Young v. State

• Decision Date: 19 May 2015
• Docket Number: No. ED101433,ED101433
• Citation: 466 S.W.3d 669
• Parties: Jeffrey Young, Appellant, v. State of Missouri, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

466 S.W.3d 669

Jeffrey Young, Appellant

v.State of Missouri, Respondent.

No. ED101433

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, DIVISION THREE .

FILED: May 19, 2015

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied June 23, 2015

Application for Transfer Denied August 18, 2015

Amy E. Lowe, Assistant Public Defender, Office of the Missouri Public Defender, 1010 Market Street, Suite 1100, St. Louis, Missouri 63101, for appellant.

Chris Koster, Attorney General, Karen L. Kramer, Assistant Attorney General, P.O. Box 899 Jefferson City, Missouri 65102, for respondent.

Kurt S. Odenwald, Presiding Judge

Introduction

Jeffrey Young(“Young”) appeals from the judgment of the motion court denying his Rule 24.035¹motion for post-conviction relief.Young avers that the motion court clearly erred in denying his Rule 24.035 motion without an evidentiary hearing because he alleged facts not refuted by the record demonstrating that he received constitutionally deficient assistance of counsel.In particular, Young alleges that counsel was ineffective in: (1) using his family members to convey legal advice and information; (2) failing to take adequate measures to address his difficulties with communication; and (3) failing to contest the determination of competency made by the Department of Mental Health and failing to request a second examination.Because Young failed to allege facts not refuted by the record demonstrating he is entitled to relief, the motion court did not clearly err in denying his Rule 24.035 motion without an evidentiary hearing.Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the motion court.

Factual and Procedural History

On November 20, 2009, the State of Missouri charged Young with first-degree statutory sodomy and attempted first-degree statutory sodomy of P.R., Young's five year-old cousin.The State alleged that Young put his penis in P.R.'s anus (Count I) and pushed P.R.'s head and told P.R. to put his mouth on Young's penis (Count II).

Young retained Kristy Ridings(“Ridings”) to serve as his defense counsel.²On May 17, 2011, Young appeared before the plea court with Ridings and entered blind guilty pleas to both charges.The plea court then engaged Young in a lengthy dialogue about whether he understood the nature of the charges against him, the range of punishment that he faced, the lack of a plea bargain, the fact that he was entering his pleas with the possibility of any sentence within the range of punishment, his rights to a trial, the facts of the offenses charged, and Young's actions in committing those offenses.Young affirmed that he understood the charges against him, understood the consequences of his pleas, and understood the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty.The plea court accepted Young's pleas as entered knowingly and voluntarily and ordered a Sentence Assessment Report to be completed before sentencing.

On August 12, 2011, the plea court sentenced Young to a term of ten years in the Missouri Department of Corrections.After briefly advising Young about his rights under Rule 24.035, the plea court continued the sentencing hearing to allow Young time to consult with counsel about Rule 24.035

The sentencing hearing resumed on September 9, 2011.Young appeared with Jeremy Farishon(“Farishon”), an attorney in Ridings's law office.The plea court advised Young about his rights under Rule 24.035 and asked Young about the assistance he received from his defense counsel.³Young indicated that he was dissatisfied because his attorneys did not visit him in jail, did not explain his case or options to him, and ultimately only told him that he would lose if he went to trial.Because of Young's allegations, the plea court continued the sentencing hearing in order to obtain a response from each attorney who assisted in Young's case.

On November 3, 2011, the plea court heard testimony from Ridings and Farishon.Ridings testified that she was retained by Young in January 2010 and met with Young at or near that time on several occasions.Ridings explained that the first few meetings with Young were not productive because Young's only concern was getting a bond.Ridings also explained that because Young had some difficulty in understanding the information and advice she provided him, she used his family members to help convey that information.After meeting with Young several times, Ridings motioned the trial court for a competency evaluation.A few months later the Missouri Department of Mental Health concluded Young was mentally fit to proceed.⁴After receiving that report, Ridings testified that she began a vigorous preparation for trial, which included taking three depositions.However, in May 2011, based upon Ridings's recommendation and the advice of his family, Young decided to plead guilty.

