not under arrest on the murder charge at the time of this or a subsequent interrogation.The Belle Glade interview was conducted by two detectives from the Dade County Public Safety Department during the daytime in the office of the prison camp captain. The detectives testified that no coercive measures were used against appellant and that he was given the opportunity to get up and leave the room or do whatever he chose to do at any time.The parties were sitting during the interview, which lasted approximately two hours.Appellant had the 'opportunity to take a break' during the interview, but did not do so.

The second interrogation took place in an unidentified office within the confines of Raiford Prison.Again appellant was being confined for offenses unrelated to the instant case.Again the interrogation was conducted by two investigators during daylight hours, and appellant was given the opportunity to 'walk out at any time.'This interrogation lasted for approximately five hours.One of the investigators testified that they displayed no anger toward appellant at any time and that the interrogation was conducted on a friendly basis in conversational tones.

In testimony before the court in the jury's absence, appellant testified that at Raiford he was threatened 'with the chair and about my parole, because my parole was coming up that time,' but that the statements given at Belle Glade were voluntary and that he was not compelled or intimidated in any manner at Belle Glade.Appellant further testified that he was offered some sort of 'deal' by the investigators during the interrogation at Raiford, that some five or six written statements of persons in some way connected with the crime were used as a basis for a portion of the questioning there, and that he would not have answered all of the questions put to him at Belle Glade if he had been 'on the outside.'The trial court concluded that there was no coercion at Belle Glade, and ultimately allowed the investigators to testify as to information received at the Raiford as well as Belle Glade interrogations.

The testimony on behalf of both the state and appellant indicates that appellant was not Suddenly thrust into a foreign and hostile environment and subjected to star-chamber tactics in the manner envisioned by the Court in Miranda and experienced by the four defendants in that case.Nevertheless, we conclude that he was subjected to 'in custody' interrogation as that term has been further delineated by the United States Supreme Court in Mathis v. United States.⁴In Mathis, certain documents and oral statements later introduced in the defendant's trial for filing false claims against the government were obtained by interrogation while defendant was in a Florida State prison serving a state sentence.To the government's argument that Miranda should not apply because the defendant had not been put in jail by officers questioning him but was there for an entirely separate offense, the Court replied as follows:⁵

'These differences are too minor and shadowy to justify a departure from the well-considered conclusions of Miranda with reference to warnings to be given to a person held in custody.

'The Government also seeks to narrow the scope of the Miranda holding by making it applicable only to questioning one who is 'in custody' in connection with the very case under investigation.There is no substance to such a distinction, and in effect it goes against the whole purpose of the Miranda decision which was designed to give meaningful protection to Fifth Amendment rights.We find nothing in the Miranda opinion which calls for a curtailment of the warnings to be given persons under interrogation by officers based on the reason why the person is in custody.'

Appellant was without question 'in custody,' as defined in Mathis, supra.It is our judgment that the permission given to appellant to depart the interrogation room at will was an illusory freedom, Within the context of appellant's imprisonment, and did not overcome the custodial atmosphere as defined in Miranda and Mathis.The interrogations should have been preceded by the warnings prescribed in Miranda.

The Miranda decision itself having clearly established that evidence obtained in violation of the procedures prescribed therein may not be produced in the state's case-in-chief, it remains only for us to determine whether such evidence is nevertheless admissible against appellant solely For impeachment purposes.The state asserts that the trial court was correct when it concluded that appellant by his own testimony 'opened the door' to impeaching evidence obtained at the interrogation sessions.

The appellant testified at trial in his own behalf.Those portions of his testimony pertaining to the interrogations at Belle Glade and Raiford appear in the footnote below.⁶The trial court proceeded to allow the state to cross-examine appellant as to the 'deal' mentioned by appellant on direct examination.On cross-examination appellant in answer to the state's questions recounted certain 'deals' offered to him at Belle Glade and Raiford, and said that he did not relate any facts surrounding the murder to the interrogators while at Belle Glade.

Over appellant's objection and after denial of his motion to suppress, the court allowed two of the investigators who interviewed appellant at Raiford and at Belle Glade to testify 'in rebuttal' to appellant's own testimony.⁷In addition to the mere denial that appellant had been offered any type of 'deal,' the detectives were allowed to recount the entire statements made to them by appellant at Belle Glade and Raiford.The stories given by appellant at Raiford differed little from the account given at Belle Glade, according to the detectives' testimony.

Appellant's statements as recounted by the investigators were extremely damaging to his cause, although appellant no doubt intended them to be exculpatory in effect.Appellant recounted a meeting with the alleged victim and a series of events at which appellant was present which ultimately led to the robbery and murder of the victim.In appellant's version of the events, appellant played a passive role in all of the activities leading up to and including taking money from the victim and sending him to his death.

This Court has recently had occasion to consider the narrow issue of whether or not 'Miranda-tainted' pre-trial statements are admissible for the limited purpose of impeachment when a defendant voluntarily chooses to...