Young v. State

• Decision Date: 30 March 1972
• Docket Number: No. 1071S301,1071S301
• Citation: 280 N.E.2d 595,258 Ind. 246,30 Ind.Dec. 91
• Parties: Marvin Leon YOUNG, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 595

280 N.E.2d 595

258 Ind. 246

Marvin Leon YOUNG, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 1071S301.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

March 30, 1972.

John G. Bunner, Evansville, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Darrel K. Diamond, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.

HUNTER, Justice.

This is an appeal by Marvin Leon Young from a judgment in the Vanderburgh Circuit Court convicting him of Second Degree Burglary. On February 18, 1971, appellant was charged by affidavit. Appellant waived arraignment, and entered a plea of not guilty. On May 3, 1971, appellant entered a special plea of insanity. The cause was tried on May 10, 1971, and upon conviction appellant was sentenced to the Indiana State Prison for a term of not less than two (2) years nor more than five (5) years.

The sole issue presented on appeal concerns the correctness of the instructions given to the jury relating to the determination of the appellant's sanity.

State's Instruction Number One, given as modified, reads as follows:

'In Indiana there is a presumption of sanity of a defendant. However, if the jury finds that credible evidence to the contrary has been introduced by the defendant, then the State has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was sane at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, and if from evidence the State has failed to prove that the defendant has substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and that the defendant had the mental ability and sufficient power to conform his conduct to the requirement of the law, then your verdict should be not guilty.'

We need give no further consideration to the other instructions for the reason that the above instruction is patently defective. For reasons hereinafter stated, the judgment must be reversed.

It was error for the jury to be instructed that there was a presumption that the defendant was sane. It was also error to instruct the jury that 'if the jury finds that credible evidence to the contrary has been introduced by the defendant, then the State has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was sane at the time of the commission of the alleged crime. . . .'

It is clearly the law in this State that the defendant in a criminal prosecution is presumed to be sane. See, Brattain v. State (1945), 223 Ind. 489, 61 N.E.2d 462; McHargue v. State (1923), 193 Ind. 204, 139 N.E. 316; Walters v. State (1915), 183 Ind. 178, 108 N.E. 583. The presumption of sanity is a legal presumption, and its existence eliminates the necessity for the State to prove sanity in each and every criminal prosecution.

'In a criminal case it is convenient to require the accused, if he wishes to raise the question of sanity, to produce evidence of his insanity. This saves the state the fruitless trouble to proving sanity in the great number of cases where the question will not raised. The vehicle for accomplishing this saving of time is the presumption of sanity.' McCormick, Law of Evidence, § 309, at 641 (1954).

In Bradley v. State (1870), 31 Ind. 492, the Court commented on the purpose and the nature of the presumption.

'The legal presumption of sanity simply dispenses with proof on that subject in the first instance on the part of the State.' 31 Ind. at 506.

The above language in Bradley v. State, supra, was cited with approval by Judge Ewbank in McHargue v. State, supra.

Keeping in mind the purpose and nature of the presumption of sanity, it logically follows that the only burden imposed by the presumption is the burden of producing evidence which is imposed upon the defendant. The burden of persuasion, however, rests at all times upon the State. In Walters v. State, supra, 183 Ind. at 179, 180, 108 N.E. at 584, the Court observed:

'When the defense of insanity is interposed in a criminal case by a proper plea, the burden rests upon the State to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was sane at the time of the commission of the acts alleged as constituting the crime. This burden never shifts from the State. Every person is presumed to be sane and this presumption is sufficient to constitute a prima facie case in favor of the State where there is no evidence to dispute it, and for this reason the state is not required to introduce evidence in chief to prove the sanity of the defendant. However, where there is some evidence introduced upon the issue of the defendant's sanity and the jury is called upon to consider such evidence for the purpose of determining his guilt or innocence, it must find that the State has sustained the burden which the law imposes and that the evidence in the case establishes the sanity of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. Such reasonable doubt as to a defendant's sanity may arise from evidence introduced by the State as well as from that introduced by the defendant.'