Farishon testified that he began working with Ridings in November 2010.Farishon recalled meeting with Young three times while Young was incarcerated.At these meetings, Farishon testified that he and Young discussed the facts of the case, possible defenses, who would be called as witnesses, and what resolution was desired.Farishon testified that it took a while for Young to understand things but he always took the time to get to a point where he was confident Young understood.Finally, Farishon testified that he explained the ramifications of pleading guilty to Young and believed Young understood those consequences.

After hearing the testimony of Ridings and Farishon, the plea court found no probable cause to believe Young received ineffective assistance of counsel from his attorneys.Young subsequently filed a pro seRule 24.035motion for post-conviction relief.Post-conviction counsel filed an amended motion and request for an evidentiary hearing alleging that counsel was ineffective in: (1) using Young's family, who was also the family of P.R., to communicate with Young and explain legal advice; (2) failing to take any appropriate measures to communicate with Young in a manner he could understand; and (3) failing to challenge the evaluation of the Department of Mental Health finding that Young was mentally fit to proceed.The motion court found that Young's allegations were refuted by the record and denied Young's motion without an evidentiary hearing.This appeal follows.

Points on Appeal

Young raises three points on appeal, each asserting that the motion court clearly erred in denying an evidentiary hearing on his Rule 24.035 motion because he alleged facts not refuted by the record establishing he was denied effective assistance of counsel.In Point One, Young asserts that counsel was ineffective in using his family members to explain the legal process and counsel's legal advice to him.Young avers that he faced substantial pressure from his family, who is also the family of P.R., to plead guilty, and without such “psychological coercion”he would not have pleaded guilty.In Point Two, Young argues that counsel was ineffective in failing to make sufficient efforts to communicate with Young in a manner he was able to understand.In Point Three, Young avers that counsel was ineffective in failing to contest the determination of competency made by the Department of Mental Health and in failing to request a second competence examination.

Standard of Review

Appellate review of a motion court's denial of a Rule 24.035 motion is limited to a determination of whether the findings and conclusions of the motion court were clearly erroneous.Rule 24.035;Day v. State,770 S.W.2d 692, 695(Mo. banc 1989).The motion court's findings and conclusions are presumptively correct and will be overturned only when this Court is left with a “definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made” after reviewing the entire record.Vaca v. State,314 S.W.3d 331, 334(Mo. banc 2010).

Discussion

To obtain an evidentiary hearing for claims related to the ineffective assistance of counsel, the movant must allege facts, not refuted by the record, showing that counsel's performance did not conform to the degree of skill, care, and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney, and that the movant was thereby prejudiced.State v. Brooks,960 S.W.2d 479, 497(Mo. banc 1997)(citingStrickland v. Washington,466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674(1984) ).To demonstrate prejudice, the facts alleged must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.State v. Carter,955 S.W.2d 548, 554(Mo. banc 1997).

When a defendant enters a guilty plea, the effectiveness of counsel becomes irrelevant except to the extent that it infringes upon the voluntariness and knowledge with which the guilty plea was made.Muhammad v. State,367 S.W.3d 659, 661(Mo.App.E.D.2012).Thus, for Young's ineffective assistance of counsel claim to succeed, he must show his plea of guilty was rendered involuntary by the inaction of counsel.SeeLynch v. State,777 S.W.2d 673, 674(Mo. App. S.D.1989).An evidentiary hearing is not required where “the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that movant is entitled to no relief.”Rule 29.15(h);Morrow v. State.,21 S.W.3d 819, 822(Mo. banc 2000).

I.Young failed to allege facts demonstrating legal coercion.

In Point One, Young asserts that the motion court clearly erred in denying an evidentiary hearing on his claim that counsel used unreasonable and inherently coercive means to explain information and legal advice.Young argues that his family members had conflicting interests in his case because they are also the family of the victim.Despite this inherent conflict of interest, counsel used Young's family members to help communicate and explain key decisions in his case.Young contends that a diligent and competent attorney would have recognized the conflict of interest in using his family as “interpreters” and therefore would have used a different means to communicate with him.By only using Young's family...