Young v. State
| Decision Date | 23 December 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 35423.,35423. |
| Citation | 102 P.3d 572,120 Nev. 963 |
| Parties | Terrell Cochise YOUNG, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent. |
| Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
Connolly & Fujii and Karen A. Connolly, Las Vegas, for Appellant.
Brian Sandoval, Attorney General, Carson City; David J. Roger, District Attorney, and Clark A. Peterson, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Clark County, for Respondent.
Before the Court En Banc.1
AppellantTerrell Cochise Young appeals from his judgment of conviction.Young argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for substitution of counsel.Young maintains that the district court failed to conduct an adequate inquiry before dismissing his motion.
We conclude that the district court abused its discretion when it denied Young's motion to dismiss and appoint new counsel.We hold that three factors are relevant in reviewing a district court's denial of a motion for substitution of counsel: (1) the extent of the conflict between the defendant and counsel, (2) the adequacy of the court's inquiry into the defendant's complaint, and (3) the timeliness of the motion and the extent of any inconvenience or delay.Following an analysis of these three factors, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in denying Young's motion.We therefore reverse Young's conviction and remand for appointment of new counsel and a new trial.2
Young was charged with one count of burglary while in possession of a firearm, one count of conspiracy to commit robbery and/or kidnapping and/or murder, four counts of robbery with use of a deadly weapon, four counts of first-degree kidnapping with use of a deadly weapon, and four counts of murder with use of a deadly weapon.Thereafter, the State filed a notice of its intent to seek the death penalty.Young was ultimately convicted, pursuant to a jury verdict, of all the charges and was sentenced to numerous prison terms, including several terms of life without the possibility of parole.
On October 6, 1998, after the public defender's office was conflicted out of Young's case because of its simultaneous representation of Young's codefendant, Donte Johnson, the district court appointed Lew Wolfbrandt and Marty Hastings to represent Young.
On May 12, 1999, Young filed a motion to dismiss Wolfbrandt and Hastings and appoint new counsel.Young complained of counsel's failure to communicate with him, failure to file a motion for bail, refusal to speak with Young's friends and family, and failure to file discovery requests.At the hearing on his motion on June 9, 1999, Young complained that Wolfbrandt had not been to see him in the eight months since his appointment.Young said that he felt that Wolfbrandt was not assisting him since he had not spoken with anyone in his defense.Young indicated that he was unable to communicate with Wolfbrandt and stated that there had been a complete lack of communication with Wolfbrandt for eight months.Young insisted that he could not go to trial with Wolfbrandt representing him.Wolfbrandt responded that he always accepted Young's calls when he was in the office; he had spoken with Young's aunt and girlfriend; he had an investigator working on the case; Hastings had visited Young several times in jail; and they were ready for trial, although they were receiving more evidence from the State.Wolfbrandt also admitted that for safety reasons he had not provided Young with a copy of the discovery, but that at Young's insistence he was beginning to copy his file.The district court denied Young's motion and told Young that if he was still concerned at the time of calendar call, he could talk to the court about it at that time.Young continued to protest, and the district court responded:
At a later hearing on another matter in Young's case, on June 23, 1999, Young again complained that he needed a new attorney because The hearing continued, and Young insisted that the district court was not listening to him.When Young was given the opportunity to speak, he claimed that Wolfbrandt was not working to save his life.He also stressed that Wolfbrandt had only been to see him once during the preceding eight months.Wolfbrandt explained that Young did not seem to understand that they were working on his case from outside the jail.The district court ordered Wolfbrandt to see Young at least once a week until August 30, 1999, the date tentatively set for trial.The district court then told Young that his motion would be heard at the time of trial.
Thereafter, Young filed another motion to dismiss Wolfbrandt and Hastings and appoint new counsel, with a memorandum to the court.Young repeated his previous complaints and added that Wolfbrandt had failed to investigate, failed to file motions, and had violated the district court's order of weekly visitation.At calendar call on August 17, 1999, Young complained that he should be permitted to argue his motion.He was allowed to continue, and he repeated all the complaints he had already made to the district court with the addition of mentioning Wolfbrandt's violation of the order for weekly visits.Young complained that Wolfbrandt was ineffective.He stated that Wolfbrandt had not been to see him during the initial eight months after his appointment, even though Young's family members called Wolfbrandt requesting that he visit Young.Young questioned how his counsel could be ready for trial when he had never even had a conversation with Wolfbrandt about the trial.Young insisted they were not ready.Young expressed discontent with Wolfbrandt's failure to file any motions on his behalf.Young also explained that in the ten weeks that had passed since the district court ordered Wolfbrandt to visit Young weekly, Wolfbrandt had only visited once.Young indicated the visit occurred only after Young had written a letter to the district court complaining, and the district court had called Wolfbrandt.Young expressed his frustration with the lack of communication.
Wolfbrandt explained that he did not frequently go to the jail, but that he had done a tremendous amount of work on the case.He represented that they were ready to go to trial.Again, Young began to protest, and the district court cut him short, stating, "That is enough, Mr. Young."The district court passed the matter over to the following hearing.
During a subsequent calendar call on August 26, 1999, Young asked if he was going to be allowed to argue his motion to dismiss his counsel.The district court stated that Wolfbrandt would continue as attorney of record and explained to Young that his motion would be passed over until the first day of trial.
On August 30, 1999, Young was again permitted to argue his motion to dismisscounsel.He complained that Wolfbrandt should be dismissed for ineffectiveness, laziness, and unprofessional behavior.Young then proceeded to repeat all his previous complaints, adding that Wolfbrandt's prior position as a law clerk for the judge was preventing the court from dismissing him.Wolfbrandt explained to the district court that he had filed all the motions he considered to be meritorious, including a motion to suppress; he had adopted all the motions that were filed in Young's coconspirator's case; he had not visited Young weekly, but at the visits that occurred, he obtained the information he needed; he had some conversations with Young's family and friends but had not discussed all matters because of attorney-client privilege; he had accepted all calls from Young when he was in his office; he had provided Young with a copy of virtually all the discovery and the transcripts from Young's coconspirator's trial; and he was ready to go to trial.The district court denied Young's motion to discharge Wolfbrandt.3
Request for substitution of counsel
We review the denial of a motion for substitution of counsel for abuse of discretion.4A defendant's right to substitution of counsel is not without limit.5Absent a showing of adequate cause, a defendant is not entitled to reject his court-appointed counsel and request substitution of other counsel at public expense.6While we have previously held that "[w]here a motion for new counsel is made considerably in advance of trial, the [district] court may not summarily deny the motion but must adequately inquire into the defendant's grounds for it,"7we have not specifically addressed what constitutes an adequate inquiry.
Young cites to authority from the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,8 suggesting that there are three factors to consider in reviewing a district court's denial of a motion for substitution of counsel.The three factors, as set forth in United States v. Moore, are: "(1) the extent of the conflict; (2) the adequacy of the inquiry; and (3) the timeliness of the motion."9Importantly, the court noted that while a defendant is not entitled to have a particular attorney serve as counsel, if the complete collapse of the attorney-client relationship is evident, a refusal to substitute counsel violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment Rights.10We have not previously adopted the standard enunciated by the Ninth Circuit; however, we find the three-part inquiry required by the Ninth Circuit to be a reasonable approach.We therefore hold that in reviewing a denial of substitution of counsel, we will consider the three factors enumerated above.
In applying this three-factor analysis, we conclude all three factors weigh in favor of our determination that the district court abused its discretion in denying Young's motion for substitution of counsel.
Extent of conflict
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