Young v. Suffolk Cnty.
| Decision Date | 11 February 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 09–cv–3325 (JFB)(ARL).,09–cv–3325 (JFB)(ARL). |
| Citation | 922 F.Supp.2d 368 |
| Parties | Deborah YOUNG, Plaintiff, v. SUFFOLK COUNTY, Suffolk County Department of Social Services, Suffolk County Police Department, Michael Delgado, Joseph Quatela, Raymond L. Young, Raymond M. Young, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Thomas F. Liotti, Lucia Maria Ciaravino, Law Offices of Thomas F. Liotti, Garden City, NY, for Plaintiff.
Arlene S. Zwilling, Suffolk County Attorney, Hauppauge, NY, Scott E. Kossove, Daniel M. Maunz, L'Abbate, Balkan, Colavita & Contin, Garden City, NY, Michael H. Joseph, Law Office of Michael H. Joseph PLLC, White Plains, NY, for Defendants.
Deborah Young (“plaintiff” or “Ms. Young”), individually and as the parent and guardian of Melissa Young, Emmalee Young, and Cecelia Young, brought this action against Suffolk County, Suffolk County Department of Social Services, Suffolk County Police Department, Michael Delgado (“Delgado”) (collectively, “County defendants”), Edmund Coppa, Edmund J. Coppa Photography, News 12, Newsday, New York Post, New York Daily News, WCBSTV.COM (collectively, “media defendants”), Raymond L. Young (“Mr. Young”) and Raymond M. Young (together, “Young defendants”), and Joseph Quatela (“Quatela”), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), alleging that defendants violated plaintiff's rights under the Fourth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment, and participated in a conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of her constitutional rights. Plaintiff also brought claims for constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and 42 U.S.C. § 1986. Plaintiff further alleged state law claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation.
The claims in this lawsuit arise from an incident that occurred on February 21, 2007, in which plaintiff's former husband, Mr. Young, allegedly: (1) trashed plaintiff's residence in Lindenhurst, New York, to create the appearance of an unsafe and unsanitary home; (2) contacted the police and entered the residence with the police without plaintiff's consent or authorization; and (3) invited the media to film the conditions of the home. Plaintiff asserts that the police actions on that day—actions that were allegedly part of a conspiracy among the County defendants, the Young defendants, Quatela (Mr. Young's father's attorney who was present on that date), and the media defendants—violated her constitutional rights and resulted in her losing custody of her three children in Family Court. On May 4, 2007, plaintiff pled guilty to neglect of her three children in Suffolk County Family Court, acknowledging that she suffers from a mental health condition that negatively impacted her ability to care for her children. On January 27, 2010, Mr. Young was awarded sole custody of the children.
The Young defendants and the media defendants filed motions to dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on November 2, 2009 and December 4, 2009, respectively. The Young defendants also filed a motion for sanctions against plaintiff and her counsel on November 2, 2009. Quatela filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on December 4, 2009. On April 9, 2010, this Court issued a Memorandum and Opinion (1) granting the media defendants' motion to dismiss in its entirety, (2) denying the Young defendants' motion and Quatela's motion with respect to plaintiff's Section 1983 claims for conspiracy and violation of the Fourth Amendment, (3) granting the Young defendants' motion and Quatela's motion with respect to all other federal and state claims alleged by plaintiff, and (4) denying the Young defendants' motion for sanctions. Thus, as a result of the Court's April 9, 2010 ruling, plaintiff's case was limited to her Section 1983 claims for violation of the Fourth Amendment and conspiracy against the County defendants, the Young defendants, and Quatela. In answering plaintiff's complaint, the Young defendants also brought two counterclaims against plaintiff, for negligence and failure to preserve and maintain property. The lawsuit proceeded to discovery under the direction of Magistrate Judge Lindsay.
Presently before the Court are three motions for summary judgment made, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, by the County defendants,the Young defendants, and Quatela. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants all three motions in their entirety.
