Young v. State

• Decision Date: 11 December 2014
• Docket Number: No. 49A04–1405–PC–217.,49A04–1405–PC–217.
• Citation: 25 N.E.3d 826 (Table)
• Parties: Antwoine YOUNG, Appellant/Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee/Respondent.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

25 N.E.3d 826 (Table)

Antwoine YOUNG, Appellant/Petitioner

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee/Respondent.

No. 49A04–1405–PC–217.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Dec. 11, 2014.

Stephen T. Owens, Public Defender of Indiana, Anne C. Kaiser, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, George P. Sherman, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

MEMORANDUM DECISION—NOT FOR PUBLICATION

VAIDIK, Chief Judge.

Case Summary

Antwoine Young was charged with Class A felony dealing in cocaine within 1000 feet of subsidized housing and Class B felony possession of cocaine within 1000 feet of subsidized housing; the probable-cause affidavit, however, states that the offense occurred within 1000 feet of a youth program center located within a church. In order to avoid facing a potential fifty-year sentence, Young pled guilty to the lesser-included Class B felony dealing charge, and received a sentence of twelve years in the Indiana Department of Correction. Thereafter he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was illusory because his attorney had failed to investigate the validity of the 1000–foot enhancement location, without which Young would not have been faced with the Class A felony and therefore would not have accepted the guilty plea. The post-conviction court denied his petition, and Young now appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief. Because Young has failed to show clear error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

In May 2011 two undercover police officers purchased .13 grams ($20 dollars' worth) of crack cocaine from a black male—later identified as Antwoine Young—on the street in front of 422 North Oakland Avenue in Indianapolis. Thereafter, Young was arrested following a routine traffic stop and, according to the charging information, charged with Count I, Class A felony dealing in cocaine within 1000 feet of subsidized housing and Count II, Class B felony possession of cocaine within 1000 feet of subsidized housing. The probable-cause affidavit, however, states that the drug deal occurred within 1000 feet of a “YOUTH PROGRAM CENTER AT STAINT [sic] MATTHEW LUTHERAN CHURCH.” See Appellant's App. p. 21.

Six months later, Attorney Howard Green entered his appearance as Young's counsel. Attorney Green had been hired by Young's family because Young and his family were not satisfied with the plea agreement his public defender had presented to him and hoped Attorney Green could obtain a better plea deal. Thereafter, Young pled guilty to the lesser-included charge of Class B felony dealing in cocaine under Count I, pursuant to a plea agreement which provided that Count II would be dismissed and a sentence of twelve years would be imposed, with placement to be determined by the trial court. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that Young serve all twelve years at the DOC.

In November 2012 Young filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. One month later, defense counsel entered an appearance on Young's behalf. Thereafter, Young's counsel requested discovery information from the State; specifically, defense counsel requested that the State admit or deny (1) that the alleged drug offenses occurred in the street in front of 422 N. Oakland Avenue and (2) that the State at no time from the date of the alleged drug deal and Young's guilty-plea hearing had any knowledge of “subsidized housing” within 1000 feet of the location of the alleged drug deal. See id. at 62. The State admitted both, and clarified that “no subsidized housing was involved in this case.” Id. at 64.

Young's post-conviction petition was amended by counsel in October 2013. In the amended petition, Young alleged that his guilty plea was not entered into knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because the benefit from his plea bargain was illusory, and that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Specifically, Young argued in his petition as follows:

1. Young pled guilty to avoid a risk that did not exist (conviction and sentencing for dealing cocaine within 1,000 feet of ‘subsidized housing’);

2. Young's benefit in pleading guilty to the lesser offense was illusory (because the risk of the charged Class A felony was bogus);

3. Young's guilty plea was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily (because the supposed benefit of the plea bargain to Young was illusory); and,

4. Young received ineffective assistance of trial counsel (because of counsel's failure to properly investigate the legitimacy of the alleged ‘subsidized housing’ element associated with the charged Class A felony and thereby also failing to recognize that in actuality there was no benefit to Young in pleading guilty).

