Young v. State
| Decision Date | 03 November 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 78,78 |
| Citation | 28 Md.App. 489,346 A.2d 669 |
| Parties | William Edward YOUNG v. STATE of Maryland. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Before ORTH, C. J., and MOYLAN and LOWE, JJ.
Unlike the usual situation, in which a determination of
defective delinquency is stridently protested and vehemently fought, we have here a felon, convicted and incarcerated, who believes he is a defective delinquent and is aggrieved because an examination and evaluation he seeks to establish it have not been afforded him.
On 9 May 1967 at a bench trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, 1 William Edward Young was convicted of murder in the first degree and assault with intent to rape. On 12 May 1967, a life sentence was imposed on the murder conviction and a concurrent sentence of 20 years on the aggravated assault conviction. The judgments were affirmed on direct appeal. Young v. State, 4 Md.App. 286, 242 A.2d 562 (1968), cert. denied, 251 Md. 753.
Following the penalty stage of the trial, the court ordered that Young be examined to determine if he was a defective delinquent. Upon evaluation by the Patuxent Institution Staff he was determined not to be a defective delinquent, and on 14 September 1967 the court ordered that he be transferred to the Maryland Penitentiary with full credit for time spent in Patuxent.
After several collateral attacks on the judgments entered on the substantive offenses, in the main unsuccessful, 2 there was filed, on 10 June 1975 in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, in proper person, over Young's signature, a 'Motion for Court Order for Examination at Patuxent Institution.' 3 He noted in the Motion that, upon being sentenced, the court on its own motion referred hem to Patuxent Institution for evaluation and that he 'was at that time not recommended for commitment to Patuxent by the staff thereof and was then returned to the Department of Correction.' He alleged that 'in the interim eight (8) years of confinement at the Maryland Penitentiary (he) has regressed both psychologically and emotionally to the point where he now fits the description of a defective delinquent and meets the criteria established therefor as defined in Section 5 of Article 31B, Annotated Code of Maryland.' He explained that 'the nature and attendant circumstances of the crimes for which (he) was tried and convicted and for which he has been and remains confined have had recurrent and regressive psychological ramifications for (him).' Claiming that there was 'ample reason to believe' that he was a defective delinquent, he prayed the issuance of an appropriate order pursuant to the provisions of Code, art. 31B, for examination and reevaluation at Patuxent. The court denied the Motion by an order issued 9 June 1975 and filed the next day. 4
In a memorandum opinion included in its order, the court referred to Code, art. 31B, § 7(a):
"If the substance of the report (request for examination) is that the said person is not a defective delinquent, he shall be retained in custody of the Department of Correction under his original sentence as if he had not been examined for purposes of defective delinquency."
It quoted Eggleston v. State, 209 Md. 504, 511, 121 A.2d 698 (1956):
"It would appear that under this sweeping language, jurisdiction, once properly obtained would continue until the purposes to be served by the examination were accomplished, regardless of the original sentence.' (Emphasis added)'
It ruled:
'Applying the above statute and judicial language, this Court can only conclude that once the examination was completed and a determination had been made that Mr. Young was not a candidate for the Patuxent Institution, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County lost its statutory jurisdiction under Article 31B.
Therefore, this Court is persuaded that any further requests for examination should be addressed by Mr. Young to the Department of Correctional Services and not to this Court.'
On 3 September 1975 Young, in proper person, applied for leave to appeal from the order of 9 June 1975.
The Court of Special Appeals has only such jurisdiction as the General Assembly grants it. 5 From its inception, it was given appellate review of any defective delinquent proceeding. Acts 1966, c. 12, §§ 1 and 5, codified as art. 31B, §§ 11 and 12. See Courts Art. § 12-308, formerly Code, art. 5, § 5C, as amended from time to time. A party in a defective delinquent proceeding, however, does not have an absolute right of appeal. There are separate statutory provisions regarding such proceedings which render inapplicable Courts Art. § 12-301, providing generally for the right of appeal from final judgments. These statutory provisions are codified as art. 31B, § 11, and implemented by Maryland Rule 1094.