It is clear from the language in the Walters decision that the presumption of sanity is sufficient to constitute a prima facie case in favor of the State where there is no evidence introduced to dispute the presumption. Stated in other terms, if the defendant fails to meet the burden of producing evidence, the legal presumption of sanity is sufficient to establish a prima facie case in favor of the State. Thus the only significance of the presumption is that it operates where no evidence of insanity has been introduced. This view is wholly consistent with the purpose the presumption is intended to serve. It follows, therefore, that when the defendant has met the burden of producing evidence, the legal presumption of sanity has no further evidentiary value, and the jury should not be instructed as to its existence.

In Commonwealth v. Vogel (1970), 440 Pa. 1, 17, 268 A.2d 89, 102, Mr. Justice Pomeroy, in an Opinion in Support, logically sets forth what we believe to be the correct statement of the law:

'According to the view this Court has expressed on past occasions, a presumption of law is not evidence no should it be weighed by the factfinder as though it had evidentiary value. Rather, a presumption is a rule of law enabling the party in whose favor it operates to take his case to the jury without presenting evidence of the fact presumed. It serves as a challenge for proof and indicates the party from whom such proof must be forthcoming. When the opponent of the presumption has met the burden of production thus imposed, however, the office of the presumption has been performed; the presumption is of no further effect and drops from the case. See Watkins v. Prudential Insurance Co., 315 Pa. 497, 173 A. 644 (1934); Szmahl's Estate, 335 Pa. 89, 6 A.2d 267 (1939); Geho's Estate, 340 Pa. 412, 17 A.2d 342 (1941); Commonwealth v. Wucherer, 351 Pa. 305, 41 A.2d 574 (1945); Waters v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 393 Pa. 247, 144 A.2d 354 (1958); Waugh v. Commonwealth, 394 Pa. 166, 146 A.2d 297 (1958); and Allison v. Snelling & Snelling, Inc., 425 Pa. 519, 229 A.2d 861 (1967). See, also, 9 Wigmore, 3rd Ed. § 2490 et seq. (1959).'

Our case law prior to Berry v. State (1968), 251 Ind. 494, 242 N.E.2d 355, provided that the burden of producing evidence had been met when 'some' evidence of insanity has been introduced. See, Flowers v. State (1956), 236 Ind. 151, 139 N.E.2d 185; Brattain v. State, supra; Walters v. State, supra. However, in Berry, the Court interpreted 'some' evidence to mean 'credible' evidence. If we accept the proposition that the trial court should exclude any instruction relating to the legal presumption of sanity once the burden of producing evidence has been met, it follows that the test for meeting this burden should not be whether the evidence is credible. The determination of credibility is a question solely for the trier of fact. The better and more logical rule is that the burden of producing evidence is met when competent or admissible evidence, direct or circumstantial, has been introduced on the issue of insanity. A majority of the Court, including this author, concurred in the decision in Berry. However, as was recognized in Jenkins v. Review Board of Indiana Emp. Sec. Div. (1965), 138 Ind.App. 12, 211 N.E.2d 42,

'We are of the opinion that 'the Judiciary should always be pervious to demonstration of Judicial error'. Therefore, where judicial errors are apparent, they should be judicially corrected for not to do so is to indulge the principle of the 'aristocracy of the robe". 138 Ind.App. at 23, 211 N.E.2d at 48.

Therefore, to the extent that Berry v. State, supra, is in conflict herewith, it is to that extent overruled. After a plea of insanity has been made and competent evidence on that issue has been introduced, the legal presumption of sanity should disappear, and the jury should not be instructed as to its prior existence or its operation.

In the case at bar, there was competent evidence introduced on the issue of insanity. Thus it was error to instruct the jury as to the existence of the legal presumption of sanity as it has ceased to have legal significance.

The instruction that 'if the jury finds that credible evidence to the contrary has been introduced by the defendant, then the State has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was sane at the time of the commission of the alleged crime . . .' is also erroneous. The only burden imposed upon the defendant is the burden of producing competent evidence. The burden of persuasion, which is persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt, is always on the State and the burden never shifts. See, Brattain v. State, supra; Walters v. State, supra. Furthermore, once the issue of the defendant's insanity has become a question of fact for the jury, the jury has a right to consider all of the evidence relating to this issue, whether introduced by the State or by the defendant. See, Brattain v. State, supra; Walters v. State, supra.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment is reversed and the cause...