Young v. State
Citation | 14 Md.App. 538,288 A.2d 198 |
Decision Date | 02 March 1972 |
Docket Number | No. 79,79 |
Parties | Wayne Stephen YOUNG v. STATE of Maryland. |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
William F. Mosner, Baltimore, for appellant.
Clarence W. Sharp, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Milton B. Allen, State's Atty., Howard L. Cardin and Arrie W. Davis, Asst. State's Attys., for Baltimore City, on the brief, for appellee.
Argued before MORTON, ORTH and GILBERT, JJ.
An inhabitant of the State of Maryland, as a part of the legacy of the common law of England bequeathed him by the People, 1 is not responsible for his criminal conduct if he was insane at the time he committed the crime. 2 Blackstone in Chapter II of Book the Fourth of his Commentaries on the Laws of England, speaking of persons capable of crimes, asserts at 24, 'In criminal cases, therefore, idiots and lunatics are not chargeable for their own acts, if committed when under these incapacities; no, not even for treason itself.' 3 The 'defense of insanity or lunancy on behalf of one charged with a crime, offense or misdemeanor' received statutory recognition in this jurisdiction in 1826. Ch. 197, § 1, Acts 1826. By 1889 the provisions of the statute were considered as having 'long been part of the law of the State.' Devilbiss v. Bennett, 70 Md. 554, 556, 17 A. 502. Ibid.
The kind and degree of unsoundness of mind could not be determined as a matter of law before pardons were issued as a matter of course upon a verdict that the accused committed the crime while mad, for prior thereto all depended upon the king's 'grace.' 2 Pollock & Maitland, 484 (2d ed. 1899). When the law began to notice insanity as a defense, Bracton, Chief Justiciary in the middle of the thirteenth century, define a madman as 'one who does not know what he is doing, who lacks in mind and reason and is not far removed from the brutes.' 4 Twenty-five years after Coke quoted Bracton's definition in Beverley's Case, he classified non compos mentis into the born idiot, the madman-one who 'wholly loseth his memorie and understanding,' and the lunatic-one who has lucid intervals but is non compos mentis during periods when 'he hath not understanding.' 2 Co. Litt. 247 a (Rev. ed. 1823) as cited in Perkins, supra, at 851. In any event, it was in 1843 in Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & Fin. 200, 8 Eng.Rep. 718 that the law as it had been developing for hundreds of years was crystallized. M'Naghten was tried on a charge of murdering one Edward Drummond. Lord Chief Tindal in his charge to the jury said:
The jury returned a verdict of not guilty, on the ground of insanity. The verdict and the question of the nature and extent of the unsoundness of mind which would excuse the commission of a felony of this sort was made the subject of debate in the House of Lords and it was determined to take the opinion of the Judges on the law governing such cases. Mr. Justice Maule and Lord Chief Justice Tindal appeared and answered five questions propounded to them. The opinion of the Judges was fully approved by the House of Lords and laid down as the settled law. It was so recognized by our Court of Appeals in 1888 in Spencer v. State, 69 Md. 28, 13 A. 809. Its understanding of the law as settled by M'Naghten was At 38, 13 A. at 813. The so-called 'M'Naghten-Spencer' test of responsibility for criminal conduct came to be expressed as whether the accused had the capacity and reason sufficient to enable him to distinguish between right and wrong and understand the nature and consequences of his acts as applied to himself. Bradford v. State, 234 Md. 505, 510, 200 A.2d 150; Dubs v. State, 2 Md.App. 524, 534, 235 A.2d 764. The test, although subject to vehement criticism, withstood constant attacks on its constitutionality and propriety. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302; Armstead v. State, 227 Md. 73, 175 A.2d 24; League v. State, 1 Md.App. 681, 232 A.2d 828. Both the Court of Appeals and this Court felt that any modification of the rule was a prerogative of the legislature and not the courts and rejected pleas to modify or abandon it. The legislature responded in 1967. By ch. 709, Acts 1967, it supplanted the M'Naghten-Spencer test with the American Law Institute test contained in § 4.01 of the Model Penal Code. Codified as Code, Art. 59, § 9(a) it provided:
The legislature did not define 'mental disease or defect,' but it did expressly exclude therefrom 'an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.' See Avey v. State, 9 Md.App. 227, 240-241, 263 A.2d 609, 616; Millard v. State, 8 Md.App. 419, 261 A.2d 227; Greenleaf v. State, 7 Md.App. 575, 256 A.2d 552; Strawderman v. State, 4 Md.App. 689, 244 A.2d 888. It was careful to spell out the applicability of the new test. It further enacted by § 2 of ch. 709 'That the provisions of this Act shall be applicable to all cases tried or scheduled for trial on and after the effective date of this Act.' The effective date of the Act was established as 1 June 1967 by § 5. These provisions were a clear legislative expression that the Act apply to cases tried on or after 1 June 1967, and a fortiori, not to cases tried before 1 June 1967. We so stated in League v. State, supra, 1 Md.App. at 685, 232 A.2d 828. In Stokes v. State, 2 Md.App. 385, 234 A.2d 620, cert. den., 248 Md. 735, we refused to depart from our holding in League in the face of the argument that the language of § 2 did not preclude giving retroactive effect to the Act: 'that had the Legislature intended non-retroactivity, the word 'only' would have been employed,' and that, therefore, the Act should be construed as retroactive. We observed, at 387, 234 A.2d at 621: 'Such a construction, in our opinion, is strained, so-phistic, and one not intended by the Legislature.' We again affirmed our position in McCracken v. State, 2 Md.App. 716, 718, 237 A.2d 87.
The new test of responsibility for criminal conduct was in effect for three years. Then in 1970, with none of the fanfare which surrounded the abolition of the venerable common law test, the legislature changed the new test. It came about by the repeal 'in its entirety' of Code, Art. 59, title, 'Lunatics and Insane', and the enactment to stand in its place of a new Art. 59 under the new title 'Mental Hygiene.' Acts 1970, ch. 407, § 2. The test for responsibility for criminal conduct was set out in § 25(a) of the new Article. The test was the same as the 1967 test with one exception; the terms 'mental disease or defect' were replaced by the term 'mental disorder.' This exception was of the utmost significance, however, in the light of other provisions of the new Act. Section 3(f) defined 'mental disorder' to mean 'mental illness or mental retardation or any other form of behavioral or emotional illness resulting from any psychiatric or neurological disorder.' Section 3(g) defined 'mental illness' to mean 'any mental disorder, other than mental retardation, which so substantially impairs the mental or emotional functioning of an individual as to make it necessary or davisable for the welfare of the person so suffering or for the safety of the persons or property of others that the mentally ill person receive care and treatment.' It provided further: 'The term shall replace the words 'insane,' 'insanity,' 'lunacy,' 'mentally sick,' 'mental disease,' 'unsound mind' and similar words as they appear in the statutes of the State of Maryland but does not include mental retardation.' Section 3(h) defined 'mental retardation' to mean 'a degree of subnormality of intellectual development expected to be of life duration which reduces the individual's capability to manage himself or his affairs.' It provided further: 'The term shall replace the terms 'defective,' 'mental defective,' 'idiot,' 'feebleminded' and 'moron' as they may appear in the statutes of the State of Maryland.' We see nothing in § 25(a) to indicate that the term 'mental disorder' was clearly intended to...
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