Code, art. 31B, § 11, provides, inter alia: 'From any court order issued under the provisions of § 9, or of § 10, within thirty (30) days after the passage of the order, application may be made to the Court of Special Appeals for leave to appeal from the order.' Thus, the appellate review of a defective delinquent determination, for an indigent or mon-indigent, is discretionary with this Court. Carter v. Director, 10 Md.App. 247, 250, 269 A.2d 172 (1970). 6
Not only is the right to appeal qualified, but what may be appealed from is limited. As we have indicated, application for leave to appeal authorized by § 11 may be made only from 'any court order issued under the provisions of § 9, or of § 10 . . ..' Section 9 provides for an order by the trial court when upon hearing the court or the jury, as the case may be, finds the defendant (1) not to be a defective delinquent, subsction (a), or (2) to be a defective delinquent, subsection (b). Section 10(a) provides for an order by the trial court upon a redetermination of defective delinquency when the defendant is found by the court or jury upon hearing (1) to be a defective delinquent, or (2) not to be a defective delinquent. It is clear that the application for leave to appeal before us is not within the ambit of § 11. The order here sought to be reviewed is not one entered by the trial court upon a determination or redetermination by the court or the jury upon hearing that Young is or is not a defective delinquent. Rather, it is from a denial of a motion by Young to be examined and evaluated for possible defective delinquency. We have previously held that there is no statutory right to contest the order of the court below that a defendant undergo an examination for possible defective delinquency. Bosley v. State, 14 Md.App. 83, 91, 286 A.2d 203 (1972). We now hold that there is no statutory right to contest an order of the court below denying a request that a defendant undergo an examination for possible defective delinquency. There is no authority to permit an application for leave to appeal from such an order. We conclude that the application by Young must be dismissed as not allowed by law.
Our holding disposes of this appeal. But we think it advisable for the guidance of the lower court in its future considerations to give our view were we to decide the case upon its merits. See Larsson v. J. C. Conley Constr. Co., 260 Md. 21, 271 A.2d 356 (1970); Rossen v. Novak, 259 Md. 508, 270 A.2d 465 (1970).
It is patent that Young, having been convicted and sentenced in a court of this State, for a crime committed after 1 January 1954, coming under one or more of the categories designated by Code, art. 31B, § 6(a) 7 was a person with respect to whom a request may be made for examination for possible defective delinquency. Section 6(b) expressly authorizes the person himself to make a request for such examination. 8 When a request for examination is made 'the court may order such person to be examined by the institution for defective delinquents to ascertain if he or she is a defective delinquent.' Id. With two exceptions, there is no limitation as to when a request for examination may be made. Section 6(c). Section 6(d) provides in relavant part:
'The request for such an examination shall be by petition filed with the court having custody of or jurisdiction over the said person, stating therein the reasons for suspecting or supposing the presence of defective delinquency in the said person.'
Section 6(e) prescribes, among other things, the jurisdiction of the defendant: 'The court which last sentenced the defendant, whether or not the term of court in which he was sentenced has expired shall retain jurisdiction of the defendant for the purpose of any of the procedures specified in §§ 6, 7, 8 or 9 hereof, except that the Criminal Court of Baltimore City and the Circuit Court of Anne Arundel County shall for such purposes have jurisdiction of a person last sentenced by the Municipal Court of Baltimore City and the People's Court of Anne Arundel County, respectively.' 9 It is specified in § 7(a) that 'If the substance of the report is that the said person is not a defective delinquent, he shall be retained in the custody of the Department of Correction under his original sentence as if he had not been examined for possible defective delinquency.' Section 7(a) further concerns who shall make the examination and the report of its findings, and § 7(b) permits additional examinations by a...
To continue reading
Request your trial