Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.

• Decision Date: 25 March 2015
• Docket Number: No. 12-1226.,12-1226.
• Citation: 574 U.S. 972,135 S.Ct. 1338
• Parties: Peggy YOUNG, Petitioner v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

574 U.S. 972

135 S.Ct. 1338

Peggy YOUNG, Petitioner

v.UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.

No. 12-1226.

Supreme Court of United States.

Decided March 25, 2015.

Justice BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act makes clear that Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination applies to discrimination based on pregnancy. It also says that employers must treat "women affected by pregnancy ... the same for all employment-related purposes ... as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). We must decide how this latter provision applies in the context of an employer's policy that accommodates many, but not all, workers with nonpregnancy-related disabilities.

In our view, the Act requires courts to consider the extent to which an employer's policy treats pregnant workers less favorably than it treats nonpregnant workers similar in their ability or inability to work. And here — as in all cases in which an individual plaintiff seeks to show disparate treatment through indirect evidence — it requires courts to consider any legitimate, nondiscriminatory, nonpretextual justification for these differences in treatment. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Ultimately the court must determine whether the nature of the employer's policy and the way in which it burdens pregnant women shows that the employer has engaged in intentional discrimination. The Court of Appeals here affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer. Given our view of the law, we must vacate that court's judgment.

I

A

We begin with a summary of the facts. The petitioner, Peggy Young, worked as a part-time driver for the respondent, United Parcel Service (UPS). Her responsibilities included pickup and delivery of packages that had arrived by air carrier the previous night. In 2006, after suffering several miscarriages, she became pregnant. Her doctor told her that she should not lift more than 20 pounds during the first 20 weeks of her pregnancy or more than 10 pounds thereafter. App. 580. UPS required drivers like Young to be able to lift parcels weighing up to 70 pounds (and up to 150 pounds with assistance). Id., at 578. UPS told Young she could not work while under a lifting restriction. Young consequently stayed home without pay during most of the time she was pregnant and eventually lost her employee medical coverage.

Young subsequently brought this federal lawsuit. We focus here on her claim that UPS acted unlawfully in refusing to accommodate her pregnancy-related lifting restriction. Young said that her co-workers were willing to help her with heavy packages. She also said that UPS accommodated other drivers who were "similar in their ... inability to work." She accordingly concluded that UPS must accommodate her as well. See Brief for Petitioner 30-31.

UPS responded that the "other persons" whom it had accommodated were (1) drivers who had become disabled on the job, (2) those who had lost their Department of Transportation (DOT) certifications, and (3) those who suffered from a disability covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 104 Stat. 327, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. UPS said that, since Young did not fall within any of those categories, it had not discriminated against Young on the basis of pregnancy but had treated her just as it treated all "other" relevant "persons." See Brief for Respondent 34.

B

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids a covered employer to "discriminate against any individual with respect to... terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... sex." 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). In 1978, Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 92 Stat. 2076, which added new language to Title VII's definitions subsection. The first clause of the 1978 Act specifies that Title VII's "ter[m] `because of sex' ... include[s]... because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions." § 2000e(k). The second clause says that

"women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes ... as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work...." Ibid.

This case requires us to consider the application of the second clause to a "disparate-treatment" claim — a claim that an employer intentionally treated a complainant less favorably than employees with the "complainant's qualifications" but outside the complainant's protected class. McDonnell Douglas, supra, at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. We have said that "[l]iability in a disparate-treatment case depends on whether the protected trait actually motivated the employer's decision." Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52, 124 S.Ct. 513, 157 L.Ed.2d 357 (2003) (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted). We have also made clear that a plaintiff can prove disparate treatment either (1) by direct evidence that a workplace policy, practice, or decision relies expressly on a protected characteristic, or (2) by using the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121, 105 S.Ct. 613, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985).

In McDonnell Douglas, we considered a claim of discriminatory hiring. We said that, to prove disparate treatment, an individual plaintiff must "carry the initial burden" of "establishing a prima facie case" of discrimination by showing

"(i) that he belongs to a ... minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications." 411 U.S., at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817.

If a plaintiff makes this showing, then the employer must have an opportunity "to articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for" treating employees outside the protected class better than employees within the protected class. Ibid. If the employer articulates such a reason, the plaintiff then has "an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant [i.e., the employer] were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination." Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981).

We note that employment discrimination law also creates what is called a "disparate-impact" claim. In evaluating a disparate-impact claim, courts focus on the effects of an employment practice, determining whether they are unlawful irrespective of motivation or intent. See Raytheon, supra, at 52-53, 124 S.Ct. 513; see also Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 578, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 174 L.Ed.2d 490 (2009). But Young has not alleged a disparateimpact claim.

Nor has she asserted what we have called a "pattern-or-practice" claim. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 359, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977) (explaining that Title VII plaintiffs who allege a "pattern or practice" of discrimination may establish a prima facie case by "another means"); see also id., at 357, 97 S.Ct. 1843 (rejecting contention that the "burden of proof in a pattern-or-practice case must be equivalent to that outlined in McDonnell Douglas").

C

In July 2007, Young filed a pregnancy discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). In September 2008, the EEOC provided her with a right-to-sue letter. See 29 CFR § 1601.28 (2014). Young then filed this complaint in Federal District Court. She argued, among other things, that she could show by direct evidence that UPS had intended to discriminate against her because of her pregnancy and that, in any event, she could establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment under the McDonnell Douglas framework. See App. 60-62.

After discovery, UPS filed a motion for summary judgment. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(a). In reply, Young pointed to favorable facts that she believed were either undisputed or that, while disputed, she could prove. They include the following:

1. Young worked as a UPS driver, picking up and delivering packages carried by air. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in No. 08-cv-02586 (D Md.), pp. 3-4 (hereinafter Memorandum).

2. Young was pregnant in the fall of 2006. Id., at 15-16.

3. Young's doctor recommended that she "not be required to lift greater than 20 pounds for the first 20 weeks of pregnancy and no greater than 10 pounds thereafter." App. 580; see also Memorandum 17.

4. UPS required drivers such as Young to be able to "[l]ift, lower, push, pull, leverage and manipulate ... packages weighing up to 70 pounds" and to "[a]ssist in moving packages weighing up to 150 pounds." App. 578; see also Memorandum 5.

5. UPS' occupational health manager, the official "responsible for most issues relating to employee health and ability to work" at Young's UPS facility, App. 568-569, told Young that she could not return to work during her pregnancy because she could not satisfy UPS' lifting requirements, see Memorandum 17-18; 2011 WL 665321, *5 (D.Md., Feb. 14, 2011).

6. The manager also determined that Young did not qualify for a temporary alternative work assignment. Ibid.; see also Memorandum 19-20.

7. UPS, in a collective-bargaining agreement, had promised to provide temporary alternative work assignments to employees "unable to perform their normal work assignments due to an on-the-job injury." App. 547 (emphasis added); see also Memorandum 8, 45-46.

8. The collective-bargaining agreement also provided that UPS would "make a good faith effort to comply ... with requests for a reasonable accommodation because of a permanent disability" under the

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