Young v. State
| Decision Date | 28 March 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 3-477A94,3-477A94 |
| Parties | Tommie YOUNG, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Daniel L. Toomey, Gary, for appellant.
Theo. L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Daniel Lee Pflum, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Defendant-appellant Tommie Young, along with co-defendants Larry Wright and Pervies Lane, were charged by information with the offense of robbery. 1 Appellant was convicted as charged and sentenced to the Indiana Department of Correction for a period of not less than ten nor more than 25 years.
On appeal appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for discharge and that the evidence is insufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to find the appellant guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
Appellant first contends that he was entitled to discharge pursuant to the speedy trial provisions of Indiana Rules of Procedure, Criminal Rule 4(B)(1). The record discloses that appellant made an oral demand for a speedy trial during his preliminary appearance in court on August 19, 1976. Appellant was arraigned on September 3, 1976, along with his co-defendants Pervies Lane and Larry Wright. The attorney appointed to defend appellant was not present at the arraignment but was represented by another attorney. During the course of the arraignment, the trial judge advised appellant that he had attempted to set trial within the 70-day time frame of the speedy trial rules, but that the attorneys for the co-defendants had conflicts on the available trial dates. The judge then asked appellant if he had any objection to a trial date of November 1, which was a few days beyond the 70-day period. Appellant responded that he would have to talk with his attorney.
At the Omnibus Hearing on October 8, 1976, appellant's counsel objected to the November 1 trial date. In overruling the objection, the trial court stated that it tried to set the matter within the prescribed time period but that counsel for the co-defendants found conflicts in their trial calendars with the two or three available trial dates. Accordingly, a November trial date was set because it would otherwise make for a congested trial docket.
On November 1, 1976, appellant filed a motion for discharge which was denied by the trial court.
Criminal Rule 4(B)(1) provides as follows:
In the case at bar, appellant Young and his co-defendants Wright and Lane were joined for trial in the same information. Appellant moved for a speedy trial. The trial court was unable to set trial within the requisite time period because the attorneys for the co-defendants could not agree on a trial date consistent with the court's openings. Accordingly, trial was set a few days beyond the 70-day limit.
Appellant did not challenge the propriety of a joint trial nor move for a separate trial. IC 1971, 35-3.1-1-11(b) (Burns Code Ed.), makes provisions for separate trials of joint defendants in certain instances. One of these instances is when the co-defendant has made an out-of-court statement which makes reference to the moving defendant but is not admissible against him.
"In all other cases, upon motion of the defendant or the prosecutor, the court shall order a separate trial of defendants whenever the court determines that a separate trial is necessary to protect a defendant's right to a speedy trial or is appropriate to promote a fair determination of the guilt or innocence of a defendant." (Emphasis added.). Id.
The appellant did not move for a separate trial. The statute does not impose upon the court a duty to order a separate trial sua sponte. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion for discharge.
Appellant next contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. The evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the State disclose that at approximately noon on August 11, 1976, the Walgreen's Drug Store in Gary, Indiana, was held up. Atheldria Givens, a clerk, was standing at her cash register when she noticed three men, one of whom was appellant Young, walking down the street in front of the drug store. Approximately five minutes later these same three men entered the store. Defendant Larry Wright positioned himself near Givens' cash register; appellant Young stationed himself near the middle register by the liquor counter; and defendant Pervies Lane went to the pharmacist's counter.
Givens proceeded to ask a customer if she could be of assistance. The customer said that he was "just looking." Defendant Wright stated, "You can help me, baby," and then said, "Give me your money," and opened his jacket displaying his revolver. Wright ordered Givens to remove all the bills from her cash register and place them in a brown paper bag.
During this time appellant Young stood at the liquor counter looking from Givens to the pharmacist.
After Givens handed Wright the bag of money, she observed the third man (defendant Lane) coming from the pharmacist's counter pushing a shopping cart with money bags inside it. The pharmacist-manager of Walgreen's, Anthony Tsikovris and the bookkeeper, Augustine Turrell were in front of Lane. They went toward the safe. Lane then told everyone in the front of the store to lay on the floor. As Lane was coming toward the front of the store, he passed by appellant Young who then followed afterwards. Appellant did not display a weapon nor say anything during the holdup.
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