Id. at 68.

The post-conviction hearing was held in November 2013. At the hearing, Attorney Green testified that he had not requested any information from the State regarding the alleged subsidized housing. He also testified that “[Young] had no interest in going to trial.” P–C Tr. p. 17. Finally, the following colloquy occurred:

Q: ... If you had known that the Class A[f]elony was not a legitimate charge, would you have—would your advice to Mr. Young have changed?

A: Well ... there was still a delivery of cocaine to an undercover officer. So he still, he is still facing with that sort of penalty regardless. What would have cha[n]ged, I believe, is that my discussions with the State, I would have said, “Perhaps there should have been a better offer more appropriate based upon certain things.” I don't know if that would have been fruitful. I think the State's perspective would have been regardless of the housing facility or that facility, they look at criminal history, they look at the act, they look at the dealing, the transfer of it to another officer, and they might want what they want anyway. But again, as I said, I wasn't—I was never going to take an A because I wouldn't take money from a family to get something that he could have got with anybody.

Id. at 19–20.

At the post-conviction hearing, Young testified that his primary motivation in taking the plea agreement was to avoid the fifty-year sentence he would have faced on the Class A felony, and that had he known the most serious charge he was facing was a Class B felony, he would not have accepted the plea agreement he was offered; rather he would have gone to trial on the Class B felony or would have accepted a plea to a Class C felony.¹

Deputy Prosecutor John Bober also testified at the post-conviction hearing. He stated that the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department East District Narcotics had targeted an approximately two-mile area in Indianapolis, within which Young's drug deal had occurred; Bober assisted the police in this project and prosecuted “about 80 percent of the sixty-plus cases that were filed....”—including Young's case. Id. at 27–28. Bober testified that he and another person prepared all the charging informations involved in this project, relying on templates to do so, and that they “supplied the detectives with the thousand foot locations.” Id. at 30. Confronted with the inconsistencies in the charging information and probable-cause affidavit, Bober characterized this as a “scrivener's error” which would have been corrected had the case gone to trial. Id. at 32. Bober also testified that there were “numerous thousand foot locations in that particular area between schools, churches, subsidized housing, any other youth program centers. We had a plethora of locations to choose for each case.” Id. Bober stated further: “I believe there is not a single location in that area that is not within a thousand feet of a youth program center.” Id. at 37.

Regarding St. Matthew Lutheran Church in particular, Bober stated that he had never actually gone inside the church, but had driven by it many times and had taken pictures of it in preparation for trial. Id. at 38. Bober also testified that he had called the “general number” of the church and had spoken with “someone who answered the phone from the church office and verified they had Sunday school.” Id. at 39. He also stated that he “never had to go to trial with St. Matthew Lutheran Church at [sic] the thousand foot location.” Id. at 42.

Finally, Jonathan Harwell, law student and law clerk at the Indiana State Public Defender's Office, testified that he had been assigned to determine whether there was, in fact, a youth program center at St. Matthew Lutheran Church. In furtherance of this assignment, Harwell visited the church to see if there were any “noticeable youth programs or anything like that in the area.” Id. at 45. He did not see any signs, placards, or other indications of Sunday school and could not tell if the church was still open, but he spoke by telephone with Pastor Ralph Spears approximately three or four months before the postconviction hearing. Harwell testified that based on “the information [Harwell] gathered from [Pastor Spears], the church had not been fully active as a church since 2008” and “even at that time the services being offered were more on a therapeutic basis than ... what we would think of as your traditional Sunday school.” Id. at 51, 53.

Following the hearing, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. First, the court quoted at length from Segura v. State:

[I]n the case of claims related to a defense or failure to mitigate a penalty, it must be shown that there is a reasonable probability that a more favorable result would have obtained in a competently run trial. However, for claims relating to penal consequences, a petitioner must establish, by objective facts, circumstances that support the conclusion that counsel's errors in advice as to penal consequences were material to the decision to pled. Merely alleging that the petitioner would not have pleaded is insufficient. Rather, specific

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