First, as to the Young defendants, the Court grants summary judgment on the Section 1983 claims because there is no evidence (1) that the Young defendants were acting under the color of state law when they entered on February 21, 2007, or (2) that the Young defendants conspired with any of the County defendants to violate plaintiff's constitutional rights. In particular, it is uncontroverted that the Young defendants repeatedly contacted the County defendants about inspecting the Nevada Street house prior to February 21, 2007, but that no action was taken. Moreover, it is uncontroverted that the Young defendants did not contact the police for assistance on February 21, 2007 until after they had already entered the home. Thus, the undisputed evidence shows that when the Young defendants entered the house on February 21, 2007, they did so without knowing whether the County defendants would in fact enter in a similar fashion and/or on that same day. In short, there is no evidence of state action, or a conspiracy with state actors, by the Young defendants.
Second, the Court grants Quatela's motion for summary judgment on the Section 1983 claims because there is no evidence (1) that Quatela was acting under color of state law when he entered, or (2) that Quatela conspired with any of the County defendants to violate plaintiff's constitutional rights. Specifically, there is no evidence that Quatela was even involved in calling the police to the Nevada Street house on the date of the incident in question. Indeed, the uncontroverted evidence shows that Quatela arrived to the house for the first time after the police had already entered and begun to search the premises. Thus, the uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that the police did not enter the home under Quatela's directive, and there was no joint action between Quatela and the police to deem Quatela a state actor for purposes of Section 1983.
Finally, with respect to the County defendants, the Court grants their motion for summary judgment on several grounds. First, the uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that Mr. Young had apparent authority to consent to Delgado's entry and, as such, Delgado's entry without a warrant did not violate plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. In particular, it is undisputed that the house was owned by Mr. Young, that his children lived there, and was accessed by Mr. Young on the date in question before the police arrived. Under such circumstances, no rational jury could find that it was unreasonable for the police to conclude that the Young defendants had apparent authority to consent to a search of the house. Second, even assuming arguendo that Mr. Young lacked apparent authority to consent to Delgado's entry, Delgado is shielded from Section 1983 liability by the doctrine of qualified immunity. Third, plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence of a Section 1983 conspiracy between the County defendants and either the Young defendants or Quatela. Fourth, plaintiff has failed to point to any evidence of an unconstitutional policy, practice, or custom by the County, or a failure to supervise or train, to support her Monell claim.
Also before the Court is a motion for sanctions under Rule 11 against plaintiff and her counsel, filed by the Young defendants. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that sanctions are not warranted, and, therefore, the Young defendants' motion for sanctions is denied.
Finally, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Young defendants' state law counterclaims.
The Court has taken the facts set forth below from the parties' depositions, affidavits, exhibits, and respective Rule 56.1 Statements of Facts.1,2 Upon consideration of a motion for summary judgment, the Court shall construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Capobianco v. City of New York, 422 F.3d 47, 50 (2d Cir.2005). Unless otherwise noted, where a party's 56.1 statement is cited, that fact is undisputed or the opposing party has not pointed to any evidence in the record to contradict it.3
Plaintiff and Mr. Young were married on August 11, 1990. (Deborah Young Affidavit ( ) ¶ 2.) Together, they had three children—Melissa Young, Emmalee Young, and Cecelia Young (collectively, the “Young children”). (County defs.' 56.1 ¶ 1.) Plaintiff, Mr. Young, and the Young children all lived at 239 Nevada Street, Lindenhurst, New York (“the house”, “the home”, or “the Nevada Street house”). ( Id. ¶ 2.) Mr. Young and his father, Raymond M. Young, held title to the Nevada Street house in which the family resided. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 2.) Plaintiff had no ownership interest in the property. (County defs.' 56.1 ¶ 6.) However, according to plaintiff, she had “exclusive occupancy”of the home. (Deborah Young Deposition ( ) at 60.)
In 2005, Mr. Young moved out, but plaintiff and the Young children continued to live in the Nevada Street house owned by Mr. Young and his father. (County defs.' 56.1 ¶ 6.) On October 31, 2006, Mr. Young consented and stipulated to plaintiff taking sole custody of their three children. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 3.)
At his deposition, Mr. Young testified that, beginning in approximately February 2005, he started having some concerns about the